State of A.P. Vs.
Vangaveeti Nagaiah  INSC 761 (15 April 2009)
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1190 OF 2003 The
State of Andhra Pradesh ....Appellant Versus Vangaveeti Nagaiah ....Respondent
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT,
in this appeal is to the order passed by learned Single Judge of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court allowing the prayer made by the appellant to quash the FIR
in Crime No. 433/2002-2003 of Prohibition and Excise Station, Mahabubabad,
Warangal District registered under Section 7 (A) read with Section 8(e) of A.P.
Prohibition Act, 1995 read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in
short the `IPC'). The Petition was filed under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the `Code').
support of the appeals, learned counsel appearing for the State of Andhra
Pradesh submitted that the High Court's approach is clearly erroneous. These
are not cases where there was no material to show the commission of a crime.
Whether there was adequate material already in existence or which could have
been collected during investigation and their relevance is essentially a matter
of trial The High Court was not therefore justified in quashing the FIR. The
exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code is clearly indefensible.
is no appearance on behalf of the respondent-accused.
of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the
exception and not the rule. The Section does not confer any new powers on the
High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before
the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the
inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order
under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to
otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to
lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent
jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for
all cases that may possibly arise.
have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary
for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is
the doctrine which finds expression in the Section which merely recognizes and
preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or
criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their
constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a
wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex a
liquid aliquot concedit, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest
(when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot
powers under the Section, the Court does not function as a court of appeal or
revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the Section though wide has to be
exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is
justified by the tests specifically laid down in the Section itself. It is to
be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the
administration of which alone courts exist.
Authority of the
court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse
that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such
abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which
would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice.
In exercise of the
powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that
initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or
quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When
no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of
fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into
the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any
offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.
R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab (AIR 1960 SC 866) this Court summarized some
categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash
(i) where it
manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or
continuance e.g. want of sanction;
(ii) where the
allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face
value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the
allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or
the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction
between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence
which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there
is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the
accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the
High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in
question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it
accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge.
Judicial process no doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or,
needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising
discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into
consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the
hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person
needlessly. At the same time the Section is not an instrument handed over to an
accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The
scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code and the categories of
cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to
cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State
of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [ 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335]. A note of caution was,
however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in
rarest of rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are
"(1) Where the
allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the
allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any,
accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under
an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the
uncontroverted allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence
and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where the
allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute
only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a Police
Officer without ah order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2)
of the Code.
(5) Where the
allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an
express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the
concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal
proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the
Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution
in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of
this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be
exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High Court being the highest
Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in
a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the
evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues
involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in
their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast
rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise
its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. It
would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant
in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction
would be sustainable and on such premises, arrive at a conclusion that the
proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material
before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In
proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash
the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not
disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations
set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has
been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in
exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not,
however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before
the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal.
The complaint/F.I.R. has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on
consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of
the complainant or disclosed in the F.I.R. that the ingredients of the offence
or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint/F.I.R.
is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no
justification for interference by the High Court. When an information is lodged
at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the
informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during
the investigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate of the
accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no
consequence and cannot by it be the basis for quashing the proceeding.
in view the principles of law as enunciated above, the action of the High Court
in quashing the FIR cannot be maintained so far as Criminal Appeal No. 1190 of
2003 is concerned.
the material already in existence or to be collected during investigation would
be sufficient for holding the concerned accused persons guilty has to be
considered at the time of trial. At the time of framing the charge it can be
decided whether prima facie case has been made out showing commission of an
offence and involvement of the charged persons.
At that stage also
evidence cannot be gone into meticulously. It is immaterial whether the case is
based on direct or circumstantial evidence.
Charge can be framed,
if there are materials showing possibility about the commission of the crime as
against certainty. That being so, the interference at the threshold with the
F.I.R. is to be in very xceptional circumstances as held in R.P. Kapoor's case
10. Ultimately, the
acceptability of the materials to fasten culpability on the accused persons is
a matter of trial. These are not the cases where it can be said that the FIR
did not disclose commission of an offence. Therefore, the High Court was not
justified in quashing the FIR in the concerned cases.
11. The appeal is
(Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)
(LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA)