Superintendent
of Police (C.B.I.) Vs. Deepak Chowdhary & Ors, [1995] INSC 398 (17 August 1995)
Ramaswamy,
K. Ramaswamy, K. Hansaria B.L. (J)
CITATION:
1996 AIR 186 1995 SCC (6) 225 JT 1995 (6) 532 1995 SCALE (5)226
ACT:
HEAD NOTE:
O R D
E R
Leave
granted.
Delay
of 232 days condoned.
The
facts lie in a short compass. During the year 1982, while the respondent no.1
was working as a Branch Manager in Desh Priya branch of the United Bank of
India at Calcutta it was realised that certain officers working in that bank
had conspired with a creditor and the bank was defrauded for a sum of
Rs.45,000/-. On a complaint laid, a crime case was registered and the appellant
investigated the matter and submitted the report to the competent authority for
sanction, who, by its order dated the 14th January, 1987 accorded sanction
under 6(1-c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (for short, `PC Act) to
file the charge-sheet against the respondent for the offences punishable under
Section 120B, 420, 467, 468, 471, 477A, 201 and 109 IPC and also under Section
5(1) (d) read with Section 5(2) of the PC Act. The respondent filed writ
petition in the High Court to quash the sanction. The High Court by the
impugned order dated the
2nd April, 1992 in
Matter No.498/87 quashed the sanction on two grounds, namely, that the
respondent was not given any opportunity of hearing before granting sanction
and in the departmental enquiry conducted by the Bank, respondent was
exonerated of the charge. Therefore, it was not expedient to proceed with the
prosecution of the respondent. Hence, the above appeal has been filed.
It is
contended for the appellant that the question of giving an opportunity to the
charged officer before granting sanction does not arise since it is not a
quasi-judicial function. Grant of sanction is an administrative function.
What
is required is that the investigating officer should place all the necessary
material before the sanctioning authority who should apply its mind to that
material and accord sanction. Therefore, the question of giving opportunity of
hearing to the accused before granting sanction does not arise.
We
find force in the contention. The grant of sanction is only an administrative
function, though it is true that the accused may be saddled with the liability
to be prosecuted in a court of law. What is material at that time is that the
necessary facts collected during investigation constituting the offence have to
be placed before the sanctioning authority and it has to consider the material.
Prima
facie, the authority is required to reach the satisfaction that the relevant
facts would constitute the offence and then either grant or refuse to grant
sanction.
The
grant of sanction, therefore, being administrative act the need to provide an
opportunity of hearing to the accused before according sanction does not arise.
The High Court, therefore, was clearly in error in holding that the order of
sanction is vitiated by violation of the principles of natural justice.
The
second ground of departmental exoneration by the disciplinary authority is also
not relevant. What is necessary and material is whether the facts collected
during investigation would constitute the offence for which the sanction has
been sought for.
It is
not appropriate at this stage to go into the merits of the culpability of the
respondent though sought to be contended for by Shri Thopas Roy, the learned
counsel. In fairness to the accused, we deem it inappropriate to go into the
merits to express any opinion.
The
appeal is accordingly allowed, the order of the High Court is set aside and the
trial court is directed to proceed with the trial against the respondent as
expeditiously as possible and conduct joint trial, if trial is not already
concluded, along with other accused. If the case has been separated and the
trial of other accused has been concluded, then the trial court is directed to
expeditiously conclude the trial of the respondent, not exceeding one year.
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