Sukh Ram Vs. State of U. P  INSC
220 (28 November 1973)
CITATION: 1974 AIR 323 1974 SCR (2) 518 1974
SCC (3) 656
R 1974 SC1567 (6) R 1975 SC1917 (11) RF 1976
SC1084 (17) F 1991 SC 318 (16)
Penal Code-S. 302 read with s. 34-Two of the
three named accused acquitted--Whether the third could be convicted with the
aid of s. 34.
The appellant, along with two others, was
tried for an offence under s. 302, I. P. C. read with s. 34, IC P. C. The
Sessions Judge acquitted one of the accused, while the High Court acquitted
another but the appellant was convicted and sentenced. The charge specifically
mentioned that the murder was committed by the three accused named therein.
In appeal to this Court it was contended that
after the acquittal of two of the three accused 'by the two courts below, the
appellant could not be convicted with the aid of s. 34, I. P. C.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD:In view of the unambiguous evidence the
Sessions Court no prejudice can be said to have been reason of his conviction
under s.302 read with s. other accused specifically named in the v charge had
been adopted by the appellant disclosed an awareness on his true nature of the
allegations levelled against him. participation in the crime to three named
individuals the murder was committed by the appellant and two other persons,
the fatal shot having been fired by one of the two. tendered by the prosecution
in caused to the appellant by 34. I. P. C. even though the two acquitted. The
defence part of the substance and Though the charge confined evidence was led
to show that While examining him under s. 342, Cr. P. C. the Sessions Judge
questioned him in regard to his participation in the crime along with his companions
not along with the two named co- accused. The High Court was certain that there
were three culprits and the appellant was one of them. It is clear that
notwithstanding the charge, the acquittal of the two accused raised no bar to
the conviction of the appellant under s. 302 read with s. 34. I. P. C. A
possible pre judice to the accused, on a reasonable view of the course- the
trial had taken, was the true touchstone of such matters. [519G-H; 520B&E]
Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab,  S. C. R. 145.
Bharwad Mepa Dana v. State of Bombay, 
2 S.C. R. 172;
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab,  2
S.C.R. 395, relied on Mohan Singh v. State of Punjab,  Suppl. 3 S.C.R.
848, and Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra,  1 S. C. R. 678,
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal
Appeal No. 99 of 1970.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and
Order dated the 28th January 1970 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal
Appeal No. 1888 of 1967.
D.Mukherjee, A. T. M. Sampath and E. C.
Agrawala, for the appellant.
D. P. Uniyal and O. P. Rana, for the
respondent The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DWIVEDI J.-Three persons,
Mahendra Singh, Lakhan Singh and the appellant Sukh Ram, were tried for the
murder of one Chunni Lal under s. 302 read with s. 34. I. P. C. by the Sessions
Judge, Aligarh. The Sessions Judge acquitted Mahendra Singh, and convicted and
sentenced the remaining two to imprisonment for life. On appeal the 519 High
Court of Allahabad acquitted Lakhan Singh and affirmed the conviction and
sentence of the appellant. Hence this appeal.
The deceased Chunni Lal has a tea stall near
the Bus Stand in Sasni. He was shot dead on 9-3-1967 at about 10-30 p.m.
The: First Information Report of the incident
was lodged by Sunder Lal, a relation of the deceased. The prosecution examined
Sunder Lal,. Radhey Shyam, Puran Mal and Devi Prasad to prove its case against
the aforesaid accused. The Sessions Judge believed all the witnesses. In a
careful and sifting analysis of the entire evidence, the learned.
Judges of the High Court (S. D. Khare and
Jagmohan Lal Sinha JJ.) have winnowed out all evidence which could legitimately
be objected to by the appellant and have held that the remaining evidence
clearly brought home the guilt to him. Counsel for the appellant could not
point out any infirmity in their opinion. We have read the entire evidence, and
we are satisfiEd that they have rightly found the appellantguilty of the murder
of Chunni Lal.
Counsel for the appellant has, however,
strenuously urged before.us that after the acquittal of Mahendra Singh and
Lakhan Singh,. the appellant could not be convicted with the aid of s. 34
I.P.C. The charge framed by the Sessions Judge reads:
"I........... Sessions Judge, Aligarh,
hereby charge you Sukh Ram S/o Hari Ram, Lakhan Singh s/o Biri Singh and
Mahenara Singh s/o Gulab Chand as follows:
That you on the 9th day of March, 1967, at
about 10.30 p.m. in the town of Sasni near the bus stand at the- shop of Chunni
Lal in furtherance of your common intention which was to commit the murder of
Chunni Lal, did commit the murder of Chunni Lal, did commit his murder by one
of you firing at him with a- pistol, as a result of which Chunni Lal
immediately fell down dead, and thereby committed an offence punishable under
s. 302 read with s. 34 I.P.C. and within the cognisance of this Court."
