Vs. Union of India  Insc 29 (9 January 2008)
Kabir & B.Sudershan Reddy Altamas Kabir,J.
appellant herein, along with one Phool Chand and Ram Prasad, was accused of
offences under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985
(hereinafter referred to as the NDPS Act) and ultimately charges were
framed against them by the Special Judge under Section 8/18 and in the
alternative under Section 8/18/29 of the aforesaid Act. On denying the charges
framed against them the accused persons were sent to trial.
learned Special Judge framed several issues and ultimately held that the
charges had been fully proved against the accused Phool Chand, from whose
possession 19 kg 200 gms. of opium was seized. Phool Chand was found guilty and
convicted under Section 8/18 of the NDPS Act and sentenced to suffer 10 years
R.I. together with fine of Rs.1 lakh, in default, to undergo 2 years R.I.
far as the appellant herein and Ram Prasad are concerned, the learned Trial
Judge found that the charges against them had not been proved and acquitted
them of the charges under Section 8/18 read with Section 29 of the NDPS Act.
Aggrieved by his conviction and sentence, Phool Chand preferred Criminal Appeal
No.47 of 2002 before the Indore Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court.
other hand, the Union of India also preferred Criminal Appeal No.108 of 2003
against the acquittal of Ram Prasad and the appellant herein.
High Court heard both the appeals together and ultimately dismissed the appeal
preferred by Phool Chand and relying on the statement made by Ram Prasad and
the appellant herein under Section 67 of the NDPS Act, found them also guilty
of the charges framed against them and allowed the appeal filed by the Union of
India. Ram Prasad and Kanhaiyalal (the appellant herein) were also sentenced to
10 years R.I. each and fine of Rs. 1 lakh each, and in default, to further
undergo a jail sentence of 6 months R.I.
is against the said judgment of the High Court that the instant appeal had been
preferred by Kanhaiyalal.
Since the appellant, Kanhiyalal was convicted on the basis of the statement
made by him under Section 67 of the NDPS Act, a question has been raised
whether such statement made to an officer within the meaning of Section 42 of
the said Act could be treated as a confessional statement and whether the
accused could be convicted on the basis thereof in the absence of any other
will appear from the records, the case of the prosecution was that on 22.2.1997
an information had been received by Shri Rajesh Nagpal, Assistant Narcotics
Commissioner of the Central Bureau of Narcotics, Neemuch, that accused Phoolchand
and Ram Prasad were involved in illegal dealing in opium and they had entered
into an agreement to buy 25 kgs of opium from the appellant and the delivery of
the said contraband was to be made at the site of the well of accused Ram
Prasad situated in Haspur. On receipt of the said information, Shri Nagpal went
to his office and reported the same. Subsequently, the same was produced before
the Deputy Commissioner, Shri Prem Raj. On the basis of the said information a
preventive party was constituted which proceeded to the identified site. The
raiding party purportedly reached village Hadipiplya Police Station, Manasa, by
a Government vehicle at about 3.00 p.m. on
the same day and after calling two independent witnesses, Madan Lal and Ram
Rattan, who belonged to Hadipatiya, the raiding party proceeded towards the
well in question belonging to Ram Prasads father Mangi Lal. The raiding
party led by Lala Ram Dinkar, Inspector, along with the said two witnesses
reached the said well at about 4.00 p.m. and
found two persons sitting there with 3 bags. On seeing the raiding/preventive
party, one of the two persons sitting there ran away and although he was chased
by some members of the raiding party, they did not manage to catch him.
Inspector Lal Ram Dinkar went up to the other person sitting near the well who
disclosed his name as Phool Chand son of Sita Ram and resident of Bardiya.
According to the prosecution case, on being asked as to who was the person who
had fled, Phool Chand indicated the name of the appellant herein. On being
further asked as to the ownership of the bags lying at the spot, accused Phool Chand
admitted that the bags belonged to him and to the appellant herein.
Thereafter, Phool Chand was told about the confidential information that had
been received and that the raiding party had reasons to believe that the bags
in question contained intoxicating materials. He was also informed that for
such reasons he would have to be searched along with the bags. In keeping with
the provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act Phool Chand was given the option
of the search being conducted by any nearby Magistrate or before any Gazetted
Officer. According to the prosecution, Phool Chand was willing to have the bag
searched before the Gazetted Officer.
