of Orissa Vs. Klockner and Company & Ors
 INSC 559 (16
K. (J) Venkataswami K. (J) Verma, Jagdish Saran (J) K.Venkataswami. J.
JT 1996 (4) 254 1996 SCALE (3)527
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 7574-76/1996 Orissa Minining Corporation V. Klockner &
Co. & Ors.
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 19846/1995 M/s. Klockner & Company V. Orissa
Mining Corporation Ltd & Ors.
above Civil Appeals arise out of an Order passed in Misc. Case No. 426/93 in
T.S.152/93 on the file of Civil Judge, Bhubaneswar dated 16.4.94 which was
later upheld by the Orissa High Court by Order dated 12.5.95. Against a single
Order of the learned Civil Judge, Bhubaneswar in M.C.No.426/93, the State of Orissa
filed one Miscellaneous Appeal No.553/94 and Civil Revision Petition No. 262/94
before the Orissa High Court on the plea that there was a doubt whether an
appeal or revision petition would lie against the Order of the Civil Judge in
the said Miscellaneous Case. The High Court rendered its decision in Civil
Revision Petition No. 262/94. However. while moving this Court, the State of Orissa not only filed two Special Leave
Petitions against the common Order of the Orissa High Court in Civil Revision
and Civil Miscellaneous Appeal but also preferred independent Special Leave
Petition against the Order of Civil Judge, Bhubaneswar in Miscellaneous Case No. 426/93. Likewise, the Orissa
Mining Corporation (appellant in C.A. Nos.7574-16/95 and third respondent
before the High Court), has also filed three Special Leave Petitions against
the common order of the High Court and of Civil Judge. After leave was granted,
all these Special Leave Petitions were numbered as Civil Appeals as mentioned
facts, shorn of details, necessary for the disposal of these Appeals are as
under :- The first respondent herein, namely, Klockner & Company entered
Company, entered into an agreement on 20.4.82 described as "Marketing
Agreement" with Orissa Mining Corporation (hereinafter referred to as
"O.M.C." for short), a Government of Orissa Undertaking. We are not
giving all the clauses in the agreement under consideration. The said agreement
inter alia stipulated that O.M.C. will establish a plant at Bamnipal in the
district of Keonjhar, Orissa, for production of "charge chrome"
(hereinafter called as the "product"). It (OMC) agreed to market the
said product exclusively through Klockner and Co. upon the terms and conditions
contained in the said agreement to which Klockner & Co. gave acceptance.
The agreement stipulated that during the currency of the agreement, O.M.C.
shall not be entitled to market its product by direct contracts with purchasers
nor shall it be entitled to market its product through any agent or distributor
other than the Klockner and Co.
during the currency of the agreement, the Klockner and Co. shall not be
entitled to purchase the product from any source in India other than O.M.C. One important
clause in the agreement is that the delivery of the product shall commence by
April 1985 and shall continue over a period of five years but it will not come
to an end until a total quantum of 250,000 MT of the product was delivered.
There is also a clause in the agreement enabling the parties to extend the
period by mutual consent. According to another clause in the agreement, if the
agreement is terminated by mutual consent or cancelled, then notwithstanding
the termination/cancellation of the agreement, the parties shall remain
responsible for the fulfillment of any obligations which are outstanding at the
time of termination/cancellation of the agreement. It was agreed that OMC will
pay to Klockner & Co. a commission on the sale of the product effected in
the territory in consideration of the services rendered by it in terms of the
agreement and the commission shall be 4% of the final FOB value of the product
sold. The said commission shall be payable to Klockner & Co. by way of
reduction from each invoice.