Thus the charge specifically mentions that the murder of Chunni Lat was
committed by the three accused named therein, namely, MahendraSingh, Lakhan
Singh and the appellant Sukh Ram. It does not mention that any other persons,
known or unknown, were concerned in the commission of the offence.
But in view of the unambiguous evidence
tendered by the prosecution in the Sessions Court, no prejudice can be said to
have been caused to the appellant by reason of his conviction under section 302
read with section 34, Penal Code, even though the two other accused
specifically named in the charge have been acquitted. Indeed, the very line of
defence adopted by /theappellant, as reflected in the cross- examination of the
prosecution. witnesses, discloses an awareness on his part of the substance and
true nature of the allegations levelled against him. Though the charge,
confines participation in the crime to three named individuals, evidence was
led to show that Chunni Lal was murdered by the 520 appellant and two other
persons, the fatal shot having been fired by one of these two. At the trial,
the heart of the issue therefore was whether there was evidence to prove that
the appellant and two others had, in pursuance of their common intention,
committed the murder In fact,may be by reason of the variance between the terms
of the charge and the trend of the evidence, the learned Sessions Judge while
examining the appellant under s. 342 Cr. P. C. questioned him in regard to his
participation in the crime along with his "companions", not along
with the two named co-accused.
On the central issue arising in the case, the
Sessions Court found : "This direct evidence taken as a whole proves
beyond any reasonable doubt that Sukh Ram along with two other companions had
gone to Chunni Lal's shop at that time and one of his companions fired at
Chunni Lal with a pistol while Chunni Lal was closing his shop." The High
Court acquitted Lakhan Singh because it thought it unsafe to rely on the sole
testimony of Kunwarji in regard to Lakhan Singh's identification. But the
learned Judges of the High Court were certain, and we are in agreement with
their view, that there were three culprits, appellant being one of those three.
This is what the High Court says : "We are, therefore, of the opinion that
it is fully established that Sukh Ram was amongst the three assailants of
Chunni Lal and that the pistol was fired at Chunni Lal in furtherance of the
common intention of all the three assailants." It is, therefore, clear
that notwithstanding the charge, the acquittal of Mahendra Singh and Lakhan
Singh raises no bar to the conviction of the appellant under s. 302 read with
s. 34. A possible prejudice to the accused, on a reasonable view of the course
the trial has taken, is the true touch- stone of such matters and we have
warned ourselves of that danger before coming to the conclusion that the High
Court is right in the view it has taken.
in Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab(1) four
persons were convicted under s. 302 read with s. 149 I. P. C. They were tried
along with three other persons but those three persons were acquitted by the
High Court. The argument in this Court was similar to the one before us. The First
Information Report had specifically named the four appellants and the three
acquitted accused. It did not state that any other person or persons had
participated in the crime with them. It was, therefore, not a case of mistaken
identity. Accordingly the appellants were acquitted by this Court. While
acquitting them, Bose J.
took care to observe at a page 151 of the
"Now mistaken identity has never been
suggested. The accused are all men of the same village and the eyewitnesses
know them by name. The murder took place in daylight and within a few feet of
the two eye-witnesses.
If the witnesses had said : "I know
there were five assailants and I am certain of A. B. C. I am not certain of the
other two but think they were D and E" a conviction of A. B. and C
provided the witnesses are believed, would be proper." (1)  S.C.R.
521 In Bharwad Nepa Dana v. State of
Bombay(1), 12 persons were tried by the Sessions Judge for the offence under s.
302 read with s. 149 I. P. C. He acquitted seven of them and convicted the
remaining five. The convicted persons appealed to the High Court. The High
Court acquitted one of them and affirmed the conviction of the remaining four.
On appeal the argument before this Court was similar to the one before us. The
High Court had recorded this finding "From the prosecution evidence, there
is no doubt whatsoever that more than five persons were operating at the scene
of offence, though the identity of all the persons has not been established
except the accused nos. 1, 2, 3 and 11. There is no doubt on the prosecution
evidence that more than five persons i.e., as many as ten to thirteen persons
took part in this offence." While maintaining the conviction of the
appellants, S. K. Das J. observed at page 181 of the Report "Nothing in
law prevented the High Court from finding that the unlawful assembly consisted
of the four convicted persons and some unidentified persons, who together
numbered more than five. We have advisedly said "Nothing in law etc."
for, whether such a finding can be given or not must depend on the facts of
each case and on the evidence led.