Shri R.K. Sinha, Superintendent of the Narcotics Department, who was present
with the raiding/preventive party introduced himself as a competent Gazetted
Officer to Phool Chand who gave his consent in writing about such search in the
Panchnama which was drawn before Shri R.K. Sinha.
to the above, search of the bags was undertaken from which the contraband opium
was found and on measurement the bags were found to contain the following
amounts of opium:-
A 11 kgs. 500 gms.
Bag B 4 kgs. 700 gms, and
Bag C 300 gms From each of the bags two samples of 25 grams each were
taken out for chemical examination while the remaining opium was sealed under
the Panchnama (Exh.P.2)
the basis of the proceeding in terms of Section 57 of the NDPS Act and the
First Information Report filed before the Narcotic Superintendent, one Suresh Badlani
was appointed as Investigating Officer and the seized opium along with samples
were deposited in the Malkhana. At this point of time the statement of accused Phool
Chand was taken where he confessed to the offence complained of.
During investigation, accused Ram Prasad and Kanhaiyalal(appellant herein) were
served with summons under Section 67 of the NDPS Act. While Ram Prasad was
present in the Neemuch office on 24.2.1997 in pursuance of the summons, the
appellant herein did not appear before the concerned officer.
charge-sheet was filed before the Special Judge under the NDPS Act against Phool
Chand and Ram Prasad on 20.5.1997. Subsequently, after fresh summons were issued
to the appellant herein, he also appeared before the concerned officer and his
statement was taken under Section 67 of the NDPS Act. In his statement the
appellant confessed that he too was involved in the smuggling of opium with the
co-accused. According to the prosecution, on the basis of his confessional
statement, Kanhaiyalal was also arrested in connection with the offence and
supplementary challan was filed against him before the Special Judge on
The defence of the accused was that they have been falsely implicated and
accused Phool Chand took a specific plea that on 21.2.1997 he was playing Kabbadi
at the sports ground.
The Trial Judge framed 4 questions for the purpose of deciding the case, namely,
Whether seized material in the case is opium?
Whether aforesaid opium seized illegally kept in possession of accused Phool Chand
in village Hadipipliya at about 4 oclock on 22.2.1997 i.e. the day of incident
Whether aforesaid opium was collected for sale by all the three accused Ram
Prasad and Kanhaiya Lal with co-accused Phool Chand in co-partnership ? and
Whether in this case compliance of necessary legal provisions of NDPS Act is done
The first question was answered by the learned Trial Judge in the affirmative
upon holding that the seized material was proved to be opium.
the second question, the Trial Judge came to the definite finding that it had
been fully proved that the opium had been seized from the possession of accused
Phool Chand for which he did not have any valid licence.
The answer to the third question, which is relevant to this appeal, was
answered in favour of the accused Ram Prasad and the appellant herein and the
Special Judge concluded that except for the contradictory confession of these
two accused there was no other corroborative evidence and the prosecution had
failed to prove that they were included in the smuggling operation.
far as the fourth question is concerned the Special Judge was satisfied that
all the provisions of the NDPS Act had been duly complied with.
the basis of his findings on the first, second and fourth questions, the
Special Judge under the NDPS Act convicted Phool Chand of the offences under
Section 8/18 of the NDPS Act, but acquitted both Ram Prasad and the appellant
herein of the said charge on his findings with regard to question no.3.
mentioned hereinabove, the High Court while dismissing the appeal filed by Phool
Chand allowed the appeal filed by the Union of India against the acquittal of
Ram Prasad and Kanhaiyalal upon holding that the statement made by Ram Prasad
and the appellant herein under Section 67 of the NDPS Act did not require any
corroboration and were sufficient in themselves to convict the said two accused.
Mr. S.K. Gambhir, learned Senior Advocate, contended on behalf of the
appellant, Kanhaiyalal, that the High Court had incorrectly stated the law
regarding statements made under Section 67 of the NDPS Act before officers
empowered under Section 42 thereunder. It was his specific case that once the
appellant had been summoned in an inquiry under Section 67 of the aforesaid Act
and was placed under arrest, any statement made by him thereafter would be hit
by the provisions of Sections 24 to 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Apart
from the above, Mr. Gambhir also submitted that after making the statement in
terms of Section 67 of the NDPS Act the appellant had retracted such statement
and in the absence of corroborative evidence, the said retracted statement/confession
could not be relied upon in order to convict the appellant. Furthermore, there
was no independent evidence to corroborate the retracted confession, which fact
had weighed with the trial court in acquitting the appellant.
