S. Abdul Khader Vs.
Abdul Wajid (D) by LRS. & Ors.  INSC 1541 (11 September 2008)
SUPREME COURT OF
INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.2770 OF 2006
S. Abdul Khader ...Petitioner Abdul Wajid (D) by LRs. & Ors. ...Respondents
special leave petition arises out of OS No.8198 of 1995 filed by the petitioner
herein for specific performance of an Agreement for Sale dated 18th May, 1995,
executed by the respondent No.1 in respect of the suit properties and for a
direction upon the respondent to execute a sale deed in his 2 favour and to
deliver vacant possession of the suit land.
case made out by the petitioner is that in view of the Agreement for Sale dated
21st February, 1995, executed by the respondent No.1 in his favour for a total
consideration of Rs.4,30,000/-, he paid Rs.1,00,000/- in cash to the respondent
No.1 as an advance towards the sale price when the said agreement was executed.
Thereafter, several amounts were paid by the plaintiff to the respondent No.1
amounting to Rs.2,05,000/- in total. It was also mentioned in the plaint that
the respondent No.1 had projected himself to be the owner of the suit property,
being site No.18, in Survey No.51/3A situated at Byrasandra 35th Division of
Bangalore, having purchased the same from one Prasanth M. Kumar, who is now the
respondent No.2 in the present Special Leave Petition. The 3 respondent No.1
assured the plaintiff that the suit property was free from all encumbrances and
that the original sale deed executed by the respondent No.2 was with the Deputy
Commissioner on account of under valuation. The respondent No.1 also assured
the plaintiff that he would produce the original sale deed at the time of
registration, together with the records from the Corporation after assessment
to register the property, since registration could not be done without the said
to the plaintiff, he believed and trusted the respondent No.1 and waited till
the end of October 1995, by which date the respondent No.1 had assured the
plaintiff that he would complete the sale transaction.
The respondent No.1,
however, did not make any effort to complete the sale transaction 4 inspite of
repeated requests made to him by the petitioner to that effect, though the
petitioner was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract
regarding payment of the balance of the sale price after deduction of the
amount already advanced by him.
is also the plaintiff's case that only when he found that a compound wall was
being constructed that he became suspicious of the motive of the respondent
No.1 who, however, continued to assure him that the compound wall was being
constructed only for the purpose of payment of tax and issuance of katha endorsement.
The respondent No.1 once again assured the petitioner that he would complete
the sale as soon as he was able to get the relevant record from the Corporation
and the original sale deed executed in his 5 favour from the Deputy
Commissioner for Under Valuation.
the petitioner was surprised when he was served with a legal notice dated 17th
November, 1995, indicating that the respondent No.1 had cancelled the Agreement
for Sale which had been executed in his favour on 21st February, 1995. The
petitioner, thereupon filed the suit for specific performance of the contract
and for delivery of possession of the suit land to him, which was disposed of
by granting the alternate relief of reimbursement of the monies advanced,
together with interest at the rate of 9% per annum. The Trial Court, however,
declined to order the execution of the said agreement in respect of the
property on the ground that third party rights had intervened, as the
respondent No.3 purchased the suit property without knowledge or notice 6 of
the prior sale agreement and was thus a bona fide purchaser for value without
notice and was not affected by the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882, and the doctrine of lis pendens.
matter was carried to the High Court by way of RSA No.781 of 2004, wherein the
submissions advanced before the Trial Court were reiterated. Agreeing with the
findings of the Trial Court, the High Court came to the finding that the
Agreement for Sale between the respondent No.1 and the petitioner was not
binding on the respondent No.3 since the respondent No.1 had no marketable
title to the suit property for the sale thereof in favour of the petitioner.
The agreements entered into on 21st February, 1995 and on 18th May, 1995, could
not be enforced as he was not the owner of the property and was not empowered
to execute any 7 Agreement for Sale in respect thereof and the petitioner had
not also sought the relief for specific performance against the other
respondents. The High Court also held that the Trial Court had rightly found
that the petitioner had allegedly made payment in favour of the Respondent No.1
without making any enquiry or verifying the records, and that he had done so at
his own risk, as the said respondent had no authority to execute the sale
agreement dated 18th May, 1995.
