Beohar Rajendra Sinha & Ors Vs.
State of M.P. & Ors  INSC 71 (11 March 1969)
11/03/1969 RAMASWAMI, V.
HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ) MITTER, G.K.
CITATION: 1969 AIR 1256 1969 SCR (3) 955 1969
SCC (1) 796
Civil Procedure Code 1908, S. 80-Karta of
Hindu Joint Family giving notice of suit under section 80-Thereafter members of
family dividing on partition-Divided members joining as plaintiffs in suit
Whether fresh notice necessary by divided members or previous notice of Karta
was in representative capacity.
The appellant, who was at the time the Karta
of a Hindu Joint Family, gave notice in January, 1954, to the respondent State
under section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code. Thereafter a suit was filed in
July, 1954, by which time a partition had taken place in the family. In view of
this the appellant's three grand-sons were joined as plaintiffs in the suit the
plaintiffs sought a declaration that three nazul plots in suit had been in the
possession of the plaintiffs and their ancestors from time immemorial and their
status was that of Raiyat Sarkar; so that an order of the State Government in
the Survey and Settlement Department refusing to recognise their possession
over the plots was wrong and ultra vires. Apart from contesting the suit on the
merits, the respondent State contended that plaintiffs 2, 3 and 4 i.e. the
appellant's grand-sons had no right to institute a suit because no notice under
section 80 C.P.C.
was given on their behalf. The trial court
dismissed the suit. In an appeal, the High Court held that the appellant had
lost the right to represent the joint family as karta at the time of
institution of the suit because their had been severence of joint status and
the notice served by him could not enure to the benefit of other plaintiffs. On
the merits the High Court found that the plaintiffs had shown their possession
for the statutory period of 6 years.
On appeal to this Court,
HELD: (1) The notice given by the appellant
in January, 1954, was sufficient in law to sustain a suit brought by all the
divided coparceners who must be deemed to be as much the authors of the notice
as the Karta who was the actual signatory of the notice. There was substantial
identity between the person giving the notice and the persons bringing the suit
in the present case. [959 B] At the time of giving notice the appellant was
admittedly the eldest member of the joint family and being a Karta he was
entitled to represent the joint family in all its affairs. The cause of action
had accrued at the time of giving of the notice and it was not necessary to
give a second notice merely because there was a severance of the joint family,
before 20th July, 1954, when the suit was actually instituted. [958 G-H]
Although the terms of section 80 C.P.C. must be strictly complied with, that
does not mean that the terms of the notice 'should be scrutinised in an
artificial or pedantic manner. [960 A] Dhian Singh Sobha Singh & Anr. v.
The Union of India,  S.C.R. 781, referred to, 956 State of Andhra Pradesh
v. Gundugola Venkata Suryanarayan Garu,  4 S.C.R., 945; Vellayan Chettiar
& Ors. v. Government of the Province of Madras and Anr., A.I.R. 1947, P.C.
197; Government of the Province of Bombay v. Pestonji Ardeshir Wadia &
Ors., 76 I.A. 85, distinguished.
(2) On the merits, the appellants had failed
to produce reliable oral or documentary evidence to prove that their ancestors
had possession over the disputed land for many years. On the contrary this land
was always recognised as Milkiat Sarkar and the respondent State Government was
justified in holding it as such.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals
Nos. 386 and 387 of 1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment
and_decree dated April 16, 1963 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in First
Appeal No. 217 of 1959.
S. V. Gupte, P. C. Bhartari and J. B.
Dadachanji, for the appellants (in C.A. No. 386 of 1966) and the respondents
(in C.A. No. 387 of 1966).
I. N. Shroff and Rama Gupta, for the State of
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Ramaswami, J. These appeals are brought by special leave from the judgment of
the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dated 16th April, 1963 in' First Appeal No.
217 of 1959, whereby the High Court modified partly the judgment of the first Additional
District Judge, Jabalpur dismissing Civil Suit No. 10-A of 1954.
The suit was instituted against the State of
Madhya Pradesh by Beohar Raghubir Singh and his three grand-sons. Beohar
Raghubir Singh's son, Beohar Rajendra Sinha, was a pro-forma defendant. A
notice under section 80 of Civil Procedure Code had been given by Raghubir
Singh on 11th January, 1954.
