J.K. Cotton Manufactures Ltd. Vs. The
Commissioner of Income Tax, Lucknow  INSC 202 (4 September 1975)
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
KHANNA, HANS RAJ KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
CITATION: 1975 AIR 1945 1976 SCR (1) 648
Income-tax Act (11 of 1922) s. 10(2)
(xv)-Scope of- Payment of managing agent of compensation for terminating
managing agency Whether capital or revenue expenditure.
An analysis of s. 10(2) (xv) of the
Income-tax Act, 1922, shows that in order to be a deductible expenditure the
amount has to fulfill two conditions, (i) that it must be laid out wholly and
exclusively for the purpose of the business, profession or vocation. and (ii)
that it should not be an expenditure of a capital nature. Both these conditions
have to be complied with before an assessee can claim deduction under the
section. [660 G] Some of the tests that have been evolved by courts for
determining when. an the facts and circumstances of a particular case, the
expenses disbursed an assessee amount to a capital expenditure or revenue
(a) Bringing into an asset or advantage of
enduring nature would lead to the inference that the expenditure is of a
capital nature. The terms `asset' or `advantage of enduring nature' are descriptive
and the question will depend upon the facts of each case.
(b) An item of disbursement may be regarded
as of a capital nature when it is relatable to a fixed asset or capital,
whereas circulating capital or stock-in-trade would be revenue receipt.
John Smith & Sons v. Moore 12 T.C. 266,
282, referred to .
(c) Expenditure relating to frame work of the
business is generally of a capital nature.
(d) When a managing agency is terminated the
termination is in terrorem, that is if commercial expediency requires that the
agency should the terminated as it had become one, or it was creating
difficulties or the agents were guilty of negligence, etc., or if any payments
were made as retrenchment compensation, or confirmed of benefit an employees or
for termination of other disadvantages or onerous relationship it would be a
capital expenditure but if it is purely voluntary obtaining substantial
benefits it would be revenue expenditure. [659E-660D] In the present case, the
appellant agreed to employ a firm as its managing agent for 20 years and to pay
them commission at 2 1/2%. But after two years the appellant terminated the
agreement. The managing agents received Rs.
25,000 as compensation and executed a release
deed. The appellant thereafter employed another managing agent at 2%
commission. There was nothing to show that the out-going managing agents were
guilty of any faches, negligence, or that they had cause and loss or
disadvantage to the appellant so as to justify the sudden termination of their
agency, or that they did not agree to reduce the commission.
On the other hand, the Board of Directors
paid high compliments to the outgoing managing agents. By employing the new
managing agents at the lesser commission a net profit of Rs. 30,000 was made by
the appellant per annum.
The members of the outgoing and incoming
agents, belonged to the same family as the appellants, showing, that the
appellants were interested in both of them.
The appellant contended that the expenses of
Rs. 2,50,000 was incurred by the appellant wholly and exclusively for carrying
on the business or the company and would therefore be an allowable deduction
under s. 10(2) (xv); but the department and the Tribunal negatived the
contention. On reference, the High Court held that the expenditure was incurred
wholly and exclusively for the Purpose of `appellant's business. but as the
amount was in the nature of a capital expenditure, it was not deductible under
649 Dismissing the appeal to this Court,
HELD: The High Court was right holding that
the disbursement of compensation of Rs. 2,50,000 was of a capital nature and
was therefore not a deductible expenditure under s. 10(2) (xv ). [661 (G] (1)
Merely because the expenditure is incurred in the course of the business is in
could not be said that it would never be a capital expenditure. Section 37 of
the 1961 Act corresponding to s. 10(2)(xv) of the 1922 Act. itself templates a
contingency where, even though the expenditure us incurred wholly and
exclusively for the purpose of the business, it may still be of a capital
nature. But the High Court was in error in this case in holding that the
expenditure was wholly and exclusively the purpose of the business, because.
the finding is not borne out by the facts and circumstances of the case. [660
H-661 A, G-H] (2) The question whether compensation paid to the outgoing
managing agents is capital or revenue expenditure depends on the facts and
circumstances of each case. [662 A- B] (3) The present case is covered by the
decision of this Court in Godrej Company v. C.I.T. Bombay City (47 I.T.R.
