JODHRAJ SINGH V. STATE OF RAJASTHAN  INSC 474 (27 APRIL 2007)
S.B. Sinha & Markandey Katju
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 634 OF 2007 [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2284 of 2006]
S.B. SINHA, J :
Appellant together with various others were tried for commission of an
offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for causing murder of one
Vishava Priya @ Lalla on 13.12.1992. A First Information Report in relation to
the said incident was lodged by one Ashok Kumar Sharma. The incident allegedly
took place at about 6 p.m. on the said date. In the First Information Report,
the complainant alleged that at the said date and time when he himself and his
uncle Mahendra Kumar had been getting the Pattis loaded near the road, a tempo
(a three wheeler) occupied by one Ajij Naeem, Bhupendra and the appellant
arrived. The accused were armed with weapons like lathi, dhariya, ballam and
sariya. As there existed a dispute between the deceased and Bhupendra,
apprehending that they may kill him, the complainant and the said Mahendra
Kumar immediately came to the place of occurrence and found the appellant and
others assaulting the deceased. They, on seeing them, ran away. A First
Information Report was lodged at about 9.10 p.m. on the same day. Appellant was
named therein along with others, wherein it was alleged that he was armed with
a gandasi and he along with others assaulted the deceased. It was furthermore
alleged that Bhupendra had thrown a stone on the deceased, due to which he
suffered a wound on his head. Investigation into commission of the offence was
carried out. Upon completion of the investigation, a chargesheet was filed
against the appellant as also the said Ajij, Naeem and Bhupendra.
Appellant had been absconding for about seven years. His case was separated
from that of the other accused. Two separate trials, thus, took place in
relation to the said incident.
In the first trial involving the accused named in the First Information
Report, other than the appellant, several witnesses were examined. Two of them,
viz., Ram Het (PW-8) and Ghasi Lal (PW-9) fully supported the prosecution case.
One Pratap Yadav (PW-10) and Alok Tripathi (PW-14), however, were declared
hostile therein. In the second trial, where the appellant was involved, they
also turned hostile. Appellant was, however, convicted. Four separate appeals
were preferred before the High Court.
The learned Sessions Judge as also the High Court, however, relied on the
testimonies of the said witnesses as they, when confronted with their earlier
statements, accepted that they had deposed against the appellant.
According to them, they did so on having been asked to do so by some
villagers. The learned Sessions Judge as also the High Court did not rely upon
that part of the testimonies of the said witnesses. The High Court, therefore,
by reason of the impugned judgment upheld the conviction and sentence of the
Mr. Mohan Pandey, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, at
the very outset drew our attention to the fact that the deceased was a known
criminal and a large number of cases were pending against him and as such the
possibility of his being killed by some unknown persons cannot be ruled out. It
was submitted that as four prosecution witnesses had turned hostile, the
impugned judgment cannot be sustained.
The first informant Ashok Kumar Sharma examined himself as PW-
17. He, as noticed hereinbefore, not only named the appellant in the First
Information Report but also in his deposition, he categorically stated about
the role played by each of the accused persons. He stated that the appellant
took part in the entire assault and furthermore inflicted a gandasi blow on the
head of the deceased. He knew all the accused persons including the appellant
from his childhood.
Both the learned Trial Judge as also the High Court relied upon the
testimonies of the said witness. We see no reason to differ therewith.
Dr. Rakesh Kumar Sharma (PW-13) conducted the post mortem on the dead body
of the deceased at about 9.45 a.m. on 14.12.1992. He found the following
ante-mortem injuries on the person of the deceased:
"1. Abrasion < x < on left shoulder posteriorily.
2. Lacerated wound 1" x 1/2" x B.D. vertical on left side of chin.
3. Lacerated would 1" x =" x 1" on left angle of mouth.
4. Lacerated wound 3" x 1" x 2" on fore head left side.
Bone broken in pieces, brain matter, badly lacerated eye ball pushed inside.
5. Abrasion 1" x =" vertical on left cheek.
6. Lacerated wound 1" x =" x =" on left frontal parietal
7. Incised wound 4" x 2" x 2" transverse tempo parietal
region left side, and 8. Bruise 1" x 1" on nose."
Ram Het (PW-2 in the first trial and PW-8 in the second) spoke in details
about the participation of the accused persons including the appellant herein.
So did the other eye-witness Ghasi Lal (PW-9).
In both the trials, common witnesses were examined. At the cost of
repetition, we may state that the first informant had supported the prosecution
case in its entirety in both the trials. He has been believed.