important clause for the purpose of disposal of these Appeals is clause 15 in
the agreement which relates to arbitration. It reads as follows:
In the remote and unlikely event of there being any dispute or difference
whatsoever arising between the parties out of/or relating to the construction,
meaning and operation or effect of this contract or the breach thereof shall be
settled in the first place by amicable agreement, failing an agreement all
disputes arising between OMC and Klockner within the framework of this contract
are to be referred to the International Chamber of Commerce. The place of
arbitration shall be London or such other place as is mutually
agreed upon. The law applicable shall be substantial Swiss Law or any other law
mutually agreed upon.." Subsequent to the original agreement as mentioned
above, another agreement was entered into on 16.2.87 between OMC and Orissa
Mining Corporation (Alloys) Ltd. which is a wholly-owned subsidiary company of
OMC to implement and establish 100% export oriented unit at Bamnipal for
manufacturing inter alia charge chrome in which it was stipulated that OMC has
already entered into a marketing arrangement with Klockner & Co. of the
Federal Republic of Germany under which OMC is to market the products of Alloys
exclusively through Klockner & Co. and that Alloys products would be
handled through the agency and instrumentality of the OMC on the basis of OMC's
agreement with Klockner & Co. and the terms and conditions of the marketing
agreement between OMC and Klockner & Co. dated 20th April, 1982 will be treated as if OMC (Alloys) replaced OMC. It is not
in dispute that the agreement was acted upon by the parties and pursuant to
that 108,429 MT of charge chrome were delivered leaving a balance of 141,571 MT
of Charge Chrome undelivered as per the agreement.
meanwhile the Department of Company Affairs of the Govt. of India ordered
merger of Orissa Mining Corporation (Alloys) with the Orissa Mining Corporation
after the merger as mentioned above, the Government of Orissa (Law Department)
promulgated Ordinance 8 of 1991 dated 24.8.91 and the Charge Chrome Division
was taken over under the said Ordinance. The relevant clauses in the Ordinance
will be referred to at the relevant place hereinafter. After the taking over as
mentioned above, the Charge Chrome Division was transferred by way of sale to Tata
Iron & Steel Company.
this stage, the first respondent (Klockner & Co.) after unsuccessful
attempts to negotiate with OMC for fulfillment of the terms of the agreement,
took steps to refer the dispute for arbitration to the International Chamber of
Commerce, invoking clause 15 in the Agreement.
appellant, State of Orissa, received notice of the arbitration
proceedings on 3.5.93. Thereafter the appellant filed T.S. No. 152/93 on the
file of Civil Judge, Bhubaneswar, seeking the following reliefs :
Declaration declaring that the plaintiff is not the successor of Defendant No.
3 and more particularly is not the successor of Defendant No. 3 in the context
of the claim of Defendant No.1 against Defendant No. 3 before Defendant no.2
Declaration declaring that plaintiff is not liable to pay- jointly with
Defendant No. 3 or otherwise to Defendant No. 1 U.S. $ 2.949.938.42 with ten
percent interest or any part there of as claimed by Defendant No. 1 in its
request dated 21.4.93 for arbitration to Defendant No.2 and in its statement of
claim appended thereto which Request tor arbitration and claim Defendant No.1
has got served on the plaintiff through Defendant No.2.
Declaration declaring that plaintiff has got no obligation whatsoever under
document dated 20.4.1982. nomenclatured as Marketing Agreement and no
obligation whatsoever towards Defendant No.1 under the said document.
Declaration declaring that the Aforementioned claim of Defendant no. 1. against
the plaintiff and Defendant No. 3 jointly is not a matter agreed either between
Defendant No. 1 and Defendant No. 3 or between the plaintiff and Defendant No.
1 or amongst plaintiff, Defendant No.. 1 and Defendant No.3 to be referred to
arbitration under the said document dated 20.4.1982 nomenclatured as marketing
Agreement or otherwise.
Permanent injunction injunction Defendant No. 1 from prosecuting the
arbitration proceeding (bearing reference No. 7878/HV of Defendant No.2)
initiated before Defendant No. 2 by Defendant No.1. in its said request fol
arbitration dated 21.4.93 and said statement of claim dated 21.4.93 appended
Such other relief/reliefs as this Hon'ble court may deem fit and proper in the
facts and circumstances of the case." The respondent herein on coming to
know of the suit filed by the appellant moved the Miscellaneous Case No.426/93
invoking Section 3 of Foreign Awards (Recognition & Enforcement) Act. 1961
for stay of the suit.
appellant stoutly resisted the application for stay of the suit. However, the
learned Civil Judge on the basis of the materials placed before him and also on
the basis of the arguments advanced came to the conclusion that the suit should
be stayed under Section 3 of the Foreign Awards Act.