381). That case has considered all the
previous decisions and has laid down that in circumstance such as in the
instant case the expenditure would be a capital expenditure in the hands of the
payer and a capital receipt in the hands of the payee-company within the
managing of s. 10(2) (xv) .
The contention that the case was concerned
any as with the nature of the payment in the hands of the payee company and
that the observations regarding the nature of the payment in the hands of the
payer-company would be abiter, is without substance. [654C, G-H] (4)(a) The
appellant has brought into existence an advantage of an enduring nature by the
change in managing agency, because, the amount of Rs. 30,000 which the
appellant got by way of recurring benefit per annum must be regarded as an
advantage of an enduring nature so as to fall within its definition in Atherton
v. British Insulated and Helsby Cables Ltd. (10 T.C 671) leading to the
inference that the expenditure is of a capital nature. [661 F] (b) It was not
the case of the appellant reducing its expenditure by getting rid of the
managing agency and taking over the management itself to save the middleman
profit. [653 B] (c) In the present case the only inference that could be drawn
from the circumstances of the case is that the termination of the managing
agency by the appellant was with the oblique motive of benefiting both the
managing agents, in whom the appellant was interested, and not because of and
commercial expediency. [661 D] C.I.T West Bengal II Calcutta v. Coal Shipment
(P) Ltd  3 S.C.C. 736, 740-41. The Commissioner of Income-tax Madras v.
M/s. Ashok Leyland Ltd  3 S.C.C. 201. 204 and M. K. Brothers (P) Ltd. v.
Commissioner of Income-tax Kanpur  3 S.C.C. 30, 34 followed.
Anglo Persian oil Co. (India) Ltd. v.
Commissioner of Income-tax 1 T.T.R. 129 133; Commissioner of Income-tax v.
Shaw Wallace and Company L.R. 59 I.A. 206,
211; Karam Chand Thopar and Brothers. (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax
(Central) Calcutta 80 I.T.R. 167, 171. Commissioner of Income-tax Calcutta v.
Turner Morrison & Company. Private Ltd. 681 T.R. 147, 156 and Greaves
Cotton & Co. Ltd. v.
Commissioner of Income-tax Bombay City 48
I.T.R. 111, 134, explained.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 2203 of 1970.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and
order dated the 26th September. 1969 of the Allahabad High Court in Income Tax
Ref No. 420 of 1963 11-L9255SupCI/75 650 A. K. Sen and M. M. Kshatriya, for the
B. B. Ahuja and S. P. Nayar, for the
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
FAZAL ALI, J.-This is an appeal by special leave against the order of the High
Court of Allahabad dated September 26, 1969 on a reference made to it by the
Income- tax Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad Bench. The facts giving rise to the
present appeal may-be briefly summarised as follows:
The appellant assessee is a public limited
company known as `J.K. Cotton Manufacturers Ltd' and the matter in dispute
relates to the assessment year 1944-45. The appellant entered into an agreement
with the firm called Juggilal Kamlapat and employed the said firm as the
Managing Agents of the Company. The agreement was executed on August 8, 1941
and the Managing Agents were to work for the Company for a period of 20 years
and were to charge commission at the rate of 21%. About two years later the
appellant decided to terminate the agreement executed in favour of Juggilal
Kamlapat and the said Managing Agents readily accepted the offer made by the
appellant as a result of which a deed of release was executed by the Managing
Agents Juggilal Kamlapat on September 28, 1943. Under the release the appellant
agreed to pay a sum of Rs. 2,50,000 to the outgoing Managing Agents by way of
compensation for terminating the agreement much earlier than stipulated under
the original contract. The appellant, however, employed another firm, namely,
J.K. Commercial Corporation as their new Managing Agents and executed an
agreement in their favour on September 30, 1943. The action of the Company was
approved by the Board of Directors.
