Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. Vs. Damodar Khemchand Talreja
& Anr  Insc 139 (4 March 2003)
Raju & P. Venkatarama Reddi P. Venkatarama Reddi, J.
appellant in both these appeals is City and Industrial Development Corporation
of Maharashtra Limiteda Government Company designated as Special Planning
Authority/New Town Development Authority for the development of notified area
known as New Nasik. The proceedings for acquisition of vast extent of land were
initiated during the year 1982 in one case and in 1975 in another case under
the provisions of Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act, 1966 read with the
Land Acquisition Act. The present appeals, which we are concerned with, relate
to award of compensation for portions of the said land belonging to the
respondents. The compensation was determined by the Reference Court zone-wise. In Civil Appeal No.
2729/1999, the appeal filed by the State against the award of the Reference Court was dismissed upholding the
determination of the market value by the Reference Court. At the same time, the High Court held that the claimants
shall be entitled to get the benefits envisaged by Sections 23(1A), 23(2) and
28 of the Land Acquisition Act as added/amended by Central Act 68 of 1984. In
Civil Appeal Nos. 2730-2731 of 1999, the appeal filed by the claimant against
the order of the Reference
Court was partly
allowed by enhancing the compensation to a certain extent. The appeal filed by
the State was dismissed. There also, the benefits under Sections 23(1A), 23(2)
and 28 as amended were made available to the claimants.
enough, the judgment of the High Court in each of these cases in the main
appeals against the awards of the Reference Court have not been questioned at all before this Court. The
orders questioned in this Court are those dismissing the appellant's
application for impleadment and review filed after the disposal of the appeals.
The impugned order in Civil Appeal Nos. 2730- 2731 of 1999 reads as follows:
learned Counsel for the parties.
applications were filed in two groups of First Appeals. One group was disposed
of on 19-20/4/93.
other was disposed of on 24- 27/1/97. The applicant is praying for impleadment
and for review of those orders. It is not possible to implead the applicant in
these First Appeals which are already disposed of and consider granting of
application disposed of accordingly." An identical order was passed on the
same date, i.e., on 22.12.1998 in the other matter covered by Civil Appeal No.
2729 of 1999.
question of law formulated in the S.L.Ps. is "whether the provisions of
Sections 23(1A), 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as introduced
by Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act No. 68 of 84 are applicable for determining
the compensation payable in respect of land acquired under the Maharashtra
Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966?" The contention of the appellants is
that the acquisition under the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act is
unaffected by subsequent amendments to the Land Acquisition Act and the
provisions in vogue at the time of enactment of M.R.T.P. Act in regard to solatium,
interest and other monetary benefits relatable to compensation should alone be
taken into account. However, this contention was not raised before the High
Court even in the main appeals. As similar issue was pending consideration in
Civil Appeal No. 4394 of 1997, leave was granted by this Court. That appeal has
been disposed of today.
speaking, the question which has been raised in the S.L.P. does not arise for
consideration at all inasmuch as the main judgment of the High Court in the
concerned appeals has not been questioned. Not even a ground is raised in the
S.L.P. as to how the impugned order dismissing the impleadment petitions and
the prayer for review is contrary to law or legally unsustainable. Even a copy
of Civil Application and the counter if any filed therein has not been filed
along with the S.L.P. or in the paper book. The reason given by the High Court
in dismissing the Civil Applications seems to be unexceptionable.
question of deciding the point of law raised by the appellants does not
strictly arise for consideration in view of what is mentioned above. In any
case, that issue stands concluded against the appellants in the judgment which
we have pronounced today in Civil Appeal No. 4394 of 1997.
course of arguments, a contention was raised that the appellant-corporation at
whose instance the application was made, is a necessary party and it should
have been impleaded in the proceedings before the statutory authorities and the
Courts. Relying on the decision in 1993 (1) SCC, Page 608, it is contended that
the failure to make the requisitioning body as a party vitiates the
acquisition. This point was not specifically raised in the S.L.P. We are not in
a position even to know the averments made in the I.A. filed in Civil
Application and the counter filed therein. We are saying this because the
learned counsel for the respondents has stated in the course of arguments and
written submissions that the appellant was well aware of the Reference
proceedings and even oral and documentary evidence was produced by the
appellant. It is further stated that the appellant deposited the amount decreed
and also instructed the Government Pleader to file the appeals. The appellant
itself did not choose to file the appeal though it was open to it to do so. It
is, therefore, contended that long after the disposal of the appeal by the High
Court, the bogey of prejudice is sought to be raised and the S.L.P. has been
preferred apparently for the reason that the issue regarding the statutory
benefits under the amended L.A. Act was pending consideration in another
matter. The learned counsel for the appellant has not been in a position to
rebut what the respondents' counsel has stated.
various reasons noted above, we cannot, at this stage, allow the appellant to
raise the point that it was not made a party, especially when we are not in a
position to say that any prejudice had occurred to the appellant. In any case,
the only question of law raised in appeals having been decided against the
State, no further consideration needs to be given to these appeals.
appeals are therefore dismissed without costs.