Phool Patti and ANR.
Vs. Ram Singh (Dead) Through LRS. & ANR.  INSC 668 (31 March 2009)
REPORTABLE IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.1240 OF
2005 Phool Patti & Anr. .. Appellant (s) -versus- Ram Singh (Dead) through
Lrs. & Anr. .. Respondent (s)
MARKANDEY KATJU, J.
appeal by special leave has been filed against the impugned judgment of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court dated 22.10.2003 in Regular Second Appeal No.2176
learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
appellants are the daughters of one Bhagwana. They along with one Shobha Ram
filed Civil Suit No.234 of 1982 against the respondents challenging the decree
in Civil Suit No.630 of 1980 regarding certain land and a house filed by Ram
Singh against Bhagwana on the ground that the said suit was a collusive suit
and hence the decree was illegal and void.
prayer in Civil Suit No.234 of 1982 filed by the appellants was to set aside
the decree in Civil Suit No.630 of 1980. The trial court on 31.5.1983 decreed
Civil Suit No.234 of 1982 and set aside the judgment and decree dated
24.11.1980 in Civil Suit No.630 of 1980 on the ground that the same was
collusive. However, in the first appeal under Section 96 C.P.C.
Additional District and Sessions Judge, Sonepat allowed the appeal and set
aside the judgment of the trial court and dismissed the suit by his judgment
against the judgment of the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge
dated 21.3.1985 the appellants filed a second appeal before the High Court
which was dismissed by the impugned judgment dated 22.10.2003. Hence this
appeal by special leave.
finding of the First Appellate Court that the judgment and decree dated
24.11.1980 in Civil Suit No.630 of 1980 was not collusive is a finding of fact.
It may be noted that Bhagwana who was the defendant in the said Civil Suit
No.630 of 1980 was alive when the Suit No.18 of 1982 was filed and he had
supported the judgment and decree dated 24.11.1980 in Civil Suit No.630 of 1980
by giving his evidence on oath as DW2.
the other hand the appellants did not appear at any stage of the trial of the
suit being No. 234 of 1982 before the trial court to stake or affirm or claim
any right in the disputed land.
has come in evidence that Bhagwana was residing with the respondents for the
last several years and Bhagwana treated the respondent as his real son.
regards the appellants who are daughters of Bhagwana, they had been married
long back, and had left for their maternal home, and hence Bhagwana was living
with the respondent alone. Bhagwana is said to have had great love and
affection for the respondent. There was a family arrangement in which the
disputed property fell exclusively to the respondent.
the consent decree dated 24.11.1980 had been held by the First Appellate Court
to be not collusive, the High Court in our opinion rightly refused to interfere
with that findings of fact.
was then urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that there was
violation of the Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908.
this connection, it may be noted that Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act
states that "nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section(1) of Section
17 applies to :
"any decree or
order of a Court except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise
and comprising immovable property other than that which is the subject- matter
of the suit or proceeding."
our opinion the exception mentioned in Section 17(2)(vi) means that if a suit
is filed by the plaintiff in respect of property A, then a decree in that suit
in respect of immovable property B (which was not the subject- matter of the
suit at all) will require registration. This is the view taken by 5 this Court
in K. Raghunandan & Ors. vs. Ali Hussain Sabir & Ors. 2008(9) Scale
a different view was taken by this Court in Bhoop Singh vs. Ram Singh Major
1995(5) SCC 709 in which it is stated that :
think that the exception engrafted is meant to cover that decree or order of a
court, including a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise, which
declares the pre-existing right and does not by itself create new right, title
or interest in praesenti in immovable property of the value of Rs.100 or
our opinion there seems to be inconsistency between the decisions of this Court
in Bhoop Singh's case (supra) and K. Raghunandan's case (supra) in so far as
the interpretation to the exception in clause (vi) of Section 17(2) of the Registration
Act is concerned. Prima facie it seems to us that the decision in Bhoop Singh's
case (supra) does not lay down the correct law since Section 17(2)(vi) on its
plain reading has nothing to do with any pre existing right. All that seems to
have been stated therein is that if a decree is passed regarding some immovable
property which is not a subject-matter of the suit then it will require
registration. As already 6 explained above, if a suit is filed in respect of
property A but the decree is in respect of immovable property B, then the
decree so far as it relates to immovable property B will require registration.
This seems to be the plain meaning of clause (vi) of Section 17(2) of the Registration
is a well settled principle of interpretation that the Court cannot add words
to the statute or change its language, particularly when on a plain reading the
meaning seems to be clear. Since there is no mention of any pre- existing right
in the exception in clause (vi) we have found it difficult to accept the views
in Bhoop Singh's case (supra).
seems that there is inconsistency in the decisions of this Court in Bhoop Singh's
case (supra) and K. Raghunandan's case (supra), and since we are finding it
difficult to agree with the decision of this Court in Bhoop Singh's case
(supra), the matter should be considered by a larger Bench of this Court.
the papers be laid before Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for constituting a
larger Bench for interpreting the exception in clause (vi) of Section 17(2) of
the Registration Act.
..................... .....J. (Markandey Katju)
(Asok Kumar Ganguly)