The dispute in the instant case centres round
the question as to whether the compensation of Rs. 2,50,000 paid to the
outgoing Managing Agents was a capital or a revenue expenditure incurred by the
appellant. The stand taken by the assessee before the revenue was that as the
expenses were incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of carrying on
the business of the Company it would fall under s. 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax
Act, 1922, which is the same as s. 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and
therefore an allowable deduction under the aforesaid provision. The appellant's
case was negatived by the Income-tax officer, the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner and also by the Tribunal. The Tribunal also refused to make a
reference to the High Court as in its opinion no point of law arose. The
appellant then approached the High Court of Allahabad which directed the
Tribunal to make a reference on the following four points and accordingly the
Tribunal made a reference to the High Court on those points:
"1. Whether there was any material on
the basis ofwhichthe Appellate Tribunal could hold that the goodwill of 651
Juggilal Karnlapat Cotton Manufacturers Ltd, was transferred to the J.K. Cotton
2. Whether there was any material on the
record for a finding that the said transfer had been for a sum of Rs. 1.00,000
or for any other sum, and
3. Whether there was any material on the
record from which it could be held that the land had appreciated in value form
Rs. 49,526/13,/6 to Rs. 1 ,00,000,
4. Whether a sum of Rs. 250,000 paid by the
assessed to the Managing Agents for the termination of their Manning Agency is
an expenditure admissible under Section 10(2) (xv) of the Income-Tax Act,"
When the matter was heard by the High Court, the assesses did not press any
other point excepting point No. 4 which related to the question whether a sum
of Rs. 2,50,000 paid by the assesses to the outgoing meaning Agents was an
admissible expenditure under s. 10(2) (xv) of the Income-tax Act, 1922. The
High Court by it judgment dated September 26, 1969, held that the expenditure
in question was incurred wholly and exclusively, for the purpose of assessee's
business, but as the amount was in the nature if a capital expenditure it was
not (deductible under the provisions of the income tax Act and hence this
appeal before us by special leave.
Mr. Asoke Sen learned counsel for the
appellant for submitted two points before us in support of his case. In the
first place it was contended that the High Court having held that the
expenditure incurred was wholly and exclusively or the purpose of the business
should have held that s. 10(2) (xv) applied in terms and therefore. the
expenditure was a revenue expenditure which would be deductible under s 10(2)
(xv) of the Income-tax Act; and second, it was submitted that the High court
was in error in not correctly applying the decision of this court in Godrej
& Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax Bombay city(1).
The learned counsel for the appellant has
adumbrated four pro positions before us for consideration:
(1) Where a payment is made by the payer
Company to the payee Company ill lieu of termination of its agency it does not
follow that the said pay meat which was made for the purpose of business must
ipso facto be considered to be capital expenditure in the hands of the player
(2) So far as the payee Company is concerned.
the law is that generally any compensation received by it not he considered as
capital receipt (1) 37 I.T.R. 381.
652 (3) So far as the payer Company is
concerned, if payment is for the purpose of business, the mere fact that it
has, bar virtue of the payment, increased its profits and reduced its expenses,
should not be regarded as expenditure of capital nature but would be one in the
course of business unless some oblique or gratuitous purpose is involved.
(4) The principles laid down in Godrej &
Co. 's case (supra) would have to be read as laying down only a proposition
that the payer company, namely, the managed company, was making a payment to
the payee company as a capital contribution to the payee company and in the
hands of the payee company the amount becomes a receipt of compensation for
incurring losses. In other words the High Court did not correctly apply the
decision of this Court in Godrej & Company' case (supra).
So for as propositions Nos. (1) to (3) are
concerned their correctness cannot be disputed, because these propositions are
covered by abandon authorities. As regards proposition No. (4) it seems to us
that on a close and careful reading of the judgment of this Court in on Goderaj
& Company case (supra) the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant
on this point appears to be without any substance.
We shall show that the facts of the present
case appear to be on all fours with the ratio laid down by this Court in
Goderaj & Company's case (supra).