by the order of the learned Civil Judge, the appellant, State of Orissa preferred Miscellaneous Appeal as
well as Revision Preferred before the Orissa High Court. The learned Single
judge for the reason stated in the Order under Appeal observed as follows :
Testing the case at hand on the touch stone of the principles enunciated in the
decided cases discussed above. the position is manifest that the parties to the
arbitration agreement have decided that the place of arbitration shall be London and the law applicable shall be
substantive Swiss Law. My attention has not been drawn to any stipulation in
the agreement nor any other material which directly or impliedly shows that the
intention of the parties was that Indian Law will be applicable to the
Arbitration Agreement. As noted earlier, Klockner & Co. is a company
registered in the Federal Republic of Germany and the agreement of 20.4.1982
was entered in Germany. It is not the case of the
petitioner that the award which may be passed in this case is not a foreign
award as defined in Section 2 of the Foreign Awards Act but it is a domestic
award. In that view of the matter there is little scope for doubt that the
provisions of the Foreign Awards Act, particularly Section 3 are applicable to the
case. As held by the Apex
Court in the case of Renusagar
Power Co. (supra) stay of the suit is mandatory if the conditions specified in
Section 3 are fulfilled. The averments in the plaint and the objections filed
to section 3 do not make out the case that the agreement is null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed or that there is not in fact any
dispute between the parties with regard to the matter agreed to be referred.
The trial court has specifically held that the circumstances to prove exception
under the statutory pro- vision have not been established.
cost of repetition. I may state that it is clear from the materials on record
that the agreement was acted upon by the parties, in pursuance of it contracts
were entered between OMC Ltd and OMC Alloys Ltd with foreign buyers and Klockner
paid its dues relating to the transactions. In the circumstances, the learned
Trial Judge was right in holding that a case for stay of the suit u/s. 3 of the
Foreign Awards Act has been made out by the opposite party- No. I - defendant.
The order is therefore unassailable. Thus the cases being devoid of merit are
dismissed." Still aggrieved, the appellant, State of Orissa as well the Orissa Mining
Corporation preferred these Appeals challenging the Order of stay of suit under
Section 3 of the foreign Awards Act.
B.M. Patnaik, Senior counsel appearing both for the State of Orissa as well as
for Orissa Mining Corporation, though the contentions of both parties are not
identical and to a certain extent conflicting, strenuously contended that the
Orders of the trial court and of the High Court, granting stay of the suit
cannot be sustained in as much as the State which has filed the suit was
neither a party to the agreement in question nor, he State claimed the right
through or under the Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd.
the State being not a party to the agreement is not bound by the terms and,
therefore, the suit cannot be stayed. He also put forward arguments relating to
the merits of the claim put forward by the first respondent Klockner & Co.
in the arbitration proceedings. In support of his argument, learned senior
counsel placed reliance on two decisions of this Court reported in Renusagr
Power Co Ltd vs. general Electric Company & Another. (1984) 4 SCC 679 ) and
Svenska Handelsbanken & Ors. vs. M/S. Indian Charge Chrome Ltd & Ors. (
(1994) 2 SCC 155 ).
C.S. Vaidyanathan learned senior counsel appearing for the first respondent. Klockner
& Co. answering the contentions of the learned senior counsel for the
appellant submitted that it is untenable to contend that the State of Orissa
has nothing to do with the agreement in question having regard to the clauses
in the Ordinance under which the Government took over Charge Chrome Division
from Orissa Mining Corporation and also having regard to the terms under which
the charge chrome Division was handed over to Tata Iron & Steel Company. He
placed reliance in particular on clauses 4,5,7 and 12 in the take over
Ordinance. He also placed reliance on clause 9 of the agreement between State
of Orissa and Tata Iron & Steel Company to support his contention that
State of Orissa for the purposes stepped into the shoes of Orissa Mining
Corporation and, therefore, the appellant cannot contend that it is not
claiming through or under Orissa Mining Corporation any rights regarding Charge
Chrome Division. The learned senior counsel also placed reliance on the
following judgments of this Court to sustain the Order of stay granted by the
Civil Judge and confirmed by the High Court.
Co-operative Agricultural & Industrial Society Limited vs. Workmen ( (1963)
(Supl) 1 SCR 730 National Thermal Power Corporation vs. Singer Company &
Ors. ((1992) (3) SCC 551 ).
have considered the rival submissions. From the above narration, it is obvious
that the main thrust of Mr. B.M. Patnaik, Sr. counsel for the appellant is that
the State of Orissa is not a successor in interest of
OMC, in particular, the Charge Chrome Division of OMC, taken over by the Govt.
