M/S Sethi Auto
Service Station & ANR Vs. Delhi Development Authority & Ors [2008] INSC
1763 (17 October 2008)
Judgment
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6143 OF 2008 (Arising
out of S.L.P. (C) No. 10230 of 2006) M/S SETHI AUTO SERVICE STATION & --
APPELLANTS ANR.
VERSUS
D.K. JAIN, J.:
1.
Leave
granted.
2.
This
appeal is directed against a common judgment and order rendered by the High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi on 6th February, 2006 in Letters Patent Appeals
No.2715 and 1 2722 of 2005. By the impugned order, the appeals preferred by
the two appellants herein, under Clause X of the Letters Patent have been
dismissed.
3.
The
appellant firms-M/s Sethi Auto Service Station and M/s Anand Service Station
own two petrol outlets adjacent to each other, located at NH-8, Mahipalpur, New
Delhi since 1994. The land for the purpose was allotted by the Airport
Authority of India (for short `AAI') whereas the petrol pumps were allotted by
the Indian Oil Corporation (for short `IOC') and Hindustan Petroleum
Corporation Limited (for short `HPCL') to Sethi and Anand respectively.
According to the
appellants, in the year 1999, a proposal was formulated for construction of an
eight-lane express highway between Delhi and Gurgaon, including construction of
a flyover/grid separator at Mahipalpur crossing, where the two petrol pumps in
question are located. Claiming unviability in the operation of the two petrol
pumps on account of construction of the flyover and relying on the policy
framed by the Delhi Development Authority (for short `the DDA') on 14th
October, 1999, the two oil companies approached the DDA, respondent No.1 in
this appeal, for "re-sitement" of both the petrol pumps. It was
claimed that, in the first instance, IOC and HPCL had corresponded with the
original allotment agency, viz. AAI, for re-sitement but some time in the year
2000, AAI informed the Oil Companies that it did not have any alternative site
for allotment due to non-availability of land.
The appellants also
relied on the letter issued by the National Highway Authority of India (for
short `NHAI') confirming that the proposed dual highway would be developed
along with the existing alignment of NH-8 and that no access would be provided
to any retail outlet or private property along the highway. Supporting the
claim of the appellants, the State Level Coordinator (Oil Industry) also wrote
a letter to the DDA on 10th May, 2002, inter alia, pointing out that the
construction work on the grid separator had commenced; after its completion,
all vehicles would cross over the separator and would not have any access to
the two petrol pumps in question for refueling thereby rendering them
economically unviable.
4.
The
stand of the appellants was that request for re- sitement made by the two Oil
Companies with the recommendation of the State Level Coordinator had been
considered by the DDA; the DDA conducted its own field survey; the Technical
Committee of the DDA on 28th April, 2002 also recommended
relocation/re-sitement and on 17th May, 2002, a proposal for allotment of
alternative sites/plots was referred to and considered by the Screening Committee
of the DDA at its meeting held on 21st November, 2003, when the proposal for
allotment of two alternative sites was approved. However, when the matter was
finally taken up by the Screening Committee of DDA on 28th November, 2003, the
proposal for relocation was disapproved and instead the Commissioner (Planning)
was directed to enquire and submit a report as to why two petrol pump sites,
earmarked for the appellants, were not auctioned. The recommendation of the
Screening Committee was considered by the Vice Chairman of DDA, who rejected
the proposal for relocation of the two petrol pumps in question.
5.
Aggrieved
thereby, the appellants filed writ petitions in the Delhi High Court. It was
pleaded that the State Level Coordinator as well as the DDA having recognised
that the two petrol pumps were rendered commercially unviable due to
construction of the grid separator, they had a legitimate right to the
allotment/relocation of petrol pumps at alternative sites, in terms of the
policy of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas formulated in the year 1998
as well as the policy of the DDA of 1999. It was urged that all the requisite
conditions for such re-allotment/re-sitement were fulfilled by them and the DDA
had also recommended the allotment in May, 2002; which proposal had also been
cleared by the Technical Committee and, therefore, the DDA was bound by the
said decisions. Moreover, having acted upon its decisions by earmarking the two
sites, the decision to withhold allotment and include the two earmarked plots
in the proposed auction was unreasonable, irrational and arbitrary and the mere
fact that the DDA chose to sit over the recommendations and did not issue
formal orders of allotment could not rob the appellants of 5 their valuable
right to such allotment. In a nutshell, the case of the appellants was that the
decision taken by the DDA in the year 2002, in favour of the appellants, upon
consideration of all the relevant materials and factors, gave rise to
substantive legitimate expectations in their minds that the allotment for
alternative sites would be made in favour of the appellants. Allegations of
discrimination were also levelled against the DDA, inter alia, stating that
six- seven named petrol outlets were given alternative lands even though they
were not operating on the lands allotted by the DDA.