Mr. Ahuja appearing for the revenue, however,
submitted that the termination of the managing agency by the appellant was made
for extra-commercial reasons, the main intention being to benefit both the
outgoing Managing Agents Juggilal Kamlapat and the incoming Managing Agents
J.K. Commercial Corporation which belonged to the same family of Singhanias
and, therefore, as the compensation paid to the outgoing Managing Agents led to
a profit to the company it would amount to acquisition of a new asset and
would, therefore be a capital expenditure.
Before dealing with the contentions raise
before us by the learned counsel for the appellant, it may be necessary to
mention a few facts which have been found by the Tribunal and whose correctness
has not been disputed before us.
(1) That there was no suggestion nor any iota
of evidence to show that the outgoing Managing Agents were in any way guilty of
laches, negligence or that they had caused any loss or disadvantage to the
appellant so as to justify a sudden termination of their agency after two years
although it was stipulated to continue for 20 years. On the other hand the
annexures filed along with the statement of the case sent by the Tribunal to
the High Court clearly show that the Board of Directors paid high compliments
to the outgoing Managing Agents Juggilal Kamlapat.
653 (2) That although the` incoming Managing
Agents J.K. Commercial Corporation were prepared to serve the appellant on a
commission of 2 % only, there is nothing to suggest that the outgoing managing
Agents had refused to reduce their commission if that was the only ground for
changing hands of the managing agency-.
(3) This is not a case where the appellant
reduced its expenditure by doing away with the middleman's profit, e.g.
to get rid of the managing agency and taking
the managing agency itself. It is only question of substituting one Managing
Agent l`or another (4) That although a compensation of Rs. 2,50,000 was paid by
the appellant to the outgoing Managing Agents yet by employing the new Managing
Agents a net profit of Rs 30,000 was made by the Company which was in the
nature of a recurring benefit, apart from other facilities.
(5) That constitution of the two Managing
Agents, namely, outgoing and the incoming Managing Agents shows that Singhania
family (the appellant) had major interest in both of them.
These facts have been clearly proved by the
additional documents filed in this Court which were the annexures filed by the
Tribunal in the statement of the case sent to the High Court along with the
reference. Annexure 'G' at p. 69 of the Paper Book shows that at the time of
terminating the agency of Juggilal Kamlapat high compliments were paid to the
said Managing Agents as would appear from the minutes of the meeting held on
August 24, l 943 . The following observation, were made in that meeting:
"There was a frank discussion among the
Directors and it was unanimously agreed that even though the present Managing
Agents have been rendering very good services to the Company, and have been
carrying on its affairs in a creditable manner, there was no denying of the
truth that the appointment of Managing Agents of the constitution and
composition of the J.K. Commercial Corporation Ltd. would give to the Company
unique advantages which the present Managing agents may perhaps be not able to
impart, being a partnership firm. and further as the J.K. Commercial
Corporation Ltd., has offered its services on lower terms, the company would be
benefited by a saving of above Rs. 30,000/- per annum." The minutes quoted
above would clearly show two things-that vary high compliments were paid to the
outgoing Agents for their very good services. and (2) that by the terms offered
to the new Agents, namely, J.K. Commercial Corporation there was to be a saving
of Rs, 30,000/. per annum Similarly the Tribunal in its order of reference to
the High Court and the statement of case has found as follows:
(p. 65 of the Paper Book) 654 "The
constitution of the two managing agents do show that the Singhania family has
major interest in both them.
The Tribunal on the basis of these facts came
to the conclusion that the compensation was paid due to extra- commercial
reasons and could not be regarded as expenditure incurred wholly and
exclusively for the purpose of the business. The High Court differed from the reasons
given by the Tribunal but affirmed its view on the ground that the expenditure
incurred by the assessee Company being of a capital nature it was not
deductible Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case we
have no doubt that this case is wholly covered by the decision of this court
ill Godrej & Company's case (supra). In this case, while it is true that
this Court was-dealing with the case of compensation in the hands of the payee
Company who were the Agents, yet in view of the clear observations made by the
Court there can be no manner of doubt that be expenses incurred in the present
case by way of payment of compensation to the outgoing Agents would be of a
capital nature. This Court in the aforesaid case observed as follows:
"In the light of those decisions the sum
7,50,000 was paid and received not to make up
the difference between the higher remuneration and the reduced remuneration but
was in reality paid and received as compensation for releasing the company from
the onerous terms as to remuneration as it was in terms expressed to be. In
other words, so far as the managed company was concerned, it was paid for
securing immunity from the liability to pay higher remuneration to the assessee
firm for the rest of the term of the managing agency and, _ therefore, a
capital expenditure and some far as the assessee firm was concerned, it was
received as compensation for the deterioration of injury to the managing agency
by reason of the release of its rights to get higher remuneration and,
therefore, a capital receipt within the decisions of this Court in the earlier
cases referred to above." Mr. Asoke Sen tried to distinguish this case on
the ground that the Court was concerned in the Godrej & Company's case (supra)
only with the nature of the payment in the hands of the payee company and any
observations made as to what would be the nature of the payment in the hands of
the payer company would be obiter, and, therefore. not binding on this Court.