Mr. Gambhir submitted that although from the arrest Memo it would be clear that
Kanhaiyalal was arrested on 8.6.1997 at 5.30 p.m., he was produced before the
Magistrate on 9th June, 1997, and on the same day he made an application in
writing to the Court that his signature had been forcibly obtained on blank
papers under threat that if he did not sign he would be involved in other
serious cases and the same were subsequently used for preparing statements
under Section 67 of the aforesaid Act as if the same had been voluntarily made
by him. Mr. Gambhir submitted that the appellant had already been arrested and
detained in custody when the statement under Section 67 of the NDPS Act was
recorded and, accordingly the same came within the mischief of Sections 24 to
27 of the Evidence Act.
pointed out that since the Trial Court had taken cognizance of the said
application and recorded a finding in the judgment itself that Kanhaiyalal had
retracted his confession, it would be incorrect to say that the said application
made by Kanhaiyalal had not been considered by the Court.
also pointed out by Mr. Gambhir that although on behalf of the prosecution it
had been submitted that Kanhaiyalal in his statement under Section 313 of the
Criminal Procedure Code had stated that he had been compelled to sign on blank
papers under threat, the truth was otherwise since in his statement under
Section 313 Kanhaiyalal answered galat hai which had to be taken as a
denial that he had given such statement. Mr. Gambhir submitted that the
appellants positive response had to be read along with his application dated
9.6.1997 retracting his confessional statement.
Mr. Gambhir submitted that the High Court had erred in relying upon the
appellants statement made under Section 67 of the NDPS Act, although, not
only had the same been retracted immediately thereafter before the learned
Magistrate, but the same was not admissible under the above-mentioned
provisions of the Evidence Act. It was submitted that since apart from the above
statement there was no other evidence, which linked the appellant with the
alleged offence, the High Court should have maintained the judgment of the
acquittal passed by the learned trial court.
support of his aforesaid submission that in the absence of other corroborating
evidence the retracted confession had been wrongly relied upon by the High
Court to convict the appellant, Mr. Gambhir referred to the three Judge Bench
decision of this Court in Muthuswami vs. State of Madras (AIR 1954 SC 4) in
which, it was indicated that no hard and fast rule could be laid down regarding
the necessity of corroboration in the case of a retracted confession in order
to base conviction thereupon. But apart from the general rule of prudence, if
the circumstances of a particular case raised doubts as to the genuineness of a
confession, it would be sufficient to require corroboration of a retracted
Puran vs. State of Punjab (AIR 1953 SC 459) the same view has
been expressed as follows:- It is a settled rule of evidence that unless a
retracted confession is corroborated in material particulars, it is not prudent
to base a conviction in a criminal case on its strength alone.
The same view was also expressed by this Court in Parmananda Pegu vs. State of
Assam (2004 (7) SCC 779), which involved a conviction made on the basis of a
confession made before a Judicial Magistrate in accordance with Section 164 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure.
the same context Mr. Cambhir strongly relied on the decision of this Court in
State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Navjot Sandhu (2005 11 SCC 600) (commonly known as the
Parliament Attack case)wherein while hearing several appeals, this Court had
occasion to go into the question of confessions and retracted confessions in
some detail. Referring to confessions in general, this Court made a distinction
between confession and admission.
observed that an admission is a statement oral or documentary which
enables the Court to draw an inference as to any fact in issue or relevant
trite to say that every confession must necessarily be an admission, but, every
admission does not necessarily amount to a confession. This Court also
cautioned that before acting upon a confession, the Court has to satisfy itself
that it was freely and voluntarily made, having regard to the language of
Section 24 of the Evidence Act.
while examining the evidentiary value of a retracted confession against the
confessor, the learned Judges had occasion to consider three previous decisions
of this Court in Bharat vs. State of U.P. (1971 3 SCC 950) and Haroon Hazi Abdulla
vs. State of Mahrashtra (1968 2 SCR 641) and Pyare Lal Bhargava
vs. State of Rajasthan (1963 Suppl.1 SCR 689). The learned
Judges extracted paragraph 7 of the judgment in Bharat vs. State of U.P.