Plaintiffs 2, 3 and 4, his grand-sons were
joined as plaintiffs because in a partition made subsequent to the giving of
the notice, they were each entitled to 1/5th share along with the first
plaintiff. Beohar, Rajendra Sinha was joined as a defendant because he did not
choose to join as the plaintiff. The plaintiffs sought a declaration (1) that
the three nazul plots in suit had been in possession of the plaintiffs and the
predecessors in their own right from time immemorial and their status was that
of Raiyat Sarkar; and (2) that the order of the State Government in the Survey
and Settlement Department refusing to recognise their possession over the plots
was wrong and ultra vires. The dispute relates to Phoota Tal a tank situated
within the town of Jabalpur. It was plot No. 282 in the settlement of 1863 A.D.
Its area then was 957 5.24 acres. it was recorded as malkiat Sarkar and in the
last column there was an entry showing possession of Aman Singh Thakur Prasad.
The next settlement took place in 1890-91. The survey number of Phoota Tal was
changed to plot No. 325. Its area remained the same, it was recorded as
"water (pani)" and in the last column, the entry showed the
possession of Beohar Narpatsingh Raghubir Singh. , The third settlement took
placed in 1909-10. The plot number of Phoota Tal was then , it was still
recorded change to 327.
Its area remained the same it was still
recorded as 'water", but there was no entry in favour of any one showing
possession. The nazul settlement took place in 1922-23. In this settlement, the
tank was given numbers 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 171. Its area was recorded as
5.24 acres. In this settlement about 2 acres of land was found to be occupied
by the Municipal Committee, Jabalpur. The land so found to be occupied was
recorded in the possession of the Muncipal Committee, Jabalpur and the
remaining land was again recorded as "Milkiat Sarkar". There was no
entry regarding possession in the remarks column so far as the remaining land
was concerned. The plaintiffs alleged that Thakur Prasad and Aman Singh were
their ancestors, that they had been in continuous possession of the disputed
landand the omission to record their possession in the last two settle- ments
of 1909-10 and 1922-23 was due to some oversight. In 1948 the first plaintiff
made an application for correction to the Deputy Commissioner, Jabalpur who
made an order in his favour Ex. P-5. The order of the Deputy Commissioner was
however set aside by the State Government on 28th May, 1953 and it was held
that the plaintiffs had no title to the disputed land. The plaintiff therefore
prayed for a declaration of the title to the disputed plots and for the correction
of the entry in the settlement record showing the status of the plaintiff as
that of "Raiyat Sarkar". The suit was contested by the State of
Madhya Pradesh. It was urged that the plaintiff had no possession over the
disputed land and the order of the State Government dated 28th May, 1953 was
correct. It was contended that plaintiffs 2, 3 and 4 had no right to institute
the suit because no notice under section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code was
given on their behalf. The suit was not contested by the second defendant
Beohar Rajendra Sinha. By its judgment dated 24th January, 1959 the trial court
held that there was no documentary evidence from 1891 to 1932 to support the
possession of the ancestors of the plaintiffs regarding Phoota Tal. The trial court
also held that- in all the settlement entries, the land was recorded as
belonging to the Government "Milkiat Sarkar". In any event, between
1891 to 1932 there was no evidence regarding the user of the property by the
plaintiffs and in the subsequent years a part of the property was found in
possession of the Municipal Committee.
The trial court dismissed the suit. Against
the judgment of the trial court 958 the plaintiffs preferred an appeal to the
High Court. The High Court held in the first place the notice Ex. P-8 was not
in conformity with section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code. The High Court held
that Beohar Raghubir Singh had lost the right to represent the joint family as
karta at the time of institution of the suit because there had been a severence
of joint status and the notice served by Beohar Raghubir Singh could not ensure
to, the benefit of the other plaintiffs. On the merits of the case, the High
Court found that the plaintiffs had established their possession for the
statutory period of 60 years. The High Court held that the plaintiffs had
acquired the right of Raiyat Sarkar and that the order of the State Government
refusing to correct the revenue record was illegal. On these findings the High
Court modified the judgment of the trial court to the extent that there was a
declaration in favour of the plaintiffs that they were entitled to 1/5th share
of the property in dispute and the claim regarding the 4/5th share was
dismissed The order of the State Government dated 28th May, 1953 refusing to
recognise the possession of the plaintiffs was held to be wrong and illegal.
