R. B. Bansilal Abirchand Milis Co.
Ltd. Vs. Labour Court Nagpur & Ors  INSC 325 (25 November 1971)
SIKRI, S.M. (CJ) SHELAT, J.M.
CITATION: 1972 AIR 451 1972 SCR (2) 580 1971
SCC (2) 154
CITATOR INFO :
E 1972 SC1579 (4,6) R 1978 SC 275 (5) D 1988
Industrial Disputes Act-S. 33C(2)-Whether
Labour Court has jurisdiction to entertain application for lay-off compensation
under s. 33C(2).
A textile mill in Madhya Pradesh employed
about a thousand workers. The mill was owned by a firm, the appellant in the
Second Appeal. A fire broke out in the Mill doing appreciable damage to some of
the machines. From a letter of the Insurance company, the extent of the damage
caused, was ascertained to be about Rs. 37,420/-. In terms of the last notice
given by the employers the mills did not commence work but instead, the
management transferred the mills to the company which had been incorporated on
8th December 1959. From the facts it was clear, that the damage to the
machinery was insignificant as against the total assets transferred to the
company and the damage was not such that it was not possible to run the mills
Respondents 2 to 346 in the Second Appeal
applied under s. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act to the Labour Court
claiming lay-off compensation for the period they remained idle. The Labour
Court held that there had been a lay-off within the meaning of s. 2(K-KK) of
Industrial Disputes Act and except 'badli' workers the employees were entitled
to compensation for the full period of 18 months. The appellants in both the
appeals, filed writ petitions before the High Court for quashing the order of
the Labour Court and the High Court raised several issues and ultimately
remanded the matters back to the Labour Court for recording fresh evidence as
to whether the applicants presented themselves for work at the appointed time
at least once a day within the meaning of S. 25E(ii). On the application of the
appellants the High Court granted certificates under Art. 133 (1) (a) of the
Constitution. The point urged by the appellants was that if a claim is made on
the basis of a lay off and the employer contends that there was no lay off but
closure it is open to a labour court to entertain an application under s.
33C(2). It is more so when the dispute was not between a solitary workman on
the one hand and the employer on the other but a whole body of workmen ranged
against their employer who was faced with numerous applications before the
labour court for computation of benefit in terms of money.
Dismissing the appeals,
HELD : (i) From the facts and circumstances
of the Case, it was clear that the business of the company was continuing.
They, in fact, continued to employ several
employees and their notices say that some portion of the mills would continue
to work. The Labour Court's jurisdiction could not be ousted by a mere plea
denying the workmen's claim to the computation of benefit in terms of money.
The Labour Court must go into the matter and come to a decision as to whether
there was really a closure or a lay off. If it took the view that there was a
lay-off, it would be acting within its jurisdiction if it awarded compensation
in terms of the provisions in Ch. VA. The High Court is right in upholding the
decision of the Court. [591 E-H] 581 (ii) Section 33C(2) takes within the
purview, rases of workmen who claim that the benefits to which they were
entitled should be computed in terms of money, even though the right to the
benefit on which their claim is based, is disputed by their employers. In other
words, the Labour Court may enquire into all such acts or disputes which are
incidental to the main dispute, [588 C-D] (iii) Section 25C provides for the
measure of compensation to be awarded in cases of lay off of workers.
The claim to compensation of every workman
who is laid off is one which arises under the statute itself and s. 25C,
provides for a benefit to the workman which is capable of being computed in
terms of money under s. 33C(2), of the Act. The scheme of the Act is that an
individual workman can approach a labour court for computation of compensation
in terms of s. 25C of the Act and he is not concerned to see whether other
co-workers will adopt the same course or not.
The fact that a number of workers make claims
of identical nature cannot make any difference to the individual workman who
prefers the claim, The mere fact that a large number of persons makes a claim,
of the same nature against the employer does not change the nature of the
dispute so as to take it out of the pale of s. 7 of the Act and render the
dispute one which can only be dealt with by an industrial tribunal. [588 E-H]
Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P. S. Rajagopalan,  3 S.C.R. 140,
followed., Mining Engineer v. Rameshwar,  1 S.C.R. 140, U.P.Electric
Supply Co. v. R. K. Shukla,  1 S.C.R. 507, Ramkrishna Ramnath v.