We are, however, unable to agree with this knew. Godrej & Company's case
(supra) has considered all the previous decisions and has clearly laid down
that in the circumstances. such as the present, the expenditure incurred would
be a capital expenditure in the hands of the payer company and a capital
receipt in the hands 1 of the payee company within the meaning of s. 10(2)(xv)
of the Income-tax Act. The distinction sought to be made by the learned 655
counsel for the appellant is extremely subtle and it is a distinction without
any difference. Moreover, there are a number of other circumstances which
clearly show that the expenditure concerned cannot, but be treated as a capital
Mr. Asoke Sen then submitted that if the
Godrej and Company's case (supra) is held to be an authority for the
proposition that the amount of compensation in the hands of the payer company
also would be of a capital nature, then that case was wrongly decided and
should be re-considered by us. We are, however, unable to agree with this
argument, because apart from the principle of stare decisis, on the facts and
circumstances of the present case, we do not find any special reasons to
reconsider the decision in Godrej & Company's case (supra) particularly
when in view of the facts and circumstances of this case we are really of the
opinion that the amount in question is undoubtedly a capital expenditure.
Reliance was placed by the learned counsel
for the appellant on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Anglo- Persian
oil Co. (India) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income- tax(1). It is true that some
observations in the aforesaid case are presumably in favour of the appellant
but the Calcutta High Court was careful to guard itself against its decision
being treated as a general principle to apply to all cases and in this
connection it observed as follows:
"The case of payer and payee must be
considered upon an independent statement of the relevant facts provide in his
presence, there being no over-riding principle of law that the Income tax
authorities are entitled to tax once at least on every payment." In that
case the Court proceeded on the admitted finding of fact that the expenditure
incurred was wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business. This,
however, is not the case in the present case. In these circumstances, the
decision in Anglo-Persian oil Co. (India) Ltd's case(1) does not appear to be
of any assistance to the assessee.
Reliance was also placed on a decision in
Commissioner of Income v. Shaw Wallace and Company(2) in which case the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council merely affirmed the finding of the High
Court that the sums received by the respondents were not income, profits or
gains within the meaning of the Act though they gave different reasons for that
conclusion. It may be noticed that Shaw Wallace and Company case(2) turned upon
the facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of the payment made to
While affirming the finding of the High Court
their Lordships observed as follows:
"The question was however, re-stated by
the learned Chief Justice in more precise terms-namely, 'whether these sums are
income profits or gains within the meaning of the (1) 80 I I.T.R. 129,133, (2)
L.R. 59 L.A. 206, 211, 656 Act at all,' and for the reasons stated in his judgment
he came to the conclusion that they were not. Their Lord ships think that his
conclusion was right though they arrive at this result by a slightly different
road." Reliance was also placed on a decision of this Court in Karam Chand
Thapar and Bros. P. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax (Central), (Calcutta(1),
where this Court observed as follows:
"As held by this court in Commissioner
of Income- tax , Chari and Chari Ltd. (57 I.T.R. 400), that ordinarily
compensation for loss of office or agency is regarded as a capital receipt, but
this rule is subject to an exception that payment received even for termination
of an agency agreement would be revenue and not capital in the case where the
agency was one of the many which the assessee held and its termination did not
impair the profit-making structure of the assessee, but was within the
framework of the business, it being a necessary incident of the business that
existing agencies may be terminated and fresh agencies man be taken." This
was, however, a case where their Lordships were dealing with that question as
to whether or not the amount of compensation in the hands of the payee company
for loss of office or agency would be regarded as a capital receipt.