The first question to be considered in these
appeals is whether the High Court was right in holding that the notice given
under section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code by the first plaintiff was
effective only with regard to Raghubir Singh and. the notice was ineffective
with regard to the other plaintiffs and therefore Raghubir Singh alone was
entitled to a declaration as regards the 1/5th share of the dispute plot. On
behalf of defendant No. 1 it was contended by Mr. Shroff that at the time of
giving notice the plaintiffs and the second defendant were joint and plaintiff
No. 1 Raghubir Singh was karta of the joint family. The notice was given on
11th January, 1954 and the suit was instituted on 20th July, 1954. It was
admitted that between these two dates there was a disruption of the joint
family of which Raghubir Singh was a karta. It was argued that the right of the
first plaintiff to represent the family had come to an end before the
institution of the suit, and hence plaintiffs 2, 3 and 4 had to comply
individually with the provisions of section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code
before appearing as plaintiffs in the suit, In our opinion, there is no
justification for this argument., We consider that there is substantial
identity between the person giving the notice and the persons filing the suit
in the present case.
At the time of giving notice the first
plaintiff Beohar Raghubir Singh was admittedly the eldest member of the joint
family and being a karta he was entitled to represent the joint family in all
its affairs. The cause of action had accrued at the time of giving of the
notice and it was not necessary to give a second notice merely because there
was a severence of the joint family, before 20th July, 1954 when the suit was
actually instituted. It is obvious 959 that the notice was given by Beohar
Raghubir Singh as a representative of the joint family and in view of the
subsequent partition the suit had to be instituted by, all the divided members
of the joint family. We are of the opinion that the notice given by Beohar
Raghubir Singh on 11th January, 1954 was sufficient in law to sustain a suit
brought by all the divided coparceners who must be deemed to be as much the
authors of the notice as the karta who was the actual signatory of the notice.
There is substantial identity between the person giving the notice and the
persons bringing the suit in the present case and the argument of defendant No.
1 on this point must be rejected.
The object of the notice under section 80,
Civil Procedure Code is to give to the Government or the public servant
concerned an opportunity to reconsider its or his legal position and if that
course is justified to make amends or settle the claim out of court. The
section is no doubt imperative; failure to serve notice complying with the
requirements of the statute will entail dismissal of the suit. But the notice
must be reasonably construed. Any unimportant error or defect cannot-be permitted
to be treated as an excuse for defeating a just claim. In considering whether
the provisions of the statute are complied with, the Court must take into
account the following matters in each case (1) whether the name, description
and residence of the plaintiff are given so as to enable the authorities to
identify the person serving the notice; (2) whether the cause of action and the
relief which the plaintiff claims are set out with sufficient particularity;
(3) whether a notice in writing has been delivered to or left at the office of
the appropriate authority mentioned in the section; and (4) whether the suit is
instituted after the expiration of two months next after notice has been
served, and the plaint contains a statement that such a notice has been so
delivered or left. In construing the notice the Court cannot ignore the object
of the legislature, viz., to give to the Government or the public servant
concerned an opportunity to reconsider its or his legal position. If on a
reasonable reading of the notice the plaintiff is shown to have given the
information which the statute requires him to give, any incidental defects or
irregularities should be ignored.
In the present case, the notice was served on
11th January, 1954 by Beohar Raghubir Singh. The notice stated the cause of
action arising in favour of the joint family.
The requirements as to cause of action, the
name, description and residence of the plaintiff were complied with and the
reliefs which the plaintiff claimed were duly set out in the notice. It is true
that Beohar Raghubir Singh did not expressly describe himself as the karta. But
reading the contents of the notice Ex. P-8 in a reasonable manner it appears to
us that the claim of Beohar Raghubir Singh 960 was made on behalf of the joint
family. It is true that the term of section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code must
be strictly complied but that does not mean that the terms of the notice should
be scrutinised in an artificial or pedantic manner. In Dhian Singh Sobha ,
Singh & Anr. v. The Union of India & Anr. (1) Bhagwati, J. observed in
the course of his judgment :- "We are constrained to observe that the
approach of the High Court to this question was not well-founded. The Privy
Council no doubt laid down in Bhagchand Dagadusa v. Secretary of State (2) that
the terms of this section should be strictly complied with.