Presiding Officer, Nagpur,  2 L.L.J. 306 and Sawatram Mills v. Baliram,
 1 S.C.R.
764, referred to and distinguished.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals
Nos. 2136 and 2295 of 1966.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated
February 2, 1965 of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench in Special Civil
Applications Nos. 246 of 1964 and 84 of 1963 respectively.
G. B. Pai, P. C. Bhartari, J. B. Dadachanji,
0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 2136 of 1966).
S. V. Gupte, C. N. Nagle and A. G.
Ratnaparkhi, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 2295 of 1966).
M. C. Bhandare, F. P. Sathe, Praveen Pareek,
Vineet Kumar and Indira Jai Singh, for respondents Nos. 131 to 142, 144 to 478,
480 to 488, 490 and 492 (in C.A. No. 2136 of 1966).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Mitter, J. The main question in these two appeals by certi ficate is, whether
the Labour Court bad jurisdiction to entertain the application for lay-off
compensation under s.
33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The
appellant in the first appeal is a 582 limited company which is now under
liquidation while the appellant in the second is a partnership firm, the
respondents in the two appeals being the Labour Court and different groups of
The facts are as follows. In Hinganghat there
was a textile mill known as R. B. Bansilal Abirchand Mills which used to employ
about 1000 men. The mill was owned by the firm, the appellant in the Second
appeal. A fire broke out in the mill on March 27, 1959 doing appreciable damage
to some of the machines. The employers put up a notice under their Standing
Order No. 19 on March 28, 1959 to the effect that the fire of the previous
night had caused heavy loss and extensive damage to the departments rendering
the mill's working impracticable until necessary repairs and adjustments were
carried out. The employees were however to note that the folding and workshop
departments would continue to work as usual and notice of resumption of mill's
working would be posted after necessary adjustment and repairs were carried
out. This was followed by a second notice issued on April 2, 1959 to the effect
that the preliminary survey of the fire have in conjunction with the insurance
companies had shown that over 60 per cent of the machines in the carding. fly
frame and Ring frame departments had been damaged and that the damage to the
bulk of these machines was such that they might require complete replacement.
It was further announced that in the circumstances the Management had no
alternative but to declare stoppage of work of all the productive departments
of the mills.
Although it is not possible to be precise as
to the extent of the damage caused, a fair idea of it can be had from a letter
of Hukumchand Insurance Company Ltd. dated August 28, 1959 stating that the
loss to buildings, machinery and accessories had been determined at Rs. 22,624/by
the surveyors. It appears that on 27th April 1960 the representatives of the
insurance companies had agreed to reassessment increasing the figure for
repairs to Rs. 37,420/-.
The third notice put up by the firm on April
29, 1960 gave no indication of the date of completion of the repairs. On
September 13, 1960 the firm notified that the departments of the mills which
had remained unproductive since 28th March, 1959 were expected to commence
working on or about 30th September, 1960.
The firm did not however work the mills in
terms of the last notice but transferred the same to the company which had been
incorporated on 8th December, 1959. It appears that the consideration for the
transfer was Rs. 34,75,000/made up of 583 Rs. 11,50,000/being the value of the
immovable properties and Rs. 23,25,000/being the value of movable properties.
Compared to the second figure, the damage to
the machinery as assessed by the insurance companies is insignificant.