High Court held further that the Respondent No. 3 had prior to purchase of the
said property made enquiries and ascertained that one Rafi Ahmed the lawful
Power of Attorney holder of the 2nd respondent possessed the legal competence
to sell the suit property in her favour. The High Court endorsed the view of
the Trial Court that the respondent No.3 was a 8 bona fide purchaser for value
without notice after due enquiries made by her.
the basis of the above, the High Court held that the Trial Court had rightly
granted the alternative relief of repayment of the sums advanced while denying
the substantial relief for execution and registration of a sale deed in respect
of the suit land in favour of the respondent. The High Court, however, was not
unmindful of the steep rise in the price of immovable properties in urban
areas, and, accordingly, enhanced the rate of interest from 9% granted by the
Trial Court to 18% upon the amount decreed in favour of the petitioner.
The appeal was partly
allowed to the above extent.
said judgment and order of the High Court has been challenged in these
behalf of the petitioner, it has been contended that the transaction between
the respondent No.2 and the respondent No.3 was hit by Section 52 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and the doctrine of lis pendens. It was urged
that both the Trial Court as well as the High Court had erred in law in
disallowing the petitioner's prayer for a direction upon the respondent No.1 to
execute the sale deed in respect of the suit land and to make over possession
thereof to the petitioner. It was also contended that both the courts below
appear to have also lost sight of the provisions of Section 19(b) of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963 which provides as follows:- "19. Relief against
parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent title. - Except as otherwise
provided by this Chapter, specific performance of a contract may be enforced
against- (a) either party thereto;
10 (b) any other
person claiming under him by a title arising subsequently to the contract,
except a transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without
notice of the original contract;
this regard Ms. Kiran Suri, learned advocate, who appeared for the petitioner,
firstly referred to the decision of this Court Revanagouda Bhimanagouda Patil,
[1997 (1) SCC 475], wherein this Court had expressed the view that when the
father of the respondent had obtained the sale deed in the name of the minor,
he was also bound by the agreement of reconveyance. Having received the money,
he had not executed the sale deed. Necessarily, the plaintiff was entitled to
seek specific performance and any subsequent sale would be 11 barred by the
doctrine of lis pendens.
subsequent purchaser was bound by the decree of specific performance and was
liable to reconvey the property to the plaintiff.
Suri also referred to the decision of this Court in Hardev Singh vs. Gurmail
Singh (dead) by LRs., [2007 (2) SCC 404], wherein this Court dealt with the
scope of Sections 41, 43 and 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. On
examining the said provisions, this Court held that the requirement of Section
41 and the proviso thereto was not a requirement for the applicability of
Section 43 and hence even if a subsequent purchaser was aware of the pending
litigation at the time of purchase of the suit property, it would disentitle
him to the benefit of Section 43. It was further held that Section 52 did not
operate to render a 12 sale deed executed during the pendency of the suit
void, as the said transaction was not hit either by Section 52 of the Transfer
of Property Act or Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872.
effect, the case made out on behalf of the petitioner is that the subsequent
purchaser steps into the shoes of the judgment-debtor and is thus bound by any
decree passed against the judgment-debtor.
petitioner also appears to have relied on an affidavit affirmed by the
respondent No.1, Abdul Wajid, since deceased, which has been referred to as a
"consent agreement" which indicates that the General Power of
Attorney earlier notarized in favour of the respondent No.1 on 3rd April, 1995,
stood cancelled with consent and a fresh agreement had been entered 13 into by
the respondent No.2 in favour of Rafi Ahmed who, in his capacity as the holder
of the second Power of Attorney executed by the respondent No.2 in his favour
on 18th June, 1995, had sold the suit property in favour of the petitioner. It
was also the case of the petitioner that since the aforesaid document had been
disclosed for the first time in the written statement filed by the respondent
No.3, Sufia Bi, on 28th October, 2003, the same did not inspire confidence and
the courts below erred in dismissing the plaintiff's claim for specific performance
of the agreement on the erroneous finding that the petitioner was not ready and
willing to conclude the sale.