That does not however mean that the terms of
the notice should be scrutinised in a pedantic manner or in a manner completely
divorced from common sense. As was stated by Pollock C. B.
in Jones v. Nicholls(3) We must impprt a
little common sense into notices of this kind'. Beaumonth, C.J., also observed
in Chandu Lal Vadilal v. Government of Bombay(4) "One must construe
section 80 with some regard to common sense and to the object with which it
appears to have been passed......." As already pointed out, the suit was
instituted in the present case by the divided members of Hindu joint family on
20th July, 1954. The notice had been given on 11th January, 1954 by Beohar Raghubir
Singh who was the karta of the undivided joint family. In our opinion there was
identity between the person giving a notice and the persons filing the suit
because it must be deemed in law that each of the plaintiffs had given the
notice under s. 80 of the Civil Procedure Code through the karta Beohar
Raghubir Singh. It is not disputed that the cause of action set out in the
notice remained unchanged in the suit. It is also not said that the relief set
out in the plaint is different from the relief set out in the notice. We are
accordingly of the opinion that the notice given by the karta was sufficient to
sustain the suit brought by the divided coparceners and the decision of the
High Court on this point must be over-ruled.
The view that we have expressed is borne out
by the judgment of this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v.
Gundugola Venkata Suryanarayan Garu(5).. In
that case, the Government of Madras applied the provisions of the Madras
Estates Rent Reduction Act, 1947 to the lands in the village Mallindhapuram on
the ground that the grant was of the whole village and hence an estate within
the meaning of s. 3 (2) (d)of the Madras Estates (1)  S.C.R. 781. (2)
 L.R. 54 I.A. 338.
(3)  13 M & W 361, 363; 153 E.R.
 Bom. 128.
(5)  4 S.C.R. 945.
961 Land Act, 1908. The respondent and
another person served a notice under s. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure upon
the Government of the State of Madras in which they challenged the above
mentioned notification and asked the Government not to act upon it. Out of the
two persons who gave the notice, the respondent alone filed the suit. The trial
court held that the original grant was not of the entire village and was not so
confirmed or recognised by the Government of Madras and as it was not an
"Estate" within the meaning of s. 3 (2) (d) of the Madras Estates
Land Act, the Madras Rent Reduction Act, 1947 did not apply to it.
But the suit was dismissed on the ground that
although two persons had given notice under s. 80 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, only one person had filed the suit. The High Court agreed with the
trial court that the grant was not of an entire village but it also held that
the notice was not defective and the suit was maintainable as it was a representative
suit and the permission of the Court under 0.1, r. 8 had been obtained in this
case. The High Court granted the respondent the relief prayed for 'by him.
Against the order of the High Court the
appellant appealed to this Court which dismissed the appeal holding that in the
circumstances of the case there was no illegality even though the notice was
given by two persons and the suit was filed by only one. If the Court grants
permission to one person to institute a representative suit and if the person
had served the notice under s. 80, the circumstance that another person had
joined him in serving the notice but did not join him in the suit, was not a
sufficient ground for regarding the suit as defective. At page 953 of the
Report Shah, J. observed as follows :- "The notice in the, present suit
was served by the plaintiff and Yegneswara Sastri. They raised a grievance
about the notification issued by the Government of Madras on May 16, 1950; it
was not an individual grievance of the two persons who served the notice but of
all the Inamdars or agrahamdars. The relief for which the suit was intended to
be filed was also not restricted to their personal claim. The notice stated the
cause of action arising in favour of all the Inamdars, and it is not disputed
that the notice set out the relief which would be claimable by all the Inamdars
or on their behalf in default of compliance with the requisition. The plaintiff
it is true alone filed the suit, but he was permitted to sue for and on behalf
of' all the Inamdars by an order of the Court under O. 1, r. 8 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. The requirements as to the cause of action, the name,
description and place of residence of the plaintiff was therefore 962 complied
with and the relief which the plaintiff claimed was duly set out in the notice.