(supra) wherein a comparison has been made between confession and
retracted confession. While in the former case, it was observed that
confessions could be acted upon, if the Court was satisfied that they were
voluntarily made and they were true, retracted confessions, stood on a slightly
different footing. In that context, it was observed that a Court may take
into account the retracted confession, but it must look for the reasons for the
making of the confession as well as for its retraction, and must weigh the two,
to determine whether the retraction affects the voluntary nature of the
confession or not. The learned Judges of the three Judge Bench went on to
observe that upon being satisfied, it was for the court to decide whether to
use the retracted confession or not, but all the same, the courts did not
normally act upon a retracted confession without finding some other evidence as
to the guilt of the accused. The learned Judges concluded that a true confession
voluntarily made could be acted upon with slight evidence to corroborate the
same, but a retracted confession requires the Court to be assured that the
retraction was an after-thought and that the earlier statement was true.
Similar views were expressed in the other two cases referred to hereinabove,
but it would be profitable to reproduce the views of the four Judge Bench in Pyare
Lal Bharagavas case (supra) which has been reproduced in Navjot Sandhus
case, in the following terms :- A retracted confession may form the legal
basis of a conviction if the court is satisfied that it was true and was
voluntarily made. But it has been held that a Court shall not base a conviction
on such a conviction without corroboration. It is not a rule of law, but is
only rule of Prudence. If cannot even be laid down as an inflexible rule of
practice of prudence that under no circumstances can such a conviction be made
without corroboration, for a court may, in a particular case, be convinced of
the absolute truth of a confession and prepared to act upon it without
corroboration; but it may be laid down as a general rule of practice that it is
unsafe to rely upon a confession much less on a retracted confession, unless
the court is satisfied that the retracted confession is true and voluntary made
and has been corroborated in material particulars.
While the above mentioned decisions dealt with other criminal enactments, the
next case referred to by Mr. Gambhir, namely, A.K. Mehaboob vs. Intelligence
Officer, Narcotics Control Bureau, (2001 10 SCC 203) is a decision under the
NDPS Act with due regard to the provisions of Sections 42 and 67 thereof. The
criminal appeal of Shri A.K. Mehaboob was heard alongwith the appeal filed by Shri
P.K. Naushad, who were the second and third accused facing charges for having
committed an offence under Sections 21 and 29 of the NDPS Ac.
the first accused, Divakaran, was found guilty and convicted on the strength of
recovery of brown sugar from him, the two appellants before this Court were
acquitted by the trial court but were convicted by the High Court in appeal
preferred by the Narcotics Control Bureau. From the facts of the said case, it
appears that apart from the statement made by Naushad under Section 67 of the
NDPS Act there was other evidence to indicate that business in Narcotic drugs
was being transacted from his house. His appeal was therefore rejected. As far
as Mehaboob was concerned, his statement did not contain any statement, which
could involve him in the offence.
High Court, therefore, allowed the appeal filed by Mehaboob and set aside his
this line of decisions, Mr. Gambhir lastly referred to a decision of this Court
in Pon Adhithan vs. Deputy Director, Narcotics Control Bureau, Madras (1999 6
SCC 1) wherein, in fact, the confessional statement made by the accused-
appellant while in custody of the Intelligence Officer, Narcotics Intelligence
Bureau, was relied upon to convict the said accused, on it being held that the
said statement had been voluntarily made as no complaint of threat or pressure
had been made by the accused when he was produced before the Magistrate. Mr. Gambhir
sought to distinguish the said decision on the ground that while in Pon Adhithans
case, no complaint had been made by the accused of any threat or compulsion for
making such statement, in the present case the confession made by the appellant
herein was immediately retracted on the very next date when the appellant was
produced before the Magistrate and that, too, in writing by way of an
application. Mr. Gambhir reiterated that the said application was referred to
by the learned trial court in its judgment. Mr. Gambhir also submitted that
since the trial court had chosen not to rely on the statement made by the
appellant under Section 67 of the NDPS Act, in the absence of any corroborating
evidence, the evidentiary value of the retracted confession had not been gone
into by the learned trial court.