The first notice of 28th March, 1959 brings
out the fact that the work in the mill as a whole was not. brought to a stand
still and that it was to continue as usual in the folding and workshop
departments. According to the second notice, the preliminary survey had shown
that over 60 per cent of the machines in only three departments, namely,
carding, fly frame and ring frame, had been damaged and that complete
replacement of some of the above might be necessary. The notices do )not make
out the case that the damage was such that it was not possible to run the mills
Towards the end of 1961 and the be-inning of
1962, respondents 2 to 346 in Civil Appeal No. 2295 of 1966 presented
applications under s. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act to the Labour
Court at Nagpur claiming to have been laid-off from 28th March 1959 to 30th
September, 1960. The appellants in the second appeal filed a written statement
before the Labour Court contending inter alia that the Labour Court had no
jurisdiction under s. 33-C(2) and that the parties had to work out their rights
within the four corners of the State Act i.e. the C.P. and Berar Industrial
Disputes Settlement Act, 1947. By order dated 30th November, 1962 the
preliminary objection as to jurisdiction of the employers was rejected by the
Labour Court. On this, the appellants preferred an application under Art. 226
of the Constitution of India before, the Bombay High Court. By a common
judgment rendered on 25th August, 1962 the High Court rejected the contentions
of the appellants that the claim under the Industrial Disputes Act was not maintainable
because of the operation of the State Act and further held that the Labour
Court was competent to adjudicate on the merits of the claim of the workers
even where the employer disputed not only the jurisdiction of the said court
but also disputed that there was any lay-off as claimed and that the applicants
were not workmen within the meaning of the Act. The appellants who were
petitioners before the High, Court did not proceed further in the matter by
applying for a certificate that the case was fit for appeal to this Court. By
order dated November 30, 1962 the Labour Court dismissed as barred by the
principles of res judicata 125 applications of some of the workers who had
previously applied to the Labour Court at Bombay and whose applications had been
subsequently dismissed by the Labour Judge, Bombay on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction under s. 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act. The claim dismissed
related to the period between March 28, 1959 and May 584 2, 1960. The Labour
Court allowed the claims relating to the period from May 3, 1960 to September
30, 1960 and ordered the issue of certificates of recovery under s. 33-C of the
Respondents 2 to 493 in Appeal No. 2136/1966
filed applications under S. 33-C in the Labour Court at Nagpur claiming lay-off
compensation for the period 28th March, 1959 to September 30, 1960. The Labour
Court held by order dated February 29, 1964 that there had been a lay-off
within the meaning of s. 2(kkk) of the Industrial Disputes Act and that the
employees were entitled to compensation for the full period of 18 months but
workers who were "badli" workers were not entitled to such
compensation. The appellants in both the appeals preferred writ petitions
before the High Court-of Bombay for quashing the order of the Labour Court.
The two writ petitions were disposed of by
the High Court by a common judgment on February 2, 1965. Before the High Court
four main points were raised, namely
1. Whether having regard to the circumstances
and the established facts there had been a lay-off within the meaning of the
expression in s. 2(kkk) ?
2. If there had been a lay-off, whether
compensation under s. 25-C read with S. 25-E of the Act was payable to the
workers, also whether the workers were not entitled to compensation because of
non-fulfilment of conditions prescribed in S. 25-E ?
3. Whether badli workers were entitled to
lay-oil' compensation? and
4. Whether the quantum of compensation would
be governed by the first proviso to S. 25-C or whether s. 25-C(ii) would be applicable
entitling the workers to compensation for the full period of the lay-off i.e.
28-3-59 to 30-9-1960 ? On the first question the High Court held that "by
every indication and circumstance and by express declaration of its management
it was a running industry", meaning thereby that there was no closure. On
the second question, the High Court held that the Labour Court should have
considered whether the workmen had proved that they had presented themselves
for work or not in terms of S. 25-E to be able to claim compensation under s.
25-C, excepting with regard to three workmen who cave clear evidence on the
point. It also held that badli labour were not entitled to lay-off
compensation. It turned down the contention that compensation was claimable only
in terms of the Standing Orders of the Mill. In the result the High Court
remanded the 585 matters 'back to the Labour Court for recording fresh evidence
on behalf of both the parties on the following issue :
Do the applicants prove that they presented themselves
for work at the appointed time at least once a day within the meaning of s. 25E(ii)?
On the applications of the appellants, the High Court granted certificates
under Art. 133(1) (a) of the Constitution.