The only departure from the notice was that two persons served a notice under
80 informing the Government that proceedings
would be started, in default of compliance with the requisition, for violation
of the rights of the Inamdars, and one person only out of the two instituted
the suit. That in our judgment is not a defect which brings the case within the
terms of s. 80".
On behalf of respondent No. 1 reference was
made, to the two decisions of the Judicial Committee in Vellayan Chettiar &
Ors. v. Government of the Province of Madras and Anr.(1) and Government of the
Province of Bombay v. Pestonji Ardeshir Wadia & Ors.(2) But the 'principle
of these decisions has no bearing on the question presented for determination
in the present case. In Vellayan Chettiar's case(1) a notice was given by one
plaintiff stating the cause of action, his name, description and place of his
residence and the relief which he claimed although the suit was instituted by
him and another. It was observed by the Judicial Committee:
"The section according to its plain
meaning requires that there should be in the language of the High Court of
Madras 'identity of the person who issues the notice with the person who brings
the suit' : See Venkata Rangiah Appa Rao v. Secretary of State(3) and on appeal
Venkata Rangiah Appa Rao v. Secretary of State (4). To hold otherwise would be
to admit an implication or exception for which there is no jurisdiction"
Two persons had sued for a declaration that certain lands belonged to them, and
for an order setting aside the decision of the Appellate Survey Officer in
regard to those lands. It was found that one alone out of the two persons had
served the notice. The relief claimed by the two persons was personal to them
and the right thereto arose out of their title to the land claimed by them. It
was held by the Judicial Committee that without a proper notice under s.
80 the suit could not be instituted for to
hold otherwise would be to admit an, implication or exception for which there
was no justification. In the other case, in Pestonji Ardeshir Wadia's case(2)
two trustees of a trust served a notice in October, 1933 upon the Government of
Bombay under S. 80 intimating that the trustees intended to institute a suit
against the Government on the cause of action and for the relief set out (1)
A.I.R. 1947 P.C. 197.
(2) 76 I.A. 85.
(3) I.L.R. Mad 416.
(4) A.I.R. 1935 Mad. 389.
963 therein. One of the trustees died before
the plaint was lodged in court, and two more trustees were appointed in the
place of the deceased trustee. Thereafter the two now trustees and the
surviving trustee filed the suit out of which the appeal arose which was
decided by the Judicial Committee. No notice was served on the Government on
behalf of the two new trustees. The Judicial Committee accepted the view of the
High Court that where there were three plaintiffs, the names and addresses of
all of them must be given in the notice. Their Lordships observed that :
"the provisions of s. 80 of the Code are
imperative and should be strictly complied with before it can be said that a
notice valid in law has been served on the Government. In the present case it
is not contended that any notice on behalf of plaintiffs 2 and 3 was served on
the Government before the filing of the suit".
It is clear that the principle of these two
decisions of the Judicial Committee has no application in the present case
because the material facts are different.
We proceed to consider the next question arising
in these appeals viz., whether the High Court was right in holding that the
plaintiffs had established their title as raiyat sarkar with regard to 1/5th
share in nazul plots Nos. 34/3, 33 and 171/1 mentioned in the Deputy
Commissioner's order dated 7th May, 1948 in Revenue Case No. 9/45-46. It was
argued on behalf of defendant No. 1 that there was no evidence to show that the
plaintiffs were in possession of the land from 1909 to 1932, and the plaintiffs
had not established their title by prescription for the statutory period of 60
years. It was contended that the High Court had no justification for holding
that the plaintiffs had established the title of "Raiyat Sarkar" and
the finding of the High Court was not based upon any evidence. In our opinion,
the argument put forward on behalf of defendant No. 1 is wellfounded and must
be accepted as correct. In the settlement of 1863-64 Ex. P-1 the names of
Amansingh and Thakurprasad were noted in the remarks column. But the column
regarding tenancy right is definitely blank. The owner is shown in the Khasra
as the State "Milkiat Sarkar".
In the settlement of 189091 Amansingh
Narpatsingh is again shown in the remarks column of the khata. But the column
regarding any kind of tenancy right is again blank. It is clear that in the
settlements of 1860 and 1890-91 the ownership of the land is recorded as that
of the Government.
