Vs. State of Maharashtra
 Insc 42 (16 January 2007)
Sinha & Markandey Katju S.B. Sinha, J :
appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 27.01.2005 passed by a
learned Single Judge of the Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay High Court in
Criminal Appeal No. 23 of 1991 whereby and whereunder the appeal preferred by
the appellant herein against a judgment of conviction and sentence dated
16.01.1991 was dismissed.
herein is a resident of Ambedkarnagar, Nanded. He was a mechanic of
two-wheelers. One Shivrani Dhondiba Kshirsagar, aged about 6 years at that
time, was also residing at House No. 14, Ambedkarnagar, Nanded. He allured the
said child to ride with him on his Luna. She was taken towards Aerodrome. A
search was made for her, but she could not be traced. She came back to her
house weeping and crying. It has been noticed by the High Court :
her mother made query, she told that the person who used to repair Luna had
taken her towards aerodrome on Luna and thee, after removing her nicker, he
urinated on his private part. She also told that as a result of the same, she
was having pains at her private part. After arrival of the father of the prosecutrix,
Vandana, the mother of the prosecutrix narrated the incident to him. The prosecutrix
also narrated the said incident to her father. Thereafter, father tried to
search the person who had committed the above acts, but he was not traced"
A First Information Report could not be lodged immediately as night had set in.
On the next day, the girl was taken to the 'Noor Garage' where the appellant
was identified as the person who had committed the 'mischievous act' against
her on the previous day. The First Information Report thereafter was lodged.
The prosecutrix was medically examined by one Dr. Sheela Kadam. The medical
report reads as under :
No evidence of
injury over valva
External anal spinctor
abrasion anteriorly and laterally about
examination not possible.
No semen deposit
and hymen intact. So wet smear for spearm taken from rectum. Negative.
is evidence of intercourse through rectum." Although a chargesheet was
filed against the appellant under Sections 363 and 376 of the Indian Penal
Code, but the same was altered to one under Sections 363, 376 read with Section
511 and Section 377 thereof.
the learned Sessions Judge, not only the prosecutrix but also her mother Vandana
Dhondiba Kshirsagar and father Dhondiba Kishan Kshirsagar were examined.
the testimonies of the said witnesses, the learned Sessions Judge found the
charges to have been proved as against the appellant. He was convicted under
Sections 363, 376 read with Section 511 and Section 377 IPC. He was sentenced
to suffer rigorous imprisonments for three years, five years and seven years
under Sections 363, 376/511 and 377 IPC respectively and to pay a fine of
Rs.2,000/- under Section 363 and Rs. 3,000/- each under Section 376/511 and 377
appeal preferred by the appellant herein was dismissed by the High Court by
reason of the impugned judgment. Hence, the appellant is before us.
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant would submit that the
appellant having not been put to test identification parade, which was
imperative having regard to the fact that the prosecutrix did not know him, the
impugned judgment cannot be sustained.
furthermore submitted that although the age of the appellant on the date of the
occurrence was more than sixteen years but below eighteen years, having regard
to the provision of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
2000, (for short, 'the 2000 Act), it was imperative on the part of the court to
follow the procedures laid down therein.
fact that the appellant as also the prosecutrix are of the same town is not in
dispute. It is also not in dispute that the appellant was a mechanic of two-
wheelers. He was working in the 'Noor Garage'. At about 2.00 p.m. on 16.12.1989, the appellant allured the prosecutrix
stating that he would take her on his Luna for a ride. She was tempted to go
along with him. The medical report is also not in dispute. The identification
of the accused by the prosecutrix on the next day also stands proved.
regard to the depositions of the prosecutrix and her parents, the learned
Sessions Judge as also the High Court cannot be held to have committed any
error in arriving at the finding as noticed hereinbefore. The High Court, in
our opinion, has rightly opined :
because there was no evidence of stains over perineum or clothes and no semen
was detected, it cannot be concluded that sexual intercourse through rectum had
not taken place. Suggestion in this behalf has been categorically denied by Dr.
Sheela Kadam. So, the medical evidence, in fact, supports the version of prosecutrix.
Merely because prosecutrix has stated that the accused put his penis on her
private part and urinated there and has not specifically stated that he had
inserted his penis in her vagina on her private part, we cannot jump to the
conclusion that there was no attempt on the part of the accused to commit rape
on prosecutrix. We must take into consideration the fact that the prosecutrix
is hardly of six years age and whatever act was committed by the accused, she might
have thought that the accused urinated there, but in fact, the evidence
indicates that he must have tried to commit rape on Prosecutrix. However,
finding that it is difficult to insert his penis in her vagina, intercourse
through rectum was committed. The doctor has stated that there is evidence of
intercourse through rectum" The deposition of the prosecutrix, in our
opinion, clearly shows that she was absolutely an innocent girl. So far as the
submission of the learned counsel in regard to non-holding of the test
identification parade of the appellant is concerned, we are of the opinion that
having regard to the fact that the appellant was known to the prosecutrix and
her family members and she having identified him before lodging of the F.I.R.,
it would have been futile to hold a test identification parade.
otherwise the substantive evidence is the evidence of identification in court.
Bhikamsing Thakur v. State of Maharashtra 2007 (1) SCALE 62]. We, therefore,
cannot accept the contention that the prosecution has not proved its case.
as the submission of the learned counsel in regard to the applicability of the
2000 Act, is concerned, it is not in dispute that the appellant on the date of
occurrence had completed sixteen years of age. The offence having been
committed on 16.12.1989, the 2000 Act has no application. In terms of the
Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, 'juvenile' was defined to mean "a boy who had
not attained the age of sixteen years or a girl who had attained the age of
applicability of the provisions of Section 20 of the 2000 Act was considered by
a Constitution Bench of this Court in Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand and
Another [(2005) 3 SCC 551], wherein, inter alia, it was held :
Section 20 of the Act as quoted above deals with the special provision in
respect of pending cases and begins with non-obstante clause. The sentence
"notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in
respect of a juvenile pending in any court in any area on date of which this
Act came into force" has great significance. The proceedings in respect of
a juvenile pending in any court referred to in Section 20 of the Act are
relatable to proceedings initiated before the 2000 Act came into force and
which are pending when the 2000 Act came into force. The term "any
court" would include even ordinary criminal courts. If the person was a
"juvenile" under the 1986 Act the proceedings would not be pending in
would be pending in criminal courts only if the boy had crossed 16 years or
girl had crossed 18 years. This shows that Section 20 refers to cases where a
person had ceased to be a juvenile under the 1986 Act but had not yet crossed
the age of 18 years then the pending case shall continue in that Court as if
the 2000 Act has not been passed and if the Court finds that the juvenile has
committed an offence, it shall record such finding and instead of passing any
sentence in respect of the juvenile, shall forward the juvenile to the Board
which shall pass orders in respect of that juvenile.
This Rule also indicates that the intention of the Legislature was that the
provisions of the 2000 Act were to apply to pending cases provided, on 1.4.2001
date on which the 2000 Act came into force, the person was a
"juvenile" within the meaning of the term as defined in the 2000 Act
i.e. he/she had not crossed 18 years of age.
xxx (b) The 2000 Act would be applicable in a pending proceeding in any
court/authority initiated under the 1986 Act and is pending when the 2000 Act
came into force and the person had not completed 18 years of age as on
1.4.2001." The appellant was above eighteen years of age on 01.04.2001.
The 2000, therefore, cannot have any application whatsoever in the instant
the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed