Chander Singh Vs. S.N. Tripathi  INSC 77 (27 January 1997)
JEEVAN REDDY, S.B. MAJMUDAR S.B. Majumdar,J.
appellant, Harish Chander Singh, has brought in challenge the order passed by
the members of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India holding
him guilty of professional misconduct and suspending him from practice for a
period of two years from the date of the communication of the order. Said
appeal is filed under Section 38 of the Advocates Act. 1961 read with Order 5
of Supreme Court Rules, 1966. This appeal was admitted to final hearing and in
the meantime the operation of the order under appeal was stayed. Earlier in
addition to Respondent S.N. Tripathi, President of the Bar Association, Akbarpur,
on Syed Husain Ahmad was also joined as Respondent no.2. He was the
co-delinquent along with the appellant. He was also held guilty of professional
misconduct on the complaint of the original complainant and was ordered to be
reprimanded. His involvement along with the appellant was in connection with
the very same transaction brought in challenge by the complainant against both
these delinquents. However, said Syed Husain Ahmad did not challenge the
finding of the Disciplinary Committee against him and the sentence imposed
against him. At the request of the appellant, therefore, he was permitted to be
deleted as second respondent in this appeal. Consequently the sole respondent
who has remained in the arena of contest is the President of the Bar
Association who filed the complaint before the State Bar Council on behalf of
the original complainant.
order to appreciate the grievance of the appellant it is necessary to note a
few introductory facts.
Ram, the original complainant before the State Bar Council, filed a complaint
against the appellant as well as the aforesaid co-delinquent Syed Husain Ahmad,
both of whom at the relevant time were practising advocates at Akbarpur in Ferozabad
District of Uttar Pradesh. In the complaint it was alleged against the
delinquents that he had engaged the appellant as his counsel in a case pending
before Consolidation Officer, Akbarpur between the complainant and one Bisai.
Subsequently he had engaged one Tarakant Tripathi as his counsel. According to
the complainant the said case was fixed before the Consolidation Officer for 17th January, 1972. and thereafter it was adjourned to
7th February, 1972. The appellant who was engaged as
his counsel is the resident of Village Jamnipur.
in connection with which consolidation proceedings were pending wherein the
appellant was engaged by the complainant to represent him, was situated in the
same village. The consolidation proceedings then were further adjourned to 21st February, 1972. In the meanwhile, in the evening of
17th January, 1972 the appellant asked him to appoint some Mukhtar so that he
may be spared to the necessity of coming to attend the consolidation case every
day. The complainant alleged that at the instance of the appellant Syed Husain
Ahmad. Original Respondent no.2, the junior of the appellant, was appointed as Mukhtar
and a Mukhtarnama was got registered. That the contents of the Mukhtarnama were
not read over to him but he proceeded on the word of the appellant and having
faith in him executed the Mukhtarnama in favour of his junior. Thereafter,
however, the appellant entertained suspicion and on 29th January,1972 he executed the Deed cancelling the above said Mukhtarnama
and got it registered. It thereafter transpired that the appellant had obtained
a Sale Deed in respect of property in question in favour of his father from Syed
Husain Ahmad, Original Respondent no.2, who had acted as Mukhtar of the
complainant and as such had purported to sell the said land on behalf of the
complainant in favour of the appellant's father. The complainant in favour of
the appellant's father. All that to intended to do was to execute the Mukhtarnama
to enable Original Respondent no.2 to do Pairwi in the consolidation case. It
was, therefore, his complaint before the State Bar Council that he was duped
and deceived by both these advocates, namely. Harish Chander Singh and Syed Husain
Ahmad, his junior, and that the Mukhtarnama was a fraudulent deed which enabled
the appellant to get the land transferred in the name of his father. This
complaint was supported by an affidavit.
complaint was registered before the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council
of Uttar Pradesh. The complaint was sponsored by S.N. Tripathi, President of
the Bar Association, Akbarpur, who forwarded the complaint of Daya Ram to the
Secretary, Bar Council. Uttar Pradesh, Allahabad and that is how the present respondent was shown as the complainant in
the disciplinary proceedings.
appellant resisted the proceedings by filing a written statement. His
submission was that he was engaged by the complainant as an advocate in the
consolidation case which had originated on an objection made by one Bisai who
had alleged that complainant Daya Ram had obtained the Sale Deed in respect of
the disputed property fraudulently and under deception. That the complainant
was a literate person and he executed the Power of Attorney in favour of Syed Husain
Ahmad of his own accord and it was duly registered in the office of
Sub-Registrar, Akbarpur, Faizabad. That thereafter on 25th January, 1972 a Sale Deed was executed by Syed Husain
Ahmad in favour of Nand Kishore Singh with full knowledge and participation of
the complainant. That he was staying separate from his father and he had no
knowledge about the said transaction. That Syed Husain Ahmad was not his
as Original Respondent no.2 Syed Husain Ahmad is concerned, he also filed a
written statement through his counsel denying the allegations made in the
ultimately during the proceedings Respondent no.2 relented and submitted that
if he is found guilty of professional misconduct he may be pardoned and that he
had acted due to inexperience and on the basis of faith in his senior advocate,
the present appellant. Thus Respondent no.2 practically admitted the case of
the complainant. As the complaint could not be disposed of by the Disciplinary
Committee of the State Bar Council within one year it stood transferred to the
Bar Council of India. Thereafter the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council
of India heard the parties, recorded their evidence and ultimately passed the
aforesaid order against the appellant and Syed Husain Ahmad, the co-delinquent
who is no longer in the arena of contest in the present proceedings as seen
counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that the order under appeal is
not sustainable by evidence on record and is required to be set aside and the
appellant is required to be exonerated of the charges levelled against him.
have gone through the evidence on record, both oral and documentary, to which
out attention was invited. Having carefully considered the same we are not able
to accept any of the contentions canvassed by learned counsel for the
appellant. The tell-tale circumstances which have emerged on record clearly
indicate that the appellant was quilty of professional misconduct. These
circumstances run as under :
appellant was admittedly engaged as a counsel of the complainant to represent
him in the consolidation proceedings which were pending against him wherein the
dispute regarding the very same suit land was on the anvil between the
complainant Daya Ram on the one hand and complainants father's sister's husband
is also well established that the appellant persuaded the complainant to
execute a Mukhtarnama in favour of Respondent no.2 whose evidence showed that
he was the appellant's junior and was well known to him and accordingly Mukhtarnama
was executed by complainant Daya Ram in favour of Respondent no.2.
That Respondent no.2 executed Sale Deed in respect of the property in favour of
Shri Nand Kishore Singh.
Nand Kishore Singh was the father of the appellant.
copy of the Mukhtarnama dated 18th January, 1972 shows that the complainant had allegedly given full power to Respondent
no.2 to dispose of his property.
copy of the Sale Deed dated 25th January, 1972 was executed by Respondent no.2 as an agent of complainant in favour of
Nand Kishore Singh, father of the appellant.
copy of the Kutumb Register showed that Shri Nand Kishore Singh and the
appellant being father and son were living in the same house.
these circumstances well established on record clearly point out an accusing
finger to the appellant. The appellant's vain attempt to show that he did not
know about the transaction of the Sale Deed in favour of his father had
remained abortive for the simple reason that nothing was brought out on record
by him to show that he was in any way having strain relations with his father.
Equally a vain attempt was made by the appellant to show that Respondent no.2
was not known to him or he was not his junior. There is no reason as to why we
should not accept the clear-cut evidence on this aspect as led by Respondent
no.2 who stated that he was the appellant's junior and he was misguided by him
and accordingly he was made to execute the Sale Deed dated 25th January, 1972
acting Mukhtar of the complainant and by which he tried to sell complainant's
land to the appellant's father. All these circumstances will established on
record leave no room for doubt that the appellant was clearly quilty of
professional misconduct. The Disciplinary Committee was, therefore, right in
taking the view that the complainant was duped by his advocate, namely, the
appellant who had misused the confidence reposed by the complainant in him and
had tried to dispose of the complainant in him and had tried to dispose of the
complainant's property in favour of his own father. Under these circumstances
the findings of professional misconduct as recorded in the impugned judgment
against the appellant must be held to be well made out on the record of the
case and cannot be found fault with form any angle. So far as the sentence of
suspension from practice for two years is concerned that also cannot be treated
to be too harsh or grossly disproportionate in the light of the professional
misconduct. After the matter was fully heard, we tried to get information from
the appellant by our order dated 27th February, 1996 on the following:
of this appeal is concluded. But before we pronounce our judgment it is
necessary to have the following information for making appropriate orders:
Whether the appellant's father Shri Nand Kishore is alive? and whether Daya Ram
is alive today? If Daya Ram is dead, who are his legal representatives?
Whether the property which was conveyed by Daya Ram through his power of
attorney, Shri Syed Hussain Ahmad, Advocate in favour of the appellant's father
Shri Nand Kishore his been cancelled and the property conveyed back to Daya Ram
or his heirs, as the case may be, or not?
What has happened to the consolidation proceedings which were pending with
respect to the land which was sold in favour of the appellant's father ? The
appellant shall file an affidavit stating the information with respect to the
the matter after six weeks for judgment." However, learned counsel for the
appellant was not in a position to file any such affidavit or to give any such
information. Consequently by our further order dated 16th April 1996 we made it clear that we had no
option but to deliver the judgment.
on further consideration by order dated 24th April, 1996 we directed that
notices be issued to (1) Complainant Daya Ram; and (2) Nand Kishore Singh
calling upon them to show cause as to why we should not pass appropriate orders
for setting aside the Sale Deed dated 25th January, 1972 purported to have been
executed by Original Respondent no.2 Syed Husain Ahmed, Power of Attorney
holder of complainant Daya Ram is favour of the transferee Nand Kishore Singh.
to the notices issued to them it has transpired that said Nand Kishore Singh as
well as Daya Ram are dead since long. In I.A. No. 1 filed in these proceedings
it has been averred that even the impugned Sale Deed was held to be fictitious
and not binding on Daya Ram by authorities entrusted with the task of
consolidation of holdings and Daya Ram himself in his lifetime had agreed to
sell this very property to third parties who have already obtained a decree for
specific performance against Daya Ram and have got the decree executed against
the estate of Daya Ram. In view of these latter development brought to out
notice, by our order dated 20th January, 1997 we have discharged the notices issued by us earlier on 24th April, 1996. Consequently now remains no
occasion to pass any order in connection with the impugned Sale Deed dated 25th January, 1972. In the light of our earlier order
dated 16th April, 1996, therefore, judgment in this appeal
has now to be delivered.
view of our findings recorded hereinabove this appeal is liable to fail and is
accordingly dismissed with costs. Interim relief granted during the pendency of
this appeal will stand vacated.