Kamala Nehru Memorial Hospital Vs. Vinod Kumar  INSC 687 (8 December
PASAYAT & TARUN CHATTERJEE
appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the
Allahabad High Court. The learned Single Judge held that the termination of
services of the respondent was contrary to the provisions of Section 6(N) of
the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the 'U.P. Act').
Directions were given for reinstatement with continuity of service and 50% of
the back wages from the date of termination of the services till the date of
facts in a nutshell are as follows:
basis of a dispute raised by the respondent a reference was made by the State
Government to the Labour Court, Allahabad for adjudication of the following
the termination of services of its workman Vinod Kumar, Clerk w.e.f. 22.10.82
by the employer is proper or legal? If no, the benefit/relief the concerned
workman is entitled for the other with details?" The respondent's case as
set up in the dispute and as was canvassed before the labour court was that he
was employed by the appellant (hereinafter referred to as the 'employer') on
16.9.1980 as a clerk and had continued till 21st October, 1982 with some
breaks. According to him he had worked for 240 days continuously in one
calendar year and, therefore, was entitled to the protections of Section 6(N)
of the U.P. Act. The Labour Court held that the respondent had not established
his claim. It was noticed that the respondent was appointed for a limited
period and after the expiry of that period he was removed from job. On the basis
of subsequent applications appointments used to be given and he used to get
engagement accordingly. He remained in continuous service only for 5 months.
though he may have worked for 240 days or more during the period of his service
he had not remained in continuous service for one year. The labour court found
that he was engaged for a special work. Aggrieved by the order of the Labour
Court a writ petition was filed by the respondent. The High Court held (without
indicating as to which provision it was referring to) that the amendment
brought in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the 'Act') is
prospective and not retrospective. Reference was made to several decisions of
various High Courts to hold that since amendment brought in the Act was
prospective, the view taken by the Labour Court that the respondent had not
completed 240 days' continuous service in one calendar year suffers from
manifest error of law and therefore, was liable to be set aside.
support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that though
some changes were introduced in the Act, so far as Section 6(N) of the U.P. Act
is concerned the same was not amended and continued as before.
definition of "continuous service" is given in Section 2(g) of the
U.P. Act and the same was clearly not applicable in case of the respondent. It
was further submitted that the view expressed by the High Court regarding
entitlement of respondent under Section 17-B of the Act is contrary to facts.
counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that reference was made
though it was not specifically mentioned by the High Court to Section 2
(oo)(bb) of the Act which was amended and the same was prospective and,
therefore, the High Court's view is correct.
to appreciate rival submission reference to Sections 2(g) of the U.P. Act and
Section 25-B of the Act is necessary. The definitions read as follows:
"Section 2(g): 'Continuous Service' means uninterrupted service, and
includes service which may be interrupted merely on account of sickness or
authorized leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock out
or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the
workman, and a workman, who during a period of twelve calendar months has
actually worked in an industry for not less than two hundred and forty days
shall be deemed to have completed one year of continuous service in the
industry." Act Section 25-B: DEFINITION OF CONTINUOUS SERVICE.
purposes of this Chapter, - (1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous
service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised
leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a
cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a
period of one year or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous
service under an employer - (a) for a period of one year, if the workman,
during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to
which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not
less than - (i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed
below ground in a mine; and (ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
(b) for a
period of six months, if the workman, during a period of six calendar months
preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has
actually worked under the employer for not less than - (i) ninety-five days, in
the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and (ii) one hundred and
twenty days, in any other case.
: For the purpose of clause (2), the number of days on which a workman has
actually worked under an employer shall include the days on which - (i) he has
been laid-off under an agreement or as permitted by standing orders made under
the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (20 of 1946), or under
this Act or under any other law applicable to the industrial establishment;
has been on leave with full wages, earned in the previous year;
has been absent due to temporary disablement caused by accident arising out of
and in the course of his employment; and (iv) in the case of a female, she has
been on maternity leave; so, however, that the total period of such maternity
leave does not exceed twelve weeks." In view of the clear definition of
the continuous service in Section 2(g) which means uninterrupted service of not
less than 240 days in one completed year, the respondent was clearly not
entitled to any relief. The interruptions which are excluded while computing the
uninterrupted service are set out in the Section itself. They are on account of
sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal or
a lock out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of
Section 2(g) provides that worker who during the period of twelve calendar
months has actually worked in an industry for not less than 240 days shall be
deemed to have completed one year of continuous service in the industry.
matter of fact the Labour Court has found that the respondent had worked for 5
months which is undisputedly less than 240 days. The High Court seems to have
adopted the definition given in Section 25-B of the Act, which is clearly
impermissible. Definition of "Continuous Service" given in Section
25-B of the Act is different from the definition of the said expression given
in Section 2(g) of the U.P. Act. By Act 36 of 1964, with effect from
19.12.1964, the definition in Section 25-B was substituted.
that the definition of "Continuous Service" was same in the Act and
the U.P. Act. Section 2(eee) of the Act was omitted with effect from 19.12.1964
and changes were introduced in Section 25-B of the Act. But Section 2(g) of the
U.P. Act remain unaltered. As per the pre-amended position it was necessary for
the workman to continue in service in the 12 calendar months period to have
actually worked for at least 240 days. After the amendment the position is
different. But the earlier position remains the same so far as the U.P. Act is
concerned. That being the case the High Court's judgment is clearly
unsustainable and is accordingly set aside.
Court's conclusions about entitlement of respondent under Section 17-B of the
Act is relatable to non-employment and non-receipt of adequate remuneration of
the workman. The appellant had adduced ample material to show that the
respondent was enrolled as an Advocate in 1983 and was a busy practitioner with
decent professional income.
even given a list of large number of cases in which the respondent had
appeared. Without any material to support its conclusions, the High Court
observed that "because of the compulsions of unemployment he has no option
but to continue for a short period as a practising Advocate" (underlined
for emphasis). The conclusions are clearly contrary to material on record. The
respondent was not entitled to any entitlement under Section 17-B of the Act.
if any amount has already been paid in the peculiar facts of the case, the
respondent shall not be entitled to refund the same.
appeal is allowed without any order as to costs.