Karam Chand Thapar and Bros. Y. Ltd case (supra)
does not throw any light on the point with which we are concerned in the
I Great reliance was sought to be placed on
the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Calcutta
v. Turner Morrison & Company Private Ltd.(2) where the High Court observed
"It is now well settled that the
expression 'expenditure laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the
purpose of such business' includes expenditure voluntarily incurred for
commercial expediency and in order indirectly to facilitate business. It is
immaterial if a third party also benefits thereby. It is further well settle
that an expenditure incurred in maintaining the efficiency of the manpower from
time to time utilised in a business is also expenditure wholly or exclusively
laid out for the purpose of such business. It is also well settled that the
employment of, say a director, at a reasonable extra remuneration to supervise
a particular business of the company, regard being had to his expert knowledge
in that particular line of business, is expenditure within the meaning of
section 10-(2) (xv) and the revenue authorities are not justified in reducing
such remuneration. The expression 'commercial expediency' is an expression of
wide import and expenditure in commercial expediency includes such expenditure
as a prudent man may incur for (1) 80 I.T.R. 167, 171. (2) I.T.R R 147 156 657
the purposes of business. An expenditure which is entirely gratuitous and has
no connection with the business does not come within the meaning of section
10(2)(xv) of the Act." This case also is distinguishable from the facts of
the present case, in as much as in Turner Morrison do Company's case (supra)
there was no question of termination of any managing agency but what had
happened was that two directors had retired and in their place an expert
director was appointed to manage the affairs of the company. on the facts of
that case this Court held that the expenditure was incurred for commercial
expediency in order to facilitate business. In the instant case, as we have
already pointed out, termination of the. managing agency of the outgoing Agents
was a voluntary act not caused by any negligence, inefficiency by the outgoing
managing agents In these circumstances on the facts a circumstances be would
not consider whether it was commercially expedient in order to facilitate
business that the managing agency of the outgoing Agents should have been
Learned counsel for the appellant also
referred us to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Greaves Cotton &
Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City(1) where the Bombay High
Court observed as follows:
"We have already said that the inference
drawn on the material on record is that the managing agency agreement had been
terminated with the object of taking over its management by the board of
directors and there is no evidence which will lead to an inference that it was
done with the oblique motive or oblique purpose of securing the payment of the
said amount of Rs. 17 lakhs to the managing agents.
For reasons stated above, our answer to the
question is in the affirmative, i.e. in favour of the assessee." This was
obviously a case where the Managing Agents had not changed hands at all but
what happened that the managing agency was terminated and the managing agency
was taken over by the Board of Directors themselves. Thus this case also does
not appear to be of any assistance to the appellant.
In C.I.T. West Bengal II, Calcutta v. Coal
Shipment (P) Ltd.(2) this Court indicated the various considerations which
would govern the Court in deciding whether a particular amount is of a capital
nature. Relying on a decision in the case of Atherton v. British Insulated and
Helsby Cables Ltd.(3) this Court observed as follows:
"The character of the payment can be
determined, it was added by looking at what is the true nature of the asset
which has been acquired and not by the fact whether it is a (1) 48 I.T.R. 111,
(2) 3 S.C.C. 736, 740, 741.
(3) 10 T.C. 671.
658 payment in a lump-sum or by installments.
It is also an accepted proposition that the words 'permanent' and 'enduring'
are only relative terms and not synonymous with perpetual or ever-lasting.
There are some other tests like those of
fixed capital and circulating capital for determining the nature of the
expenditure. An item of disbursement can be regarded as capital expenditure
when it is referable to fixed capital.