Before us learned counsel for the respondents
Mr. Bhandare sought to resist the main contention of the appellants by urging
that the decision of the High Court in 1962 operated as res judicata in the
present appeals. He said that it was open to the appellants to challenge the
conclusion of the High Court arrived at in 1962 by moving the High Court by an
application for the issue of a certificate of fitness for appeal to this Court
and in the event of refusal thereof, to ask for special leave of this Court. In
the absence of such applications the determination of the High Court in 1962
had become final and the question as to jurisdiction could not be canvassed
again. We do not think it necessary to go into this question as the matter can
be disposed of even on the basis that it is open to the appellants to raise the
question of jurisdiction before this Court although the point was not expressly
taken in the grounds for leave to appeal to this Court before the High Court.
The substantial point of Mr. Gupte appearing
for one set of appellants was that it being the case of the employers that
there had been a closure of the mills the dispute could not be adjudicated upon
by a Labour Court and was entertain able only by an Industrial Tribunal under
the provisions of s.
10(1) (d) of the Act. Mr. Gupte drew our
attention to various sections of the Act in support of his contention that an
"industrial dispute meant primarily a dispute or difference between
employers on the one hand and employees on the other connected with the
employment or non-employment or the terms of employment etc. of any person. He
urged that the basic underlying idea was that to be an industrial dispute the
dispute had to be one which affected the employee,; ,-is a class as pitted
against their employers.
He argued that individual workman could only
approach the Labour Court for lay-off compensation when prima facie there was
no question of closure of the industry by the employers and drew our attention
to the definition of 'lay-off' ins.2(kkk). According to him in a situation like
the present where the inability on the part of the employer to give employment
was not limited to a handful of persons but extended to the employees wholesale
arising out of a calamity it could not be said that there had been a lay-off of
the employees. Although the word 'closure' is not defined in the Act, counsel
586 argued that the expression would aptly describe the condition prevailing in
the mills as a result of the fire on March 27, 1959.
We find ourselves unable to accept Mr.
We may in this connection refer to the
relevant provisions in the Act. The authorities under the Act are specified in
different sections of Chapter II containing ss. 3 to 9.
Under s. 7 it is open to the appropriate
Government by notification in the Official Gazette constitute one or more
Labour Courts for the adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any
matters specified in the Second Schedule and for performing such other
functions as may be assigned to them under the Act. Under s. 7-A the
appropriate Government may, by notification, constitute one or more Industrial
Tribunals for the adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter,
whether specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule. In the Second
Schedule are set forth certain matters in items 1 to 5 which are within the
jurisdiction of a Labour Court and item 6 gives the Labour Court jurisdiction
to deal with "all matters other than those specified in the Third
Schedule". The Third Schedule contains 11 items of which item 10 reads :
"Retrenchment of workmen and closure of
Lay-off is not expressly covered by either of
the two Schedules. It would therefore be a matter covered by the Second
Schedule tinder item 6 thereof. S. 10 (1) (c) enables the appropriate
Government when it is of opinion that an industrial dispute exists or is
apprehended inter alia, to refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be
connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, if it relates to any matter
specified in the Second Schedule to a Labour Court for adjudication. So far as
an Industrial Tribunal is concerned,, the appropriate Government may under s.
10(1)(d) make reference to it not only in cases covered by the Second Schedule
but also those included in the Third Schedule except that when the dispute
relates to any matter in the Third Schedule and is not likely to affect more
than one hundred workmen, the appropriate Government may, if it thinks fit,
make a reference to a Labour Court tinder cl.
According to Mr. Gupte, Chapter V-A of the
Act introduced in the year 1953 providing for claims being preferred by
individual workmen to compensation could only be resorted to when the dispute
was such as would not call for a reference under S. 10 (1) (d). He urged
further that it being open to the Central Government to amend the Second and
the Third Schedules by issue of notification under s. 40 of the Act, so long as
the said Schedules stood unaltered, it should be presumed that the legislature
did not intend a Labour Court to exercise its jurisdiction in cases where there
was 587 a serious question of closure of an establishment put forward by the
employers. All this, argued counsel, went to show that if the essential nature
of the dispute was a difference between the employer on the one hand and a very
large body of workmen on the other, the employer making an assertion involving
a matter covered by the Third Schedule to the Act, it would not be open to the
workmen to prefer claims individually under s. 33-C.