6.
The
stand of the DDA before the High Court was that its policy and guidelines of
1999 for re-sitement of petrol outlets and gas godowns had been revised in
June, 2003, superceding all its earlier policies on the subject. As per the new
policy, re-sitement was permissible only when the land of an existing outlet
was utilized for a planned proposal/scheme directly necessitating its closure;
as per its policy the DDA has to dispose of land for petrol outlets through
competitive mode of tender or auction and, in any 6 case, the new policy does
not contain any provision for allotment of an alternative site for an existing
petrol pump located on private land or land allotted by other agency such as
the AAI; that the internal notings or communications with the DDA are of no
relevance and consequence till a final decision was taken and communicated to
the concerned parties. In the present case though the proposals of other
Government Agencies were considered, no final decision was taken and
communicated by the DDA to the appellants. As regards the approval by the
Technical Committee or other officials, the stand of the DDA was that till a
final decision was taken by the competent authority i.e. the Vice Chairman and
communicated to the appellants, there was no question of any vested right
accruing in favour of the appellants, merely on the basis of recommendations of
the officials of the DDA.
7.
None
of the contentions urged on behalf of the appellants found favour with the
learned Single Judge of the High Court. The learned Judge, by a well reasoned
order, came to the conclusion that the appellants could not claim an 7
enforceable right merely on the basis of the proposal leading to the
recommendation by the Technical Committee as it did not amount to an order or
decision of the DDA, particularly when its competent authority had rejected the
request of the appellants. The learned Judge also observed that at best the
appellants had a mere expectation of being considered for re-sitement. The
stand of the DDA that in view of the fact that a new policy had been formulated
in June, 2003, it was within its right to apply the same was also found to be
in order. Thus, the learned Judge found that the DDA had acted fairly and
reasonably in rejecting appellants' prayer for re-sitement. Accordingly, both
the writ petitions were dismissed.
8.
Aggrieved
by the said order, the appellants preferred Letters Patent Appeals under Clause
X of the Letters Patent as applicable to the High Court of Delhi. Both the
appeals having been dismissed, the appellants have preferred this appeal.
9.
Mr.
Arun Jaitley, learned senior counsel, appearing for the appellants, strenuously
urged that the representations of the appellants were considered by the DDA in
terms of its policy dated 14th October, 1999 and its Technical Committee,
headed by the Vice Chairman himself, had found the appellants to be eligible
and on 28th November, 2002 recommended re-sitement of the two outlets and,
therefore, it was not open to the DDA to do a volte-face and reject the
representation of the appellants. It was contended that once appellants' cases
were considered by the DDA under the guidelines in vogue at the relevant time
and they were found to be covered thereunder, the appellants had substantive
legitimate expectation that allotments would be made to them. It was argued
that mere delay on the part of the DDA in communicating formal orders of
allotment to the appellants could not defeat their valuable right on the ground
of subsequent change in the policy in June, 2003, which could only be applied
prospectively.
10.
Per
contra, Mr. A. Sharan, learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for the
DDA, submitted that mere notings and proposals in the files of the DDA did not
result in creation of any right in favour of the appellants till a final
decision was taken by the Vice Chairman as the administrative head of the DDA
and the same was communicated to the appellants. It was also urged that in the
absence of a final decision duly communicated to the appellants, their claims
had to be considered on the basis of the policies framed by the DDA from time
to time and the relevant date for the said purpose would be the date when the
Vice Chairman took the final decision under the policy in vogue at that point
of time. In support of the proposition, reliance was placed on a decision of
this Court India & Ors.1 A reference was also made to Howrah & Ors.2 to
contend that in view of the amendment of the guidelines, which had the statutory
flavor, in June, 2003, 1 (1996) 5 SCC 268 2 (2004) 1 SCC 663 10 the so called
vested right to be considered under the 1999 guidelines, if any, also got
nullified on account of the amended guidelines.