The possession of the plaintiffs or of their
ancestors could not be attributed to ownership or tenancy right of the
property. In the settlement of 1909-10, Ex.P-3 there is no entry in the remarks
column showing the possession of the ancestors of the plaintiffs. It was said
on behalf of the plaintiffs that no (1) 76 I.A. 85.
L11 Sup. C.I./69-12 96 4 notice was given to
them of the proceedings of the.
settlement of 1909-10. Even assuming that
this allegation is correct, the entries of the khasra P-3 cannot be treated to
be a nullity and of no effect. In any event, it was open to the plaintiffs to
adduce other reliable evidence to prove their possession between the years 1909
to 1932. But the plaintiffs have failed to produce any such evidence. in the
nazul settlement of 1922-23 the tank was given new plot numbers 33, 34, 35,36,
37 and 171 and its area was recorded as 5.24 acres. In this settlement about 2
acres of land was found to be occupied by the Municipal Committee, Jabalpur.
The land so found to be occupied was recorded
in the possession of the Municipal Committee, Jabalpur and the remaining land
was again recorded as "Milkiat Sarkar".
There is no entry as regards the remaining
land recording anybody's possession in the. remarks column. Actually
proclamations were made during this settlement and objections were invited as
per Ex.ID-14. A date was fixed upto 31-8-1924 but no one came forward. The
proclamation clearly recited that the vacant sites which were not in possession
of anybody were not recognised as belonging to any person. It is impossible to
believe that the plaintiffs or their ancestors were unaware of such a
proclamation. Had they been in possession they would not have failed to make a
claim. For the period after 1933-34 the plaintiffs produced account books to
show that they exercised certain rights.
Certain receipts were also proved but they
also relate to a period after 1939. We have gone through the oral evidence
produced by the plaintiffs and it appears to be unreliable.
The result is that for the period 1891 till
1932 there is no reliable oral or documentary evidence to prove that the
plaintiffs or their ancestors had any possession over the disputed land. On the
contrary the disputed land i.e. Phoota Tal was always recognised as Milkiat
Sarkar and the State Government was justified in holding that the order of the
Deputy Commissioner dated 7th May, 1948 should be set aside.
In the course of the argument reference was
made by Mr. Gupte to the following passage in the Central Provinces Settlement
Instructions (Reprint of 1953) page 213 "In dealing with proposed method
of the settlement of titles it will be convenient in order to remove all causes
for misapprehension among residents, to lay emphasis on the policy of
Government in making these settlements.
That policy was defined in the Chief
Commissioner's Resolution No. 502-B-X dated the 19th October, 1917, in the
Revenue & Scarcity Department, but its main principles will bear
As it is not the intention of Government in
making the settlement to disturb long possession, but only to 965 obtain an
accurate record of the lands which are its property and to secure its right to
any land revenue to which it may be entitled, long possession even without
clear proof of a definite grant from Government will be recognised as entitled
the holder to possession. In deciding what constitutes long possession in any
individual town, regard will be hard to the special circumstances of the place,
and while this point will be dealt with more particularly in the Deputy
Commissioner's report, the following general principles will ordinarily be
(1) all occupants who are able to prove
possession to any land prior to 1891 or such later date as may be fixed for
each town, either by themselves or by a valid title from a previous holder, and
all occupants who can prove a definite grant or lease from Government will be
recorded as entitled to hold such land as against Government (paragraph 6 of
the Resolution) On the basis of this passage it was argued that it was the duty
of the settlement officer to treat the plaintiffs as having established their
title because they were shown to be in possession in the settlement of the year
1890-91. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. The passage quoted
above only applies to a case where the ownership of the land was unknown i.e.
where possession is proved for a long time, but its original title could not be
traced, and not to a case where the land is recorded as Government land.
For the reasons expressed, we hold that the
suit brought by the plaintiffs being Civil Suit No. 10-A of 1954 should be
dismissed. Civil Appeal 386 of 1966 is accordingly dismissed and Civil Appeal
387 of 1966 is allowed with costs in favour of defendant No. 1 i.e. State of
There will be one hearing fee.
R.K.P.S. Civil Appeal 386/66 dismissed.
Civil Appeal 387/66 allowed.