The ambit of s. 33-C has been examined by this
Court on a number of occasions and reference may usefully be made to some of
the authorities in this connection to find out whether the Labour Court was
within its jurisdiction to entertain the applications which were followed by
the writ petitions to the Bombay High Court. in Central Bank of India Ltd. v.
P. S. Rajagopalan(1) the legislative history of s. 33-C was gone into at length
and the conclusion of this Court on the scope thereof was as follows (see p.
150) "The legislative history to which we have just referred clearly
indicates that having provided broadly for the investigation and settlement of
industrial disputes on the basis of collective bargaining, the legislature
recognised that individual workmen should be given a speedy remedy to enforce
their existing individual rights, and so inserted s.33-A in the Act in 1950 and
added s. 33-C in 1956. These two provisions illustrate the cases in which
individual workmen can enforce their rights without having to take recourse to
s. 10(1) of the Act, or without having to depend upon their Union to espouse
their cause. Therefore, in construing s. 33-C we have to bear in mind two
relevant considerations. The construction should not be so broad as to bring
within the scope of s. 33-C cases which would fall under s. 10(1).
Where industrial disputes arise between
employees acting collectively and their employers, they must be adjudicated
upon in the manner prescribed by the Act, as for instance, by reference under
s. 10(1). These disputes cannot be brought within the purview of s. 33-C.
Similarly, having regard to the fact that the policy of the Legislature in
enacting s. 33-C is to provide a speedy remedy to the individual workmen to
enforce or execute their existing rights, it would not be reasonable to exclude
from the scope of this section cases of existing rights which are sought to be
implemented by individual workmen." Turning down the contention put
forward on behalf of the employers there that computation under s. 33-C(2)
would only be (1)  3 S.C.R. 140.
588 possible where the right of the workman
to receive the benefit was not disputed, it was said :
"The claim under S. 33-C(2) clearly
postulates that the determination of the question about computing the benefit
in terms of money may, in some cases, have to be preceded by an enquiry into
the existence of the right and such an enquiry might be held to 'be incidental
to the main determination which has been assigned to the Labour Court by sub-s.
(2). As Maxwell has observed " where an Act confers jurisdiction, it
impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such
means, as are essentially necessary to its executions" Accordingly it was
held that s. 33-C(2) took "within the purview cases of workmen who claimed
that the benefit to which they are entitled should be computed in terms of
money, even though the right to the benefit on which their claim is based is
disputed by their employers".
Following the above decision, it was held in
Mining Engineer v. Rameshwar(1) that sub-s. (2) of s. 33-C was not confined to
cases arising under an award, settlement or even under the provisions of
Chapter V-A of the Act and the benefit provided in the bonus scheme under the
Coal Mines Provident Fund and Bonus Schemes Act, 1948 would be covered by
Section 25-C provides for the measures of
compensation to be awarded in cases of lay-off of workers. S. 25-F of the Act
however provides inter alia that no compensation shall be paid to a workman who
has been laid-off if he does not present himself for work at the establishment
at the appointed time during the normal working hours at least once a day.
The claim to compensation of every workman
who is laid-off is one which arises under the statute itself and s.. 25-C
provides for a benefit to the workman which is capable of being computed in
terms of money under S. 33-C(2) of the Act. The scheme of the Act being to
enable a workman to approach a Labour Court (oil computation of the
compensation claimed by him in terms of s. 25-C of the Act he is not concerned
to see whether other co-workers will or will not adopt the same course. The
fact that a number of workers make claims of identical nature i.e. to
compensation for lay-off, arising out of the same set of facts and
circumstances cannot make any difference to the individual workman who prefers
the claim. The mere fact that a large number of persons makes a claim of the
same nature against the employer, does not change (1)  1 S.C.R. 140.