To appreciate this argument on behalf of the appellant and the counter-argument
advanced on behalf of the first respondent, it is necessary to set out certain
relevant clauses in the take over Ordinance, namely, Ordinance 8 of 1991 dated
24.9.91. Clauses 4(5), 5, 6 and 7 read as follows :- 4(5). If, on the appointed
day, any suit, appeal or other proceeding of whatever nature in relation to any
property: which has vested in the State Government under section 3 or
instituted or preferred by or against the Charge Chrome Division is pending,
the same shall not abate, be discontinued or be, in any way prejudicially
affected by reason of the vesting and transfer of the Charge Chrome Division of
the Company but the suit appeal or other proceeding may be continued or
enforced by or against the State Government or, where the Charge Chrome
Division of the Company vested under section 6 in any other company, by or
against the other company.
Every liability of the Charge Chrome Division of the Company including dues to
foreign and Indian Banks shall be the liability of the State Government on
which the properties of the Charge Chrome Division has vested and shall be
enforceable against the State Government or, where the Charge Chrome Division
of the Company is directed to vest in any other company, against the other
The State Government may, it is satisfied that any other company is willing to
comply with such terms and conditions as the Government may think fit to
impose, direct by notification that the Charge Chrome Division of the Company
and the right, title and interest of the Charge Chrome Division of the Company
which have vested with the State Government under section 3 shall, instead of
continuing to vest in the State Government, from the date of publication of the
notification of such vesting, vest in the other company.
Where the right, title and interest of the Charge Chrome Division of the
Company is vested under sub-section (1) in any other company the other company
shall, on and from the date of such vesting, be deemed to have become the owner
in relation to the Charge Chrome Division and all rights and liabilities of the
State Government in relation to such Division shall, on and from the date of
such vesting, be deemed to have become the rights and liabilities of the other
State Government hereby takes over all the assets of the Charge Chrome Division
at the depreciated written down value or book value as the case may be as on
the date of transfer. The State Government also hereby takes over the
liabilities of the Charge Chrome Division including loans of foreign and Indian
Banks on the said date of transfer. The net difference between the value of the
assets and the liabilities referred to above shall be settled by actual
payment." In this context, Clause 9 of the agreement between the State
Government and Tata Iron & Steel Company, with whom the Charge Chrome
Division of OMC, taken over by the Government subsequently, came to be vested
is also relevant to be noted and that reads as follows :
It is specifically, agreed between the parties that Tata Steel shall not be
bound or governed by any agreement whatsoever entered into or executed by OMC
Alloys Ltd., OMC Ltd. or Government, including marketing agreement in respect
of the sold plant which is not agreed to be ratified by Tata Steel. Any claim,
action, liability in respect of such agreement shall be discharged by
Government and it shall keep Tata Steel indemnified at all time against such
claims, actions, loss and liability." A conjoint reading of the Clauses
extracted from the take over ordinance and the agreement between the State of Orissa and Tata Iron & Steel Co. will
clearly show that the State of Orissa is the
successor in interest of OMC Charge Chrome Division taken over by the
Government under Ordinance of 1991. In view of this clear position, it is not
possible to accept the contention of the learned senior counsel for the
appellant that the State of Orissa has
nothing to do with the contract entered into between the Klockner & Co. and
OMC in respect of which the former has initiated arbitration proceedings
invoking Section 3 of Foreign Awards Act.
other aspect to be considered is whether the requirements of Section 3 of the
Foreign Awards Act are satisfied to justify the invocation of that provision on
the facts of this case.
this case, the existence of agreement dated 20.4.82 cannot be disputed by OMC
or by the appellant. The first respondent (Klockner & Co.) one of the
parties to the agreement has commenced arbitration proceedings against the
other party is also an undisputed fact. In the light of the wide scope of
Clause 15 of the agreement between the first respondent and OMC dated 20.4.82
(already extracted) relating to arbitration and in view of our finding that the
State of Orissa is the successor to OMC, it is not open to the appellant to
contend that the legal proceedings initiated was not in respect of any matter
agreed to be referred to arbitration in the agreement. Except filing an application
under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC for rejection of the plaint in the suit filed by OMC,
the first respondent has not taken any step in the legal proceedings and that
application for rejection of the plaint cannot he construed as any step in the
legal proceedings to bar the invocation of Section 3 of the Foreign Awards Act
by the first respondent vide General Electric Company vs. Renusagar Power
Company ( (1987) 4 SCC 137 ).
absence of any serious challenge to the commercial contract or to the arbitration
agreement, it has to be found that the agreement was valid, operative and can
be of being performed and that there are disputes between the parties with
regard to the matters agreed to be referred to.
