Institute of Technology,Jamshedpur & Ors Vs. Chandra Shekhar Chaudhary
 Insc 795 (13
Pasayat & Lokeshwar Singh Panta
out of SLP (C) No. 15833 of 2004) ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Jharkhand
High Court dismissing the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the appellant against
the judgment of the learned Single Judge in a writ petition. The respondent
filed a writ petition for a direction to the appellant to relieve him so that
he would be in a position to pursue his Ph.D course in Indian Institute of
Technology, Madras (in short 'IIT').
background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
writ petitioner (respondent herein) is an Associate Professor in Metallurgical
Engineering Department of the National Institute of Technology, Jamshedpur, the appellant herein. According to
the writ petition, the writ petitioner submitted an application for admission
in Quality Improvement Programme (QIP) sponsored by AICTE through Regional
Institute of Technology, Jamshedpur. He was selected for admission in
IIT, Madras and was asked to appear at that
institution for completing pre-registration formalities.
to the writ petition, though he made an application to the appellant for
relieving him to make the pre-registration visit, he had been illegally and
arbitrarily denied the permission by the appellant. According to the writ
petitioner, the action of the appellant was unreasonable and was also
discriminatory. The appellant resisted the writ petition by pointing out that
according to the norms, if on relieving a teacher to attend such a programme,
the staff strength in that department would go below 70 percent of the fixed
capacity, the permission was to be denied and if the writ petitioner was to be
relieved as sought for by him, the strength in that department would be reduced
to 6l.9% of the sanctioned strength and it was in that situation that he was
not accorded permission to get himself registered for the course. It was also
submitted that even originally, while forwarding his application, the writ
petitioner had been informed that he would be able to pursue his course only if
he could be relieved from the Institute and only if on his being relieved, the
staff strength would not be reduced below 70%. The plea of discrimination was
denied and it was submitted that the writ petitioner was deliberately
attempting to malign the department by raising the bogey of his being a member
of a Scheduled Caste and was trying even to blackmail the authorities by
threatening that he would commit suicide if he was not relieved. The writ
petition deserves to be dismissed.
the learned Single Judge found that there was a norm providing for refusal of
permission to a teacher to go in for such a course if the staff strength would
be reduced below 70% yet it was observed that there was no consistency in that
regard and the norms were not followed in several cases.
it would not be fair to deny such an opportunity.
appellant preferred Letters Patent Appeal before the High Court.
pointed out that pursuant to an administrative decision dated 9.11.2003 by the
Ministry of Human Resources Development (in short the 'HRD') the Board of Governors
had adopted the Leave Rules and Conduct Rules of the National Institute of
Technology for implementation in the institute.
decision was taken on the day the matter was heard by a learned Single Judge
and the orders were reserved. By the time the learned Single Judge pronounced
its judgment IIT, Delhi Rules had already become operative and, therefore, no
member of the teaching staff could be relieved for such a course, if the
available strength of the staff gets reduced below 85%. To state differently,
only quota of 15% could be permitted for such a course.
Division Bench held that though on principles it would have agreed with the
appellant's stand that when the norms prescribed that the strength should not
be reduced below 70% by relieving a teacher for a programme such a teacher
should not be relieved, yet it was held because the norm was universally
implemented. The learned Single Judge was justified in his view.
counsel for the appellant submitted that merely because there may have been any
lapse in the past, that could not have been taken as a ground by the High Court
to grant relief to the respondent. It was further pointed out that the
respondent did not continue his programme as Ph.D. degree at IIT, Madras after April, 2005. But as is
evident from the letter of IIT Madras, respondent had secured low grades in the
three subjects he had appeared and he had not attended the rest of the course.
It was pointed out that the respondent has manipulated and fabricated documents
to show that he was being prevented by the functionaries of the appellant from
carrying on the study course. Respondent is also guilty, according to him, of
making false and biased allegations against the functionaries of the appellant.
counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that there is no reason
as to why a different yardstick was sought to be applied for the respondent. He
was the victim of machination. The respondent has clearly established as to how
and why it was not possible for him to attend the course after April, 2005. It
is submitted that the appellant with mala fide intention has pursued the
State of Haryana & Ors. v. Ram Kumar Mann [1997
(3) SCC 321] this Court observed:
doctrine of discrimination is founded upon existence of an enforceable right.
He was discriminated and denied equality as some similarly situated persons had
been given the same relief. Article 14 would apply only when invidious
discrimination is meted out to equals and similarly circumstanced without any
rational basis or relationship in that behalf.
respondent has no right, whatsoever and cannot be given the relief wrongly
given to them, i.e., benefit of withdrawal of resignation.
High Court was wholly wrong in reaching the conclusion that there was invidious
discrimination. If we cannot allow a wrong to perpetrate, an employee, after
committing mis- appropriation of money, is dismissed from service and
subsequently that order is withdrawn and he is reinstated into the service. Can
a similarly Circumstanced person claim equality under Section 14 for
Reinstatement? The answer is obviously "No".
converse case, in the first instance, one may be wrong but the wrong order
cannot be the foundation for claiming equality for enforcement of the same
order. As stated earlier, his right must be founded upon enforceable right to
entitle him to the equality treatment for enforcement thereof.
wrong decision by the Government does not give a right to enforce the wrong
order and claim parity or equality. Two wrongs can never make a right".
[See: State of Bihar and others v. Kameshwar Prasad
Singh and Another (2000) 9 SCC 94, Vikrama Shama Shetty v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (2006 (6) SCC 70), South
Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Prem Kumar Sharma and Ors. (2006 (7) SCALE 240), Ekta
Shakti Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi (JT 2006 (6) SC 500), and South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Prem Kumar
Sharma and Ors. (AIR 2006 SC 2727).
because in some cases the norms may not have been followed that cannot be a
ground to hold that departure from norms should be continued. There are serious
allegations about respondent having manipulated and fabricated documents to
substantiate his stand. We need not go into these allegations. But as has been
fairly accepted by the learned counsel for the respondent, there is no official
communication from IIT Madras to support the respondent's stand that he was
asked by the authorities of the said institute not to attend the programme.
There should have been some material to support the stand. Unfortunately, for
the respondent there is none. On the other hand admittedly after April, 2005
the respondent had abandoned the programme. It is also on record that the
appellant notwithstanding these facts had asked the respondent to report back
to IIT, Madras to continue studies in terms of
High Court's direction. But that does not seem to have been done by the
inevitable result is that the orders of the learned Single Judge and the
Division Bench of the High Court cannot be maintained and are accordingly set
aside. The appeal is allowed but in the circumstances without any order as to