589 the nature of the dispute, so as to take
it out of the pale of s. 7 of the Act and render the dispute one which can only
be dealt with by an Industrial Tribunal to which reference can be made by the
Reference was however made to the decision of
U.P. Electric Supply Co. v. R. K. Shukla(1) in aid of the contention for the
appellants that if the dispute touches a matter in the Third Schedule the
Labour Court will not have jurisdiction to. deal with it. In this case the
State Electricity Board, U.P. took over the undertaking of the company from
September 16, 1964 in exercise of power under sec. 6 of the Indian Electricity
Act, 1910 and under the provisions of the appellants' licences. As a result
thereof, the company ceased to carry on the business of generation and distribution
of electricity thereafter. On September 16, 1964 the Board issued letters of
appointment to the employees of the appellant in the posts and positions which
they had previously held. According to the respondents they were not given
credit for their past services with the company. All the workmen of the two
undertakings were taken over in the employment of the Board with effect from
September 17, 1964.
443 workmen employed in the Allahabad
undertaking filed applications before the Labour Court under s. 6-H(2) of the
U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for payment of retrenchment compensation and
salary in lieu of notice. The orders for payment of retrenchment compensation
were resisted by the company inter alia on the ground that the workmen were
)not in fact retrenched and in any event since they were admitted to the
service of the Board on terms not less favorable than those enjoyed before, the
company was under no liability to pay retrenchment compensation and the Labour
Court was incompetent to entertain and decide the applications for awarding
such compensation. On the above facts the Court in the appeal by special leave
observed "the Company had expressly raised a contention that they had not
retrenched the workmen and that the workmen had voluntarily abandoned the
Company's service by seeking employment with the Board even before the Company
closed its working." Reliance was however placed on certain passages in
the judgment at p. 513 and at p. 517 which according to counsel for the
appellants went to show that when the factum of retrenchment is questioned,
there is a dispute which is 'exclusively within the competence of the
Industrial Tribunal. These observation cannot be considered binding on us as
all the aspects were not placed before the Court then.
Reference was also made to the case of
Ramakrishna Ramanath v. Presiding Officer, Nagpur(2). In that case the
appellant bad (1)  1 S-C.R. 507.
7-L643 Sup. CI/72 (2) (1970) 2 L.L.J. 306.
590 issued a notice in writing on the 1st
July 1958 following the issue of a notification by the Government of Bombay
under S. 5 (2) read with s. 5(1) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 to the effect
that it had been forced to close its factory as from the 1st of July 1958 by
the action of the Bombay Government in issuing the said notification inasmuch
as minimum rates of wages made payable as from 1st July, 1958 were so excessive
and unworkable that it was impossible for any employer to give effect to them
and the notification had made the working of the business a financial
impossibility. The workers were also informed that the closure of the business
would continue as long as the notification dated 11th June, 1958 continued in
force. The Government of Bombay withdrew the notification after some time and
the appellants started to work the factory from 10th August, 1958 taking in all
employees who were there before 1st July. The respondent No. 2 put in an
application before the Presiding, Officer, Labour Court Nagpur on 5th November,
1963 claiming Rs. 334.80 on account of retrenchment compensation and one
month's pay in lieu of notice. The appellant put in its written statement,
inter alia, contending that the said respondent was not an employee but an
independent contractor and that there had been no closure of the business to
attract s. 25-FFF of the Act and that in any event the dispute could not be
referred to a Labour Court. In the appeal by special leave to this Court it was
contended, inter alia, (a) that the dispute did not fall within the
jurisdiction of the Labour Court but within that of an Industrial Tribunal, (b)
that there was really,-no closure of the appellant's business but only a lock
out or a temporary stoppage of work not attracting the operation of s. 25-FFF
and (c) that in order that the respondent could claim. the benefit of 25-F it
was obligatory on her to show that she had worked for 240 days in each year of
service for which the claim was made. This Court found that the appellant had
not taken the plea in its written statement and that there had been a lay-offor
a lock-out and that it had only submitted that the closure in accordance with
the notice did not fall within the scope of s. 25-FFF of the Act. By issues 6
and 7 the appellant raised questions as to whether the closure had resulted in
the retrenchment of the applicant and whether the closure was beyond the
control of the employer. No dispute was raised about the factum of closure.