General Electric Company's case (supra) this Court had occasion to consider the
scope of Section 3 of the Foreign Awards Act and it observed as follows :
may be straightaway noticed that while Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act
vests in the court the discretion to stay or not to stay the proceedings,
Section 3 of the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act vests no such
discretion in the court. Under the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement)
Act it is mandatory that the proceedings should be stayed if the conditions
prescribed are fulfilled. But the application of the defendant to the court, be
it under Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act or Section 3 of the Foreign
Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, may be filed before filing a written
statement or taking any other step in the proceedings. It is competent then
only and not thereafter." In Renusagar Power Co. Ltd vs. General Electric
Co. ((1984) 4 SCC 679 ) the court held as follows :
a plain reading of the section as it now stands two things become very clear.
In the first place the section opens with a non obstante clause giving
overriding effect to the provision contained therein and making it prevail over
anything to the contrary contained in the Arbitration Act, 1940 or the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908. Secondly, unlike Section 34 of the Arbitration Act which
confers a discretion upon the court; the section uses the mandatory expression
"shall" and makes it obligatory upon the court to pass the order
staying the legal proceedings commenced by a party to the agreement if the
conditions specified therein are fulfilled.
conditions required to be fulfilled for invoking Section 3 are :
must be an agreement to which Article II of the Convention set forth in the
not disputed that this is so in the instant case);
party to that agreement must commence legal proceedings against another party
thereto. (It is again not disputed that Renusagar and G.E.C. are the two
parties to the arbitration agreement and that Renusagar has commenced legal
proceedings against G.E.C by filing Suit 832 of 1982);
legal proceedings must be in respect of any matter agreed to be referred to
arbitration" in such agreement. (The question whether this condition is
fulfilled here needs to be decided);
application for stay must be made before filing the written statement or taking
any other step in the legal proceedings.
this condition is fulfilled);
Court has to be satisfied that the agreement is valid, operative and capable of
being performed; this relates to the satisfaction about the "existence and
validity" of the arbitration agreement. (In the instant case these
questions do not arise);
Court has to be satisfied that there are disputes between the parties with
regard to the matters agreed to be referred; this relates to effect (scope) of
the arbitration agreement touching the issue of arbitrability of the claims.
have already found that on a conjoint reading of relevant clauses in the
takeover Ordinance, the agreement between the State of Orissa and Tata Iron
& Steel Company and the marketing agreement dated 20.4.82, the requirements
of Section 3 of Foreign Awards Act have been satisfied. We, therefore, find
that the test laid down by this Court in Renusagar's case (Supra) for invoking
Section 3 of the Foreign Awards Act is satisfied and the High Court was,
therefore, justified in confirming the stay granted by the trial court.
observed earlier, the main thrust of the learned counsel for the appellant was
to challenge the finding of the High Court that State of Orissa was the
successor in interest to OMC Charge Chrome Division. The connected arguments
relate to disputes or differences that would arise between the parties in the
arbitration proceedings concerning the construction, meaning etc. of the
connected arguments need not be gone into in these proceedings and those
arguments are to be addressed before the appropriate forum. Once it is found
that the first respondent has established a case for invoking Section 3 of
Foreign Awards Act, all other disputes will has to be addressed and settled in
appropriate forum. The limited issue before us is with reference to the
legality and validity of invoking Section 3 of the Foreign Awards Act which we
have found in favour of the first respondent.
coming to Special Leave Petition (C) No. 19846/95, this petition is filed
against the judgment and order of the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in First Appeal No. 14/95 dated
12.5.95. By the Order under appeal, the High Court has reversed the Order of
the learned Subordinate Judge, Bhubaneswar
dated 26.3.94, by which the learned Subordinate Judge accepting an application
filed under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C., rejected the plaint in title suit No.