It is really a question of fact to be deter-
mined in each case on the evidence given therein. Learned counsel for the
appellant argued before us, as though it is a matter of law, that it was riot
open to the High Court to come to the finding to which it came, because the
prosecution case was that thirteen named persons constituted the unlawful
assembly. We are unable to accept this.
argument as correct. We do not think that
there was any such legal bar as is suggested by learned counsel, though there
may be cases where on the facts proved it will be impossible to reach a finding
that the convicted persons, less than five in number, constituted an unlawful
assembly with certain unspecified persons not mentioned in the charge." In
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (2), the prosecution case was. that the
appellant along with 12 other persons had committed the offence under s. 302
read with s. 149 I. P. C.
13 persons including the appellant were tried
for the offence. The Sessions Judge was not certain of the participation of 10
accused. But he was satisfied that the appellant and two others did participate
in the crime. He positively found that those two persons along with at least 9
or 10 persons had committed the crime. But he could not say as to who those 9
or 10 persons were. The three convicted persons appealed to the. High Court.
The High Court dismissed the appeal. It was urged (1)  2 S.C.R. 172.
(2)  2 S.C.R. 395.
522 before this Court that on the acquittal
of the 10 co-accused the remaining three accused could not be convicted with
the aid of s. 149 I. P.C. Rejecting the argument, Raghubar Dayal J. observed
"It is only when the number of the alleged assailants is definite and all
of them are named, and the number of persons found to be proved to have taken
part in the incident is less than five, that it cannot be held that the
assailants' party must have consisted of five or more persons. The acquittal of
the remaining named persons must mean that they were not in the incident. The
fact that they were named, excludes the possibility of other persons to be in
the appellant's party and especially when there is no occasion to think that
the witnesses naming all the accused could have committed mistake in
recognising them. " The learned Judge added "The witnesses were from
village Seel. A good number of the accused were from other villages. Only two
of the witnesses had named all the thirteen accused. Other witnesses did not
name all of them. None of them named more than seven accused and all of them
said that there were thirteen persons in the appellant's party." The
learned Judge then observed "In this state of evidence, it is not possible
to say that the courts below could not have come to the conclusion that there
were more than five persons in the appellant's party." It may be observed
that the facts of this case have a close resemblance with the facts in our
Counsel for the appellant has relied on Mohan
Singh v. State of Punjab(1). The appellants along with three others were
charged with the offence under s. 302 read with s. 149 I. P. C. They were all
named. The Sessions Judge acquitted two of them. He convicted the appellant and
one more. On appeal the High Court affirmed their conviction and sentence. The
Sessions Judge had taken care to record a finding that the crime must have been
committed by more than three or four persons. The High Court affirmed this
finding. On appeal in this Court, it was pointed out that the charge and the
evidence of the prosecution referred to the five accused as assailants and to
no once else. Council for the State conceded that it was so. On this
concession, the Court said : "If that be so, as soon as two of the five
named persons are acquitted, the assembly must be deemed to have been composed
of only three persons and that clearly cannot be regarded as an unlawful
assembly". Obviously, the facts of this case are distinguishable from the
facts of our case.
So that appellant can derive no assistance
from this case.
It may be observed that Dalip Singh, Bharwad
Mepa Dana and Kartar Singh (supra) were noticed in this case and not dissented
(1)  Suppl. 3 S.C.R. 848.
523 The next case relied on by counsel, for
the appellant is Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra(1). In this case
the appellant was convicted of the offence under s. 302 read with the aid of S.
34 I. P. C. The prosecution case was that the appellant along with three
persons had committed the crime. The appellant and those three persons were
charged with the offence under s. 302 read with s. 34 I.P.
C. The Sessions Judge did not believe the
prosecution evidence and acquitted all of them. On appeal the High Court
convicted the appellant but maintained the acquittal of the remaining three The
appellant challenged his conviction in this Court on a ground identical to the
one before us. This Court accepted the argument and acquitted the appellant.
But it may be noted that the facts of this case are entirely distinguishable
from the facts of our case. There the eye witnesses had deposed that the four
accused specifically named had beaten the deceased. ?None of those witnesses
spoke about the participation of any other person. While convicting the appellant
the High Court recorded the finding that he along with one or more of the other
accused committed the offence. Obviously, the prosecution did not put forward a
case of the commission of crime by one known person and one or two unknown
persons as in our case. Nor was here evidence to the effect that the named
accused had committed the crime with one or more other persons. In the case
before us there is clear evidence to the effect that the appellant along with
two unknown persons had committed the crime. For these distinguishing features
this case will also not assist the appellant.
In the result, we find no illegality in the
conviction of the appellant with the aid of s. 34 I. P. C. There is no force in
this appeal aid it is hereby dismissed.
P.B.R Appeal dismissed.
(1)  1 S.C.R. 678.