Suri submitted that the findings of both the trial court and the High Court
regarding the petitioner's readiness and willingness to conclude the sale was
contrary to the evidence 14 adduced and was, therefore, liable to be set aside
and the suit was liable to be decreed for specific performance in respect of
the other hand, Mr. S.N. Bhat, learned advocate, submitted that the submissions
advanced on behalf of the petitioner was without any foundation since the very
basis of the petitioner's suit, namely, the Agreement for Sale executed in his
favour by the respondent No. 1 on 21st February, 1995, was invalid since on
that date the respondent No.1 had no power or authority to execute the said
Agreement in respect of the suit property. Mr. Bhat submitted that the Power of
Attorney, which had been executed by respondent No.2 in favour of the
respondent No.1 on 3rd April, 1995, was revoked and hence the Agreement for
Sale executed in favour of the petitioner by the respondent No.1 on 18th May,
1995 was without any legal authority. Mr. Bhat 15 submitted that after
revocation of the said Power of Attorney in favour of the respondent No.1, the
respondent No.2 gave another General Power of Attorney to Rafi Ahmed on 9th
June, 1995 on the basis whereof the said Rafi Ahmed executed the sale deed in
favour of the respondent No.3, who claimed that he came to know about the Agreement
for Sale which is purported to have been executed by the respondent No.1 in
favour of the petitioner on 18th May, 1995.
Bhat urged that on both counts the petitioner's suit had been rightly
Firstly, that the
respondent No.1 was neither the owner nor the person authorized to enter into
an Agreement for Sale with the petitioner on 21st February, 1995. The
respondent No.3 had been found to be a bonafide purchaser for the value without
notice, which did not affect his 16 title to the suit property in any way. Mr.
Bhat urged that whether the respondent No.3 had knowledge of the earlier
Agreement for Sale, had been considered by the Trial Court as well as the High
Court and no fresh materials have been shown before this Court, which would warrant
interference with such findings of facts.
Bhat urged that since both the courts below had on a detailed analysis of the
evidence on record found that the respondent No.3 was a bonafide purchaser for
value without notice, the Special Leave Petition was liable to be dismissed.
carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the parties, we are not
inclined to reappraise the evidence once again in these proceedings. We shall,
therefore, 17 confined ourselves only to the legal aspects of the Special
the merits of the case of the parties, it is clear that when the first
Agreement for Sale was executed by respondent No.1 in favour of the petitioner,
he did not possess any power to enter into the agreement with the petitioner.
For a brief period
such power was given to him but was again withdrawn. Accordingly, on the two
dates which are relevant for our purpose, namely, 21st February, 1995 and 18th
May, 1995, the respondent No. 1 had no legal right in respect of the suit
property. Consequently, the agreement executed by the respondent No.1 in favour
of the petitioner on 21st February, 1995, had no legal sanction and the suit
for specific performance on the basis thereof was incompetent.
as far as the respondent No.3 is concerned, the Agreement for Sale entered into
with him by Rafi Ahmed on the strength of the General Power of Attorney issued
in his favour by the respondent No.2 on 8th June, 1995 was valid and protected
by the provisions of Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
it is well established that granting relief of specific performance is purely
discretionary and is dependendent on the provisions of Section 20 of the
aforesaid Act and the Court under Section 21 thereof has the power to award
compensation for breach of contract instead of decreeing the suit for specific
performance, as has been done in the present case and, in our view, quite
we are in agreement with both the trial Court as well as the High Court that
the 19 respondent No. 1 had no legal authority to enter into an Agreement for
Sale with the petitioner when he was not vested with the authority to do so, no
interference is called for with the judgment impugned in the Special Leave
Petition, which is accordingly dismissed.
will, however, be no order as to costs.