231/92 filed by the first respondent in Special Leave Petition. The learned
Single Judge of the High Court while reversing the Order of the learned
Subordinate Judge observed as follows:- "In the present case on a fair
reading of the petition filed by defendant No. 1 under Order 7, Rule 11 of
C.P.C it is clear that the case of the applicant is that the plaintiff has no
cause of action to file the suit. It is not specifically pleaded by the
applicant that the plaint does not disclose any cause of action. The learned
trial Judge has also not recorded any specific finding to this effect. From the
discussions in the order it appears that the learned trial Judge has not
maintained the distinction between the plea that there was no cause of action
to the suit and the plea that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action.
No specific reason or ground is stated in the order in support of the finding
that the plaint is to be rejected under Order 7, Rule 11(a). From the averments
in the plaint, it is clear that the plaintiff has pleaded a cause of action for
filing the suit seeking the reliefs stated in it. That is not to say that the
plaintiff has cause of action to file the suit for the reliefs sought that
question is to be determined on the basis of materials (other than the plaint)
which may be produced by the parties at appropriate stage in the suit. For the
limited purpose of determining the question whether the suit is to be wiped out
under Order 7, Rule 11(1) or not the averments in the plaint are only to be
looked into. The position noted above is also clear from the petition filed by
defendant No. 1 under Order 7, Rule 11 in which the thrust of the case pleaded
is that on the stipulations in the agreement of 20.4.82 the plaintiff is not
entitled to file a suit seeking any of the reliefs stated in the plaint.
Coming to the question whether the plaint is to be rejected under clause (d) of
rule 11 of order 7, the Supreme Court in the case of Orient Transport Co.
(supra) has clearly laid down that there is a distinction between a case in
which the validity, effect and existence of the arbitration agreement is
challenged and suit in which the validity of the contract which contains an
arbitration clause is challenged. The bar to suit under section 32 of the
Arbitration Act extends to a case where the existence, effect or validity of an
arbitration agreement is challenged and not to the latter type of the suit. On
this question too the learned trial Judge has failed to maintain the
distinction between the two types of cases. He has failed to notice that the
case pleaded by the plaintiff is that the entire agreement including the
arbitration clause is null and void and unenforceable and not that the
arbitration agreement is null and void.
From the lower court record in the case and also the records in a similar suit
filed by the State of Orissa, Title Suit No. 152 of 1993 in which OMC Ltd. is a
defendant, it appears that in both the cases the defendant No. 1 - Klockner
& Co. filed applications under section 3 of the Foreign Awards (Recognition
and Enforcement) At, 1961. Such application presupposes that the applicant
accepts the position that the said Act applies to the case and the Arbitration
Act, 1940 has no application to the case. Under the Foreign Awards Act, there
is no specific provision for bar of suit. Further, from the averments in the
application filed under Order 7, Rule 11 of C.P.C., it is clear that the main
case pleaded by the applicant was that the parties had agreed that the Swiss
Law will be applicable to the contract as the arbitration agreement and the
venue of arbitration will be at London and, therefore, the Indian Law in
general and the arbitration Act in particular, have no application to the case.
Alternatively the applicant has pleaded that even assuming that the Indian Law
of Arbitration applies to the case then the suit is barred under section 32 of
the Act. The learned trial Judge does not appear to have considered the main
case pleaded by the applicant but disposed of the petition on consideration of
the alternative case pleaded by it.
this finding against bar of the suit under Order 7, Rule 11(d) is also
the analysis and discussions in the foregoing paragraphs, it is my considered
view that the order passed by the learned trial Judge rejecting the plaint
under Order 7, Rule 11(a) and (d) of C.P.C. is unsustainable and has to be set
aside. Accordingly the appeal is allowed and the order dated 26.3.1994 of the
Civil Judge (Senior Division) Bhubaneswar in
Misc. Case No. 75 of 1993 is set aside. There will be no order for costs of
this Court." After hearing the learned counsel on both sides and after
carefully perusing the relevant pleadings, we do not think that the High Court
has committed any error in rejecting the application of the appellant under
Order 7 Rule 11. We accept the view taken by the High Court and consequently
find no case for interference.
result all the Civil Appeals are dismissed with costs and Special Leave
petition is dismissed without costs.