Reliance was also placed by Mr. Gambhir on the Constitution Bench decision in Haricharan
Kurmi vs. State of Bihar (1964 6 SCR 623) in support of his submission that
apart from the statement of Phoolchand, the main accused, there was no other
evidence to connect the appellant with the alleged offence under the NDPS Act.
In the said case, the Constitution Bench, held that though a confession within
the meaning of Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, cannot strictly speaking
be treated as evidence as defined in Section 3, it is an element which may be
taken into consideration by the criminal courts but the court cannot start with
the confession of a co-accused person, but must begin with other evidence
adduced by the prosecution before relying on the confession of the co-accused.
behalf of the Union of India, Mr. B.B. Singh, learned Advocate, submitted that
having regard to the decisions of this Court in Pon Adithan vs. Dy. Director
Narcotics Bureau, (supra), A.K. Mehaboob vs. Intelligence Officer, Narcotics,
(supra) and M.Prabhulal vs. The Assistant Director, Directorate of Revenue Intellegence
(2003) 8 SCC 449, the appellant had been rightly convicted on his confessional
statement made under Section 67 of the NDPS Act alongwith the evidence of PW 9
Suresh Badlani, Inspector in the office of the Deputy Narcotics Commissioner, Lucknow,
U.P., before whom such statement had been made. Mr. Singh also submitted that
even if the person was in custody at the time when he made such confessional
statement, the same would not attract the bar under Article 20(3) of the
Constitution, if it was made voluntarily. Mr. Singh also emphasised that in all
the three cases referred to hereinabove the accused were in custody when their
confessional statements were recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act.
Mr. Singh further submitted that although PW 9 had deposed that the
confessional statement had been made by the appellant on 8.6.97 before him in
the office of the Deputy Commissioner, there was no cross-examination on this
point on behalf of the appellant and consequently the confessional statement of
the appellant had to be accepted.
the issue involving retraction by the appellant of his statement made before
the Inspector under Section 67 of the NDPS Act, Mr. Singh submitted that the
application which the appellant is said to have filed before the Magistrate was
never proved or exhibited in the Trial Court and did not form part of the
evidence on record. He submitted that the same could not, therefore, be taken
note of or be relied upon in support of the appellants case of retracted
support of his aforesaid submission Mr. Singh referred to the decision of the
eleven Judge Bench of this Court in State of Bombay vs. Kathi Kalu Oghad and
others (1962) 3 SCR 10) wherein it was, inter alia, concluded that the accused
person cannot be said to have been compelled to be a witness against himself
simply because he made a statement while in police custody, without anything
more. In other words, just being in Police custody when the statement was made would
not, by itself, give rise to an inference that the accused had been compelled
to make such statement. It was also held that to bring the statement within the
prescription of Article 20(3), the person accused must have stood in the
character of an accused person at the time he made the statement. It is not
enough that he should become an accused any time after the statement had been
From the facts of the case and the submissions made on behalf of the respective
parties the point which emerges for determination is upto what extent can a
statement under Section 67 of the NDPS Act be relied upon for convicting a
person accused of having committed an offence under the provisions of the said
Act. In order to arrive at a decision in regard to the above, it will also have
to be considered whether such a statement would attract the bar both of
Sections 24 to 27 of the Indian Evidence Act as also Article 20(3) of the
Constitution of India. For the aforesaid purpose, the provisions of Section 67
of the N.D.P.S. Act are reproduced hereinbelow:- 67. Power to call for
information, etc. Any officer referred to in section 42 who is authorised in
this behalf by the Central Government or a State Government may, during the
course of any enquiry in connection with the contravention of any provisions of
call for information from any person for the purpose of satisfying himself
whether there has been any contravention of the provisions of this Act or any
rule or order made thereunder;
any person to produce or deliver any document or thing useful or relevant to
any person acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case.
parallel may be drawn between the provisions of Section 67 of the NDPS Act and
Sections 107 and 108 of the Customs Act and to a large extent Section 32 of the
Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 and Section 15 of the Terrorist and
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. These are all special Acts meant
to deal with special situations and circumstances. While the provisions of the
Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, and TADA Act, 1987, are much more stringent
and excludes from its purview the provisions of Sections 24 to 27 of the
Evidence Act with regard to confession made before a police officer, the
provisions relating to statements made during inquiry under the Customs Act and
under the NDPS Act are less stringent and continues to attract the provisions
of the Evidence Act. In the case of both the latter enactments, initially an
inquiry is contemplated during which a person may be called upon to provide any
information relevant to the inquiry as to whether there has been any
contravention of the provisions of the Act or any Rule or Order made thereunder.