11.
Thus,
the first question arising for consideration is whether the recommendation of
the Technical Committee vide minutes dated 17th May, 2002 for re-sitement of
appellants petrol pumps constitutes an order/decision binding on the DDA?
12.
It
is trite to state that notings in a departmental file do not have the sanction
of law to be an effective order. A noting by an officer is an expression of his
viewpoint on the subject. It is no more than an opinion by an officer for
internal use and consideration of the other officials of the department and for
the benefit of the final decision-making authority. Needless to add that
internal notings are not meant for outside exposure. Notings in the file
culminate into an executable order, affecting the rights of the parties, only
when it reaches the final decision-making authority in 11 the department; gets
his approval and the final order is communicated to the person concerned.
13.
Constitution
Bench of this Court had the occasion to consider the effect of an order passed
by a Minister on a file, which order was not communicated to the person
concerned. Referring to the Article 166(1) of the Constitution, the Court held
that order of the Minister could not amount to an order by the State Government
unless it was expressed in the name of the Rajpramukh, as required by the said
Article and was then communicated to the party concerned. The court observed
that business of State is a complicated one and has necessarily to be conducted
through the agency of a large number of officials and authorities. Before an
action is taken by the authority concerned in the name of the Rajpramukh, which
formality is a constitutional necessity, nothing done would amount to an order
creating rights or casting liabilities to third parties.
It is possible,
observed the Court, that after expressing one 3 [1962] Supp 3 SCR 713 12
opinion about a particular matter at a particular stage a Minister or the
Council of Ministers may express quite a different opinion which may be opposed
to the earlier opinion. In such cases, which of the two opinions can be
regarded as the "order" of the State Government? It was held that
opinion becomes a decision of the Government only when it is communicated to
the person concerned.
14.
To
the like effect are the observations of this Court in Maharashtra & Anr.4,
wherein it was said that a right created under an order of a statutory
authority must be communicated to the person concerned so as to confer an
enforceable right.
15.
In
view of the above legal position and in the light of the factual scenario as
highlighted in the order of the learned Single Judge, we find it difficult to
hold that the recommendation of the Technical Committee of the DDA fructified
into an order conferring legal right upon the appellants. We may note that
during the course of hearing 4 (2003) 5 SCC 413 of the writ petitions, the
learned Single Judge had summoned the original records wherein the
representations of the appellants were dealt with. On a perusal thereof, the
learned Judge observed that the proposal for re-sitement was apparently
approved up to the level of the Commissioner and the matter was placed before
the Technical Committee, which approved it on 28th November, 2002. Thereafter,
the DDA took further steps on the basis of field inspection to earmark the two
sites; the entire matter was placed before the Screening Committee and the
Screening Committee in its decision some time in 2003 noted that the matter had
to be placed for disposal in accordance with the policy. Some time in July,
2004 after the conclusion of certain inquiries into the complaints regarding
re-sitement, the issue of relocation was again taken up and a detailed note was
made on 12th August, 2004, recounting the steps taken including the discussion
of the Screening Committee in its meeting on 21st November, 2003. It is pointed
out that the note records that the proposals for re-sitement were not finally
approved.
The learned Judge has
also observed that the note dated 21st November, 2003 along with the inspection
report and the proposal for re-sitement was put up before the Commissioner (LB)
who, on 9th September, 2004 recorded the following comments:
"However, the
basic fact to be noted is that these petrol pumps were allotted on the land of
Airport Authority of India and there is no responsibility on the part of the
DDA to bear any cost or to carry out resitement for such sites given by any other
land owning agency and which are being effected by a project which is being
done by a third agency vis National Highway Authority of India with which DDA
has no links. This was discussed with VC and PC last week in the context of
certain other resitement proposal pending for different areas in Dwarka and it
was agreed that the onus of such petrol pump sites on DDA land, does not lie
upon DDA particularly in a situation when DDA now has a policy for auction of
petrol pump sites. It was, therefore, decided that irrespective of the impact
of the proposed Express Way on these petrol pump sites, there is no reason for
DDA to take the responsibility of resitement of these petrol pump sites and the
oil companies concerned may either participate in the auction process or obtain
private plots for the purpose of carrying out their business."
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
Finally,
the Vice Chairman concurred with the view of the Commissioner; proposals for
re-sitement were rejected and consequently decision was taken to put the two
plots, on which the appellants had staked their claims for auction.