It is revenue when it can be attributed to
circulating capital." Similarly in The Commissioner of Income Tax Madras
Ashok Leyland Ltd. (1) this Court observed as
"A long line of decisions have laid down
that when an expenditure is made with a view to bringing into existence an
asset or an advantage for the enduring benefit of a trade there is good reason
(in the absence of special circumstances leading to the opposite conclusion)
for treating such an expenditure as properly attributable not to revenue but to
From the facts found, it is clear that the managing
agency was terminated on business considerations and as a matter of commercial
expediency. There is no basis for holding that by terminating the managing
agency, the company not only saved the expense that it would have had to incur
in the relevant previous year but also for few more years to come. It will not
be correct to say that by avoiding certain business expenditure, the company
can be said to have acquired enduring benefits or acquired any income yielding
asset." It may be seen that in that case there was a finding of fact that
the termination of the managing agency was purely on business considerations
and as a matter of commercial expediency and that no enduring benefits were
acquired by the company.
Similarly in M. K. Brothers (P) Ltd. v Commissioner
of Income-tax, Kalipur.(2) my brother Khanna, J., speaking for the Court
indicated the real tests to determine whether an amount is of a capital nature.
In this connection the Court observed as follows:
"The answer to the question as to whether
the money paid is a revenue expenditure or capital expenditure depends not so
much upon the fact as to whether the amount paid is large or small or whether
it has been paid in lump-sum or by installments, as it does upon the purpose
for which the payment has been made and expenditure incurred. It is the real
nature and quality of the payment and not the quantum or the manner of the
payment which would prove decisive. If the object of making the payment is to
acquire a capital (1) [19731 S.C.C. 201, 204. (2)  S. C.C. 30. 34.
659 asset, the payment would partake of the
character of a capital payment even though it is made not in a lump sum but by
installments over a period of time." It would thus appear that numerous
cases have laid down various tests to determine as to when on the facts and
circumstances of a particular case the expenses disbursed by an assessee amount
to a capital expenditure or a revenue receipt. The classic test laid down is by
Viscount Cave, L.C., in Atherton's case (supra) where he observed at pp. 192-193
But when an expenditure is made, not only
once and for all, but with a view to bringing into existence an asset or an
advantage for the enduring benefit of a trade, I think that there is very good
reason (in the absence of special circumstances leading to an opposite
conclusion) for treating such an expenditure as properly attributable not to
revenue but to capital." Atherton's case (supra) has been followed by this
Court in a large number of decisions such as in M/s. Ashok.- Leyland Ltd. case
(supra) and Coal Shipment (P) Ltd's case (supra) and lot of other cases.
Several tests that have been evolved over the
years by this Court as also the other High Courts may be briefly formulated as
(1) Bringing into an ass or advantage of
enduring nature would lead to the inference that the expenditure disbursed is
of a capital nature These terms, such asset" or "advantage of
enduring nature" are, however, purely descriptive rather than definitive
and no rule of universal application can be laid down.
Ultimately the question will have to depend
on the facts and circumstances of each case, namely. quality to, and quantum of
the amount, the position of the parties, the object of the transaction which
has impact on the business, the nature of trade for which the expenditure is
incurred and the purpose thereof etc.
(2) An item of disbursement may be regarded
as of a capital nature when it is relatable to a fixed asset or capital,
whereas the circulating capital or stock-in-trade would be treated as revenue
Lord Haldane in John Smith & Sons v.
Moore(1) has aptly and adroitly explained the terms 'field capital' and
'circulating capital' thus:
"Fixed capital is what the assessee
turns into profit by keeping it in his own possession and circulating capital
is what he makes profit of by parting with it and letting it change masters.
(1) 12 T.C. 255, 282 660 (3) Expenditure
relating to framework of business generally capital expenditure.
(4) Another important and safe test that may
be laid down particularly in cases where the managing agency is terminated
would be to find out whether the termination of the agency is in termination of
purely voluntary for obtaining substantial benefits. In other words, the
decisive test to determine whether or not termination of the agency is in
terrorem would be to find out is in such case commercial expediency requires
that the agency should be terminated as it had become onerous or it was
creating difficulties or the Agents were guilty of negligence etc. It will also
include payments for retrenchment compensation or conferment of benefits on
employees or termination of other disadvantages or onerous relationships.