At that stage the person concerned is not an accused although he may be said to
be in custody. But on the basis of the statements made by him he could be made
an accused subsequently. What is important is whether the statement made by the
person concerned is made during inquiry prior to his arrest or after he had
been formally charged with the offence and made an accused in respect thereof.
As long as such statement was made by the accused at a time when he was not
under arrest, the bar under Sections 24 to 27 of the Evidence Act would not
operate nor would the provisions of Article 20(3) of the Constitution be
attracted. It is only after a person is placed in the position of an accused
that the bar imposed under the aforesaid provision will come into play.
course, this Court has also held in Pon Adithans case (supra) that even if
a person is placed under arrest and thereafter makes a statement which seeks to
incriminate him, the bar under Article 20(3) of the Constitution would not
operate against him if such statement was given voluntarily and without any
threat or compulsion and if supported by corroborating evidence.
The law involved in deciding this appeal has been considered by this Court from
as far back as in 1963 in Pyare Lal Bhargavas case (supra). The consistent
view which has been taken with regard to confessions made under provisions of
Section 67 of the NDPS Act and other criminal enactments, such as the Customs
Act, 1962, has been that such statements may be treated as confessions for the
purpose of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, but with the caution that the Court
should satisfy itself that such statements had been made voluntarily and at a
time when the person making such statement had not been made an accused in
connection with the alleged offence. In addition to the above, in the case of Raj
Kumar Karwal v. Union of India and others (1990) 2 SCC 409, this Court held
that officers of the Department of Revenue Intelligence who have been vested
with powers of an Officer-in-Charge of a police station under Section 53 of the
NDPS Act, 1985, are not police officers within the meaning of Section
25 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, a confessional statement recorded by such
officer in the course of investigation of a person accused of an offence under
the Act is admissible in evidence against him. It was also held that power
conferred on officers under the NDPS Act in relation to arrest, search and
seizure were similar to powers vested on officers under the Customs Act.
Nothing new has been submitted which can persuade us to take a different view.
Considering the provisions of Section 67 of the N.D.P.S. Act and the views
expressed by this Court in Raj Kumar Karwals case (supra), with which we
agree, that an officer vested with the powers of an Officer-in-Charge of a
Police Station under Section 53 of the above Act is not a Police
Officer within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, it is clear
that a statement made under Section 67 of the N.D.P.S. Act is not the same as a
statement made under Section 161 of the Code, unless made under threat or
coercion. It is this vital difference, which allows a statement made under
Section 67 of the N.D.P.S. Act to be used as a confession against the person
making it and excludes it from the operation of Sections 24 to 27 of the
There is nothing on record to suggest that the appellant was compelled under
threat to make the statement after he had been placed under arrest which
renders such statement inadmissible and not capable of being relied upon in
order to convict him. On the other hand, there is the evidence of PW9 upon
which the High Court has relied in convicting the appellant. It may once again
be mentioned that no question in cross-examination had been put to PW9 in this
regard and the version of the said witness must be accepted as corroborative of
the statement made by the accused.
may also be recalled that though an application was made for retracting the
confession made by the appellant, neither was any order passed on the said application
nor was the same proved during the trial so as to water down the evidentiary
value of the said statement. On the other hand, in the absence of such evidence
on record, the High Court had no option but to proceed on the basis of the
confession as made by the appellant under Section 67 of the NDPS Act. Since it
has been held by this Court that an officer for the purposes of Section 67 of
the NDPS Act read with Section 42 thereof, is not a police officer, the bar
under Sections 24 and 27 of the Evidence Act cannot be attracted and the
statement made by a person directed to appear before the officer concerned may
be relied upon as a confessional statement against such person. Since a
conviction can be maintained solely on the basis of a confession made under
Section 67 of the NDPS Act, we see no reason to interfere with the conclusion
of the High Court convicting the appellant.
We, accordingly, dismiss the appeal and maintain the order of conviction and
sentence passed against the appellant by the High Court.