Strangely enough it was urged before this Court that "there could be no
closure because the appellant was ,merely protesting against irresponsible
action of the Government action and had no intention to close the business
permanently." The Court found that the question of lock-out was not mooted
when the issues were settled nor had any plea been taken that there had been a
temporary cessation of work under Standing Order No. 11. In our view, the
observations in this case do not help the appellants before us.
591 In Sawatram Mills v. Baliram(1) the claim
of the workmen for lay-off during a certain period before the Second Labour
Court Bombay was resisted inter alia on the ground that the said court had no
jurisdiction as the dispute fell to be tried under the C.P. and Berar Industrial
Disputes (Settlement) Act, 1947, and, secondly, the application under s. 33-C
was incompetent because it was not a claim for money due and calculations had
to be made for ascertaining the sum due. On a construction of the sections of
the industrial Disputes Act this Court held that :
"Compensation for lay-off could only be
determined under Chapter V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act and the workmen
were entitled under s. 3 3 C (1) to go before the Second Labour Court to
realise moneys due from their employers under Chapter V-A." The Court also
negatived the contention that the Industrial Disputes Act did not apply but the
C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes (Settlement) Act did as the State Act made
no mention of lay-,off or compensation for lay-off. The other argument was
rejected following the judgment in Kays Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of
U.P. & ors.
In substance the point urged by the
appellants was that if a claim is made on the basis of a lay-off and the
employer contends that there was no lay-off but closure, it is not open to a
labour court to entertain an application under s.
33-C(2). The more so it was stated, when the
dispute was not between a solitary workman on the one hand and the employer on
the other but a whole body of workmen ranged against their employer who was
faced with numerous application-, before the Labour Court for computation of
benefit in terms of money. As has been said already, the Labour Court must go
into the matter and come to a decision as to whether there was really a closure
or a lay-off. If it took the view that there was a lay-off without any closure
of the business it would be acting within its jurisdiction' if it awarded
compensation in terms of the provisions of Chapter V-A. In our opinion the High
Court's conclusion that "In fact the business of this Company was
continuing. They in fact continued to employ several employees. their notices
say that some portions of the mills would continue to work" was
unexceptionable. The notices which we have referred to can only lead to the
above conclusion. The Labour Court's jurisdiction could not be ousted by a mere
plea denying the workman's claim to the computation of ,lie benefit in terms of
money: the (1)  I S.C.R, 764.
(2)  2 S.C.R. 276.
592 Labour Court had to go into the question
and determine whether, on the facts, it had jurisdiction to make the
computation. It could not however give itself jurisdiction by a wrong decision
on the jurisdiction plea.
Appearing for the appellant in Civil Appeal
No. 2136/66 Mr. Pai contended that his clients' liability would only commence
after the 1st October, 1960 when it started to run the mill. This point had not
been canvassed before the High Court and consequently we cannot entertain it.
In the second case Mr. Gupte argued that
although his client did not raise the question of liability before, there was
no question of any concession and he should be allowed to contest his liability
on the basis of the application preferred for urging additional grounds before
As this point was not urged in the court
below this application must be refused.
The last point urged was that in view of
Standing Orders 19 and 21 the quantum of compensation had to be scaled down or
measured in terms of the Standing Order 19 the employer could, in the event of
fire, breakdown of machinery etc.
stop any machine or machines or department or
departments wholly or partially or the whole or a part of the establishment for
any period, without notice and without compensation in lieu of notice. Under
Standing Order 21, any operative played off under Standing Order 19 was not to
be considered as dismissed from service but as temporarily unemployed and was
not to be entitled to wages' during such unemployment except to the extent
mentioned in Standing Order No. 19. The High Court rightly turned down the
contention in view of S. 25-J of the Act under which the provisions of Chapter
V-A are to have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith
contained in any other law including Standing Orders made under the Industrial Employment
(Standing Orders) Act, 1946.
These appeals were originally heard by a
Bench of five, Judges including S. C. Roy, J. who expired a few days back.
The above judgment was concurred in by our
We however gave a further hearing to the
parties at which nothing was addressed to us to make us change our opinion
In the result, the appeals fail and are
dismissed with costs. One set of hearing fee.