Priya Patel Vs. State of M.P. & Anr  Insc 399 (12 July 2006)
Pasayat & S.H. Kapadia
out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 68 of 2006) ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
lady be prosecuted for gang rape is the interesting question involved in this appeal.
in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court holding that the charge framed against the appellant under
Sections 323 and 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short 'IPC') is
facts in a nutshell are as follows:
was lodged by the prosecutrix alleging that she was returning by Utkal Express
after attending a sports meet. When she reached her destination at Sagar,
accused Bhanu Pratap Patel (husband of the accused appellant) met her at the
railway station and told her that her father has asked him to pick her up from
the railway station. Since the prosecutrix was suffering from fever, she
accompanied accused Bhanu Pratap Patel to his house. He committed rape on her.
When commission of rape was going on, his wife, the present appellant reached
there. The prosecutrix requested the appellant to save her. Instead of saving
her, the appellant slapped her, closed the door of the house and left place of
incident. On the basis of the complaint lodged, investigation was undertaken
and charge-sheet was filed. While accused Bhanu Pratap Patel was charged for
offences punishable under Sections 323 and 376 IPC the appellant, as noted
above, was charged for commission of offences punishable under Sections 323 and
376(2)(g) IPC. The revision filed before the High Court questioned legality of
the charge framed so far as the appellant is concerned, relatable to Section
376 (2)(g) IPC. It was contended that a woman cannot be charged for commission
of offence of rape. The High Court was of the view that though a woman cannot
commit rape, but if a woman facilitates the act of rape, Explanation-I to
Section 376(2) comes into operation and she can be prosecuted for "gang
to learned counsel for the appellant the High Court has clearly missed the
essence of Sections 375 and 376 IPC. It was submitted that as the woman cannot
commit rape, she cannot certainly be convicted for commission of "gang
rape", and Explanation-I to Section 376(2) IPC has no relevance and/or
contra, learned counsel for the State supported the order. Additionally, it was
submitted that even if for the sake of argument it is conceded that the
appellant cannot be prosecuted for commission of offence punishable under
Section 376(2)(g), she can certainly be prosecuted for commission of the
offence of abetment.
order to appreciate rival submissions Sections 375 and 376 need to be noted.
They so far as relevant read as follows:-
"Rape A man
is said to commit "rape" who, except in the case hereinafter
excepted, has sexual intercourse with a woman under circumstances falling under
any of the six following descriptions:--
Against her will.
Without her consent.
With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any
person in whom she is interested in fear of death or of hurt.
her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband, and that her
consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or
believes herself to be lawfully married.
her consent, when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness
of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through
another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand
the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent.
With or without her consent, when she is under sixteen years of age.
Explanation.--Penetration is sufficient to
constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of rape.
Exception.--Sexual intercourse by a man with his
own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape.] 376.
Punishment for rape
in the cases provided for by sub-section (1), commits rape shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than
seven years but which may be for life or for a term which may extend to ten
years and shall also be liable to fine unless the women raped is his own wife
and is not under twelve years of age, in which cases, he shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years or
with fine or with both:
that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the
judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than seven
Whoever,-- xx xx
xx xx xx
rape, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not
be less than ten years but which may be for life and shall also be liable to
that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the
judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment of either description for a term of
less than ten years,
Explanation I.--Where a woman is raped by one or more in a group of
persons acting in furtherance of their common intention, each of the persons
shall be deemed to have committed gang rape within the meaning of this
x xx xx
xx xx A bare reading of Section 375 makes the position clear that rape can be
committed only by a man. The section itself provides as to when a man can be
said to have committed rape. Section 376(2) makes certain categories of serious
cases of rape as enumerated therein attract more severe punishment. One of them
relates to "gang rape". The language of sub-section(2)(g) provides
that "whoever commits 'gang rape" shall be punished etc. The
Explanation only clarifies that when a woman is raped by one or more in a group
of persons acting in furtherance of their common intention each such person
shall be deemed to have committed gang rape within this sub-section (2). That
cannot make a woman guilty of committing rape. This is conceptually inconceivable.
The Explanation only indicates that when one or more persons act in furtherance
of their common intention to rape a woman, each person of the group shall be
deemed to have committed gang rape. By operation of the deeming provision, a
person who has not actually committed rape is deemed to have committed rape
even if only one of the group in furtherance of the common intention has
intention" is dealt with in Section 34 IPC and provides that when a
criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention
of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it
was done by him alone. "Common intention" denotes action in concert
and necessarily postulates a pre-arranged plan, a prior meeting of minds and an
element of participation in action. The acts may be different and vary in
character, but must be actuated by the same common intention, which is
different from same intention or similar intention. The sine qua non for
bringing in application of Section 34 IPC that the act must be done in
furtherance of the common intention to do a criminal act. The expression
"in furtherance of their common intention" as appearing in the
Explanation to Section 376(2) relates to intention to commit rape. A woman
cannot be said to have an intention to commit rape. Therefore, the counsel for
the appellant is right in her submission that the appellant cannot be
prosecuted for alleged commission of the offence punishable under Section 376(2)(g).
residual question is whether she can be charged for abetment. This is an aspect
which has not been dealt with by the Trial Court or the High Court. If in law,
it is permissible and the facts warrant such a course to be adopted, it is for
the concerned court to act in accordance with law. We express no opinion in
appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.