17.
From
the afore-extracted notings of the Commissioner and the order of the Vice
Chairman, it is manifest that although there were several notings which
recommended consideration of the appellants' case for relocation but finally no
official communication was addressed to or received by the appellants accepting
their claim. After the recommendation of the Technical Committee, the entire
matter was kept pending; in the meanwhile a new policy was formulated and the
matter was considered afresh later in the year 2004, when the proposal was
rejected by the Vice Chairman, the final decision making authority in the
hierarchy. It is, thus, plain that though the proposals had the recommendations
of State Level Co-ordinator (oil industry) and the Technical Committee but
these did not ultimately fructify into an order or decision of the DDA, 16
conferring any legal rights upon the appellants. Mere favourable
recommendations at some level of the decision making process, in our view, are
of no consequence and shall not bind the DDA. We are, therefore, in complete
agreement with the High Court that the notings in the file did not confer any
right upon the appellants, as long as they remained as such. We do not find any
infirmity in the approach adopted by the learned Single Judge and affirmed by
the Division Bench, warranting interference.
18.
We
may, now, consider the plea relating to the legitimate expectation of the
appellants in terms of DDA's policy dated 14th October, 1999 and the impact of
change of the policy, in June, 2003, thereon.
19.
The
protection of legitimate expectations, as pointed out in De Smith's Judicial
Review (Sixth Edition), (para 12-001), is at the root of the constitutional
principle of the rule of law, which requires regularity, predictability, and
certainty in government's dealings with the public.
20.
The
doctrine of legitimate expectation and its impact in the administrative law has
been considered by this Court in a catena of decisions but for the sake of
brevity we do not propose to refer to all these cases. Nevertheless, in order
to appreciate the concept, we shall refer to a few decisions. At this juncture,
we deem it necessary to refer to a decision by the House of Lords in Council of
Civil Service Unions & on the subject, wherein for the first time an
attempt was made to give a comprehensive definition to the principle of
legitimate expectation. Enunciating the basic principles relating to legitimate
expectation, Lord Diplock observed that for a legitimate expectation to arise,
the decision of the administrative authority must affect such person either (a)
by altering rights or obligations of that person which are enforceable by or
against him in private law or (b) by depriving him of some benefit or advantage
which either: (i) he has in the past been permitted by the decision maker to
enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do
until some rational ground for 5 [1984] 3 All ER 935 18 withdrawing it has been
communicated to him and he has been given an opportunity to comment thereon or
(ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker that they will not be
withdrawn without first giving him an opportunity of advancing reasons for
contending that they should be withdrawn.
leading case on the
subject, Lord Fraser said: "when a public authority has promised to follow
a certain procedure, it is in the interest of good administration that it
should act fairly and should implement its promise, so long as the implementation
does not interfere with its statutory duty".
21.
Explaining
the nature and scope of the doctrine of M/s Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries7, a
three-Judge Bench of this Court had observed thus:
"The mere
reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not
by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due
weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how 6 (1983) 2
All.ER 346 7 (1993) 1 SCC 71 19 the requirement of due consideration of a
legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness, a
necessary concomitant of the rule of law. Every legitimate expectation is a
relevant factor requiring due consideration in a fair decision-making process.
Whether the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the
context is a question of fact in each case.
Whenever the question
arises, it is to be determined not according to the claimant's perception but
in larger public interest wherein other more important considerations may
outweigh what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the
claimant. A bona fide decision of the public authority reached in this manner
would satisfy the requirement of non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial
scrutiny. The doctrine of legitimate expectation gets assimilated in the rule
of law and operates in our legal system in this manner and to this
extent."
22.
The
concept of legitimate expectation again came up for Development Corporation
& Ors.8. Referring to a large number of foreign and Indian decisions,
including in Council of Civil Service Unions and Kamdhenu Cattle Feed
Industries (supra) and elaborately explaining the concept of legitimate
expectation, it was observed as under:
"If a denial of
legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to denial of right guaranteed or
is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or biased, 8 (1993) 3 SCC 499 20 gross
abuse of power or violation of principles of natural justice, the same can be
questioned on the well-known grounds attracting Article 14 but a claim based on
mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a
right to invoke these principles. It can be one of the grounds to consider but
the court must lift the veil and see whether the decision is violative of these
principles warranting interference. It depends very much on the facts and the
recognised general principles of administrative law applicable to such facts
and the concept of legitimate expectation which is the latest recruit to a long
list of concepts fashioned by the courts for the review of administrative
action, must be restricted to the general legal limitations applicable and
binding the manner of the future exercise of administrative power in a particular
case. It follows that the concept of legitimate expectation is "not the
key which unlocks the treasury of natural justice and it ought not unlock the
gate which shuts the court out of review on the merits", particularly when
the element of speculation and uncertainty is inherent in that very
concept."