The High Court took up all the appeals together for hearing. The only
distinctive fact in the case involving the appellant was PWs 8 and 9 turned
hostile, but the same, in our opinion, would not materially alter the
prosecution case, as a conviction can even be based on the testimony of a
single witness. The courts furthermore are entitled to rely upon a part of the
testimony of a witness who has been permitted to be cross-examined by the
In State of U.P. v. Ramesh Prasad Misra and Another [(1996) 10 SCC 360],
this Court opined:
"7. The question is whether the first respondent was present at the
time of death or was away in the village of DW 1, his brother-in-law. It is
rather most unfortunate that these witnesses, one of whom was an advocate,
having given the statements about the facts within their special knowledge,
under Section 161 recorded during investigation, have resiled from correctness
of the versions in the statements. They have not given any reason as to why the
investigating officer could record statements contrary to what they had
disclosed. It is equally settled law that the evidence of a hostile witness
would not be totally rejected if spoken in favour of the prosecution or the
accused, but it can be subjected to close scrutiny and that portion of the
evidence which is consistent with the case of the prosecution or defence may be
[See also Gurpreet Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 8 SCC 18 and Gagan
Kanojia & Anr. v. State of Punjab, 2006 (12) SCALE 479] Moreover, while
recording a judgment of conviction, the court may consider a part of the
deposition of a witness who had been permitted to be cross-examined by
prosecution having regard to the fact situation obtaining in the said case. How
the evidence adduced before it shall be appreciated by the court would depend
on the facts and circumstances of each case.
It is trite that only because a witness, for one reason or the other, has,
to some extent, resiled from his earlier statement by itself may not be
sufficient to discard the prosecution case in its entirety. The courts even in
such a situation are not powerless. Keeping in view the materials available on
record, it is permissible for a court of law to rely upon a part of the
testimony of the witness who has been declared hostile.
Appellant was seen in the company of the other accused. Sufficient materials
have been brought on records to establish that he participated in commission of
the offence. All the accused persons came together in a tempo. They were armed
with various weapons. They assaulted the deceased. The learned Sessions Judge
as also the High Court found existence of a motive for commission of the
offence. They left the place of occurrence together. It may be that the
ultimate cause of death was found to be an assault by stone on the head of the
deceased which is said to be the act of Bhupendra but only by reason thereof
existence of the common intention on the part of the appellant cannot be said
to be absent.
Reliance by the learned counsel for the appellant on Mithu Singh v.
State of Punjab [(2001) 4 SCC 193] is misplaced. Therein, no overt act was
attributed to the appellant therein. The court found that no evidence was
brought on records as against him, save and except ipse dixit on the part of the
witnesses. This Court, in the aforementioned fact situation, opined:
"6. To substantiate a charge under Section 302 with the aid of Section
34 it must be shown that the criminal act complained against was done by one of
the accused persons in furtherance of the common intention of both. Common
intention has to be distinguished from same or similar intention.
It is true that it is difficult, if not impossible, to collect and produce
direct evidence in proof of the intention of the accused and mostly an
inference as to intention shall have to be drawn from the acts or conduct of
the accused or other relevant circumstances, as available. An inference as to
common intention shall not be readily drawn; the culpable liability can arise
only if such inference can be drawn with a certain degree of assurance.
At the worst Mithu Singh, accused-appellant, knew that his co-accused
Bharpur Singh was armed with a pistol. The knowledge of previous enmity
existing between Bharpur Singh and the deceased can also be attributed to Mithu
Singh. But there is nothing available on record to draw an inference that the
co-accused Bharpur Singh had gone to the house of the deceased with the
intention of causing her death and such intention was known to Mithu Singh,
much less shared by him. Simply because Mithu Singh was himself armed with a
pistol would not necessarily lead to an inference that he had also reached the
house of the deceased or had accompanied the co-accused Bharpur Singh with the
intention of causing the death of Gurdial Kaur.
In our opinion, an inference as to Mithu Singh, accused-appellant having
shared with Bharpur Singh a common intention of causing the murder of the
deceased Gurdial Kaur cannot be drawn. His conviction under Sections 302/34 IPC
cannot be sustained and must be set aside."
Such is not the position here.
regards formation of common intention, this Court opined:
"Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code envisages that "when a
criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention
of all, each of such persons, is liable for that act, in the same manner as if
it were done by him alone". The underlying principle behind the said
provision is joint liability of persons in doing of a criminal act which must
have found in the existence of common intention of enmity in the acts in
committing the criminal act in furtherance thereof. The law in this behalf is
no longer res integra. There need not be a positive overt act on the part of
the person concerned. Even an omission on his part to do something may attract
the said provision. But it is beyond any cavil of doubt that the question must
be answered having regard to the fact situation obtaining in each case."
[See also Triloki Nath and Others v. State of U.P., (2005) 13 SCC 323] In
Pardeep Kumar v. Union Administration, Chandigarh [(2006) 10 SCC 608], this
"12. It is settled law that the common intention or the intention of
the individual concerned in furtherance of the common intention could be proved
either from direct evidence or by inference from the acts or attending
circumstances of the case and conduct of the parties. Direct proof of common
intention is seldom available and, therefore, such intention can only be
inferred from the circumstances appearing from the proved facts of the case and
the proved circumstances."
We are, having regard to the materials brought on record by the prosecution,
satisfied that the appellant shared common intention with the other accused in
committing the crime.
We, therefore, do not find any infirmity in judgments of the learned
Sessions Judge and the High Court. The appeal is dismissed accordingly.