Singh & ANR Vs. Gurbachan Kaur & Ors  INSC 432 (13 October 1993)
S. (J) MOHAN, S. (J) BHARUCHA S.P. (J) CITATION: 1994 SCC Supl. (2) 545
After having heard both the learned counsel, we are of the view that the appeal
will have to fail on two grounds. The document Ex. P-3, upon which the
appellant bases his claim contains a peculiar clause to the effect that if the
sale consideration of Rs 12,000 (Rupees twelve thousand only) was not paid on
or before June 30, 1973, the document shall be deemed to be
cancelled. Therefore, this is not a case where the sale consideration is
promised to be paid on a future date. Hence it will not qualify within the
definition of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. Further, the deed has
been executed only by the transferor there being no reciprocal promise to pay
by the transferee. Even on that score, it cannot constitute a promise to pay
the sale consideration in future. Therefore, the courts below are correct that
there is no valid conveyance of the property.
find not any merit and the civil appeal stands dismissed.
there shall be no order as to costs.
Balbir Singh and another Vs. Gurbachan Kaur and others Order
This is an appeal against the judgment and order of a Division Bench of Andhra
Pradesh High Court at Hyderabad dated April 25, 1975 passed in Civil Appeal No. 9 of 1972.
appellant herein was the plaintiff before the subordinate judge, seeking under
Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, reference of the subject-matter of his
dispute with the respondent to arbitration. The trial court agreed with his
plea and referred the matter to arbitration.
appeal, however, the High Court upset it on the basis that the trial court was
wrong in observing that the plaintiff had laid any foundation to his assertion
that the 'no claim certificates', put up against him as defence to deny
arbitration, were obtained under duress and coercion.
High Court went on to observe that from the perusal of the plaint it was
evident that submission regarding signatures of the appellant having been
obtained under undue influence and coercion, was not existing. The High Court
also viewed that in the absence of any plea to that effect, it had to proceed
on the footing that the plaintiff voluntarily had executed those no-objection
High Court then took the view that since the appellant had executed 'no claim
certificates', the contract ceased to exist and the arbitration clause also
perished, since it was otherwise provided in one of the clauses of the
agreement that after such satisfaction, the contractor would not be entitled to
make any claim whatsoever against the respondent by virtue of its arising out
of the contract. This according to the High Court implied that even a claim to
refer the matter to the arbitration was barred.
do not want to express any opinion on the analysis of the High Court since we
have satisfied ourselves that the High Court misread the pleadings of the
appellant. A copy of the plaint is annexed in the paper-book and it is plain
wherefrom that not only at one place but at more than one place the appellant
has asserted that he signed the so- called no-objection certificates under
undue influence and coercion. If the fact asserted by the appellant was proved
to be correct then these no claim certificates were not valid in law and
everything which the High Court sought to close becomes open, But if it is
otherwise, it would perhaps lead to the conclusion as arrived at by the High
Court. It would therefore have to be seen as to who would decide the question
of fact whether there was any undue influence or coercion exercised on the
appellant when he signed those no claim certificates. If it is referable to the
arbitrator then the 547 arbitrator is the sole judge. But if it is not, then
the matter is to be decided by the trial court. The view of the trial court in
either situation is necessary. Therefore, it would necessitate a remand to the
trial court to settle the question about the undue influence and coercion over
the appellant and whether that would vitiate the no claim certificates clearing
the way for arbitration. If on the other hand it is held that no such undue
influence or coercion was exercised then the trial court would be at liberty to
reject the application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act for the matter
would then be not arbitrament. The appeal is allowed in terms remitting the
matter to the trial court. Let the trial court now decide the matter most
expeditiously as it is a very old dispute.