23.
Taking
note of the observations of the Australian High Quinn9 that "to strike
down the exercise of administrative power solely on the ground of avoiding the
disappointment of the legitimate expectations of an individual would be to set
the Courts adrift on a featureless sea of pragmatism", speaking for the
Bench, K. Jayachandra Reddy, J. said that 9 (1990) 64 Aust LJR 327 21 there
are stronger reasons as to why the legitimate expectation should not be substantively
protected than the reasons as to why it should be protected. The caution
sounded in the said Australian case that the Courts should restrain themselves
and restrict such claims duly to the legal limitations was also endorsed.
24.
Then
again in National Buildings Construction Bench of this Court observed as under:
"The doctrine of
"legitimate expectation" has its genesis in the field of
administrative law.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
The
Government and its departments, in administering the affairs of the country,
are expected to honour their statements of policy or intention and treat the
citizens with full personal consideration without any iota of abuse of
discretion. The policy statements cannot be disregarded unfairly or applied
selectively. Unfairness in the form of unreasonableness is akin to violation of
natural justice. It was in this context that the doctrine of "legitimate
expectation" was evolved which has today become a source of substantive as
well as procedural rights. But claims based on "legitimate
expectation" have been held to require reliance on representations and
resulting detriment to the claimant in the same way as claims based on
promissory estoppel."
26.
10
(1998) 7 SCC 66 22 India & Ors.11, referring to a large number of
authorities on the question, observed that a change in policy can defeat a
substantive legitimate expectation if it can be justified on
"Wednesbury" reasonableness. The decision maker has the choice in the
balancing of the pros and cons relevant to the change in policy. Therefore, the
choice of the policy is for the decision maker and not for the Court. The
legitimate substantive expectation merely permits the Court to find out if the
change in policy which is the cause for defeating the legitimate expectation is
irrational or perverse or one which no reasonable person could have made. (Also
see: Officer & Ors.12) Haryana & Anr.13, it has been reiterated that a
legitimate expectation is not the same thing as an anticipation. It is distinct
and different from a desire and hope. It is based on 11 (1999) 4 SCC 727 12
(2005) 1 SCC 625 13 (2008) 2 SCC 161 23 a right. It is grounded in the rule of
law as requiring regularity, predictability and certainty in the Government's
dealings with the public and the doctrine of legitimate expectation operates
both in procedural and substantive matters.
27.
An
examination of the afore-noted few decisions shows that the golden thread
running through all these decisions is that a case for applicability of the
doctrine of legitimate expectation, now accepted in the subjective sense as
part of our legal jurisprudence, arises when an administrative body by reason
of a representation or by past practice or conduct aroused an expectation which
it would be within its powers to fulfill unless some overriding public interest
comes in the way. However, a person who bases his claim on the doctrine of
legitimate expectation, in the first instance, has to satisfy that he has
relied on the said representation and the denial of that expectation has worked
to his detriment.
28.
The
Court could interfere only if the decision taken by the authority was found to
be arbitrary, unreasonable or in gross abuse of power or in violation of
principles of natural justice and not taken in public interest. But a claim
based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto
give a right to invoke these principles. It is well settled that the concept of
legitimate expectation has no role to play where the State action is as a
public policy or in the public interest unless the action taken amounts to an
abuse of power. The court must not usurp the discretion of the public authority
which is empowered to take the decisions under law and the court is expected to
apply an objective standard which leaves to the deciding authority the full
range of choice which the legislature is presumed to have intended. Even in a
case where the decision is left entirely to the discretion of the deciding
authority without any such legal bounds and if the decision is taken fairly and
objectively, the court will not interfere on the ground of procedural fairness
to a person whose interest based on legitimate expectation might be affected.
29.
Therefore,
a legitimate expectation can at the most be one of the grounds which may give
rise to judicial review but 25 the granting of relief is very much limited.