These arc some of the instances which I have
given but they are by no means exhaustive The present case, however, falls
within condition No (4) pointed out by us above, and the termination of the.
agency cannot be said to be in terrorem but was voluntary so as to obtain an
enduring or recurring benefit.
Before applying these tests to the facts of
the present case, I would like to stress the important ingredients of s.
10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 itself.
Section 10(2)(xv) runs thus:
10. (2) Such profits or gains shall be
computed after making the following allowances, namely:- (xv) any expenditure
not being an allowance of the nature described in any of the clauses (i) to
(xiv) inclusive. and not being in the nature of capital expenditure or personal
expenses of the assessee laid out or expanded wholly and exclusively for the
purpose of such business, profession or vocation An analysis of this section
would clearly show that in order to be deductible expense the amount in
question must fulfill two essential conditions: (i) that expense must be laid
out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business, profession or
vocation; and (ii) that it should not be expense of a capital nature. Both
these conditions have to be complied with before an assessee can claim
deduction under s. 10(2)(xv). The High Court in this case has found that while
the assessee had complied with the first condition that the expenditure was
incurred for the purpose of the business, yet it has held that in the
circumstances the expenditure is of a capital nature. It cannot be argued as
was suggested by Mr. Asoke Sen at one time that whenever an expenditure is
incurred in the course of the business it would never be a capital expenditure
because s. 37 of the income-tax Act, 1961, 661 itself contemplates contingency
where even though the expenditure may be incurred wholly and exclusively for
the purpose of the business yet it may be of a capital nature.
Let us now apply the tests laid down by the
Courts as specified by us to the facts of the present case. We have already
given the facts found by the Tribunal which have not been disputed before us.
In this connection there are two circumstances which clearly indicate that the
expenses incurred by the assessee were not dictated by commercial expediency
but were inspired be a profit-hunting motive:
(1) That there was absolutely no necessity to
terminate the managing agency of Juggilal Kamlapat only two years after the
appellant entered into agreement with them. There was no complaint that the
Agents had m any way' caused any loss or damage to the appellant or to their
reputation, nor was there anything to show that the outgoing agents were guilty
of negligence, laches, fraud or negligence. In these circumstances, therefore,
the only irresistible inference that could be drown is that the assessee wanted
to benefit both the firms, namely, incoming agents and the outgoing agents,
which belonged to the Singhania family as found by the Tribunal and not
disputed before us. The outgoing agents were benefited because an amount of Rs.
2,50,000 was paid to them and the incoming
agents were benefited because they were given the managing agency of the
Company and as found by the Tribunal the appellant had pledged their goods in
lieu of advance, (2) That it is the admitted case of the appellant that by
virtue of the fact that the incoming agents had agreed to charge only 2%
commission, the appellant got a benefit of Rs. 30,000 per annum. this amount is
a recurring benefit to the appellant and can safely be regarded as an advantage
of an enduring nature so as to fall within the definition laid down by Viscount
Cave, L.C In these circumstances therefore, the present case is fully covered
by the 'decision of this Court in Godrej Company's case (supra).
For these reasons we are satisfied that the
High Court was right in holding that the disbursement of compensation of Rs.
2,50,000 was of a capital nature and was, therefore, not deductible expenditure
under s. 10(2)(xv) of the Income- tax-Act 1922. We, however, feel that the High
Court was in error in giving a cryptic finding that the expenditure in question
was incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business. This
finding has been arrived at without considering the facts mentioned by us above
and is not borne out from the facts and circumstances proved in this case.
Nevertheless we uphold the order of the High
Court on reasons different from those given by the High Court.
662 We would, however, like to make it clear
that we have held that the compensation paid to the outgoing Agents in the
peculiar facts of the present case amounts to capital expenditure. But we
should not be understood as laying down a general rule that in all cases where
compensation is paid to the Managing Agents whose agency is terminated it would
amount to capital expenditure. We have already pointed out the various tests to
be applied which are by no means exhaustive, nor are they of universal
application. Each case has to be examined in the light of the circumstances of
The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed
V.P.S. Appeal dismissed.