[Vide Hindustan Development Corporation (supra)] 28.Bearing in mind the
aforestated legal position, we may now advert to the facts at hand. In the
light of the factual scenario noted above, the short question arising for
determination is whether rejection of appellants claim for resitement on the
basis of the revised policy of the year 2003, their substantive legitimate
expectation of being considered under the old policy of 1999 has been defeated?
29.In order to adjudicate upon the controversy, it would be necessary to
briefly refer to the two policies being pressed into service by the rival
parties. In the guidelines issued in 1999, the relevant eligibility criteria
was in the following terms:
"iv) The
resitement sought due to reduction in sale on account of any planned
scheme/project may be entertained by DDA, provided it is referred by an Oil
Company/Ministry mentioning that the sale level is below the prescribed limit
and petrol pump is not feasible in its existing location."
30.
According
to the said guidelines, a request for resitement on the ground of reduction in
sales level below the prescribed limit could be entertained by the DDA provided
the proposal was referred by the oil company or the Ministry. The parties are
ad-idem that the cases of both the appellants for relocation were recommended
by the two Oil Companies, viz., IOC and HPCL, on account of expected fall in
sales because of the construction of the flyover and grid separator. However,
before a final decision on the representation of the appellants could be taken,
the policy of the DDA underwent revision in the year 2003. The criterion for
allotment of land by the DDA for resitement of existing petrol pumps was
changed. Under the revised policy, dated 20th June, 2003, a case for resitement
could be considered by the DDA only under the following circumstances:
"A. Resitement:
1) Resitement will be
made only when the existing petrol pump/gas godown site is utilized for a
planned project/scheme which directly necessitates the closing down of the
petrol pump/gas godown site. No resitement will be made on any other grounds.
As the 27 petrol pumps will be disposed on annual Licence fee basis rather
than on upfront payment, if an allottee does not find the business lucrative
due to certain other reasons, he can always chose to surrender the site.
2) In all cases of
resitement, the existing rates for the new site will be charged and the
possession of the old site will be handed over to DDA.
3) The alternative
site will be allotted through computerized draw from the available sites. For
holding the draw at least 3 sites must be available on the date of holding the
draw."
31.
31.It
is plain that under the new policy resitement of a petrol pump etc. is possible
only when the existing petrol pump is utilized for a planned project/scheme,
which directly necessitates the closing down of the petrol pump. Under the new
policy, resitement on account of fall in sales etc. is not contemplated. In
fact, resitement on any other ground is specifically ruled out. It is also
evident from the new policy that in the event of DDA permitting resitement, the
possession of the old site has to be delivered to the DDA, which presupposes
that the old site was also allotted by the 28 DDA. As noted above, the
existing sites on which the two petrol pumps in question are operating were
allotted by the Airport Authority of India and not by the DDA.
32.
32.Having
bestowed our anxious consideration to the facts in hand, in our judgment, the
doctrine of legitimate expectation, as explained above, is not attracted in the
instant case. It is manifest that even under the 1999 policy, on which the
entire edifice of appellants substantive expectation of getting alternative
land for resitement is built does not cast any obligation upon the DDA to
relocate the petrol pumps. The said policy merely laid down a criterion for
relocation and not a mandate that under the given circumstances the DDA was
obliged to provide land for the said purpose. Therefore, at best the appellants
had an expectation of being considered for resitement. Their cases were duly
considered, favourable recommendations were also made but by the time the final
decision-making authority considered the matter, the policy underwent a change
and the cases of the appellants did not meet the 29 new criteria for allotment
laid down in the new policy. We are convinced that apart from the fact that there
is no challenge to the new policy, which seems to have been conceived in public
interest in the light of the changed economic scenario and liberalized regime
of permitting private companies to set up petrol outlets, the decision of the
DDA in declining to allot land for resitement of petrol pumps, a matter of
largesse, cannot be held to be arbitrary or unreasonable warranting
interference. Moreover, with the change in policy, any direction in favour of
the appellants in this regard would militate against the new policy of 2003. In
our opinion, therefore, the principle of legitimate expectation has no
application to the facts at hand.
33.
33.In
view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal is devoid of any merit and
deserves to be dismissed. It is dismissed accordingly. However, in the
circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
.................................................J. ( C.K. THAKKER)
.................................................J.
( D.K. JAIN)
NEW
DELHI, OCTOBER 17, 2008.
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