Ramarao & ANR Vs. Narayan & ANR
 INSC 324 (20 December 1968)
20/12/1968 SHAH, J.C.
CITATION: 1969 AIR 724 1969 SCR (3) 185 1969
SCC (1) 167
Registrar under section whether a court
within the meaning of s. 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure-Sanction of such
court whether required for prosecution in respect of offences under ss. 465 and
471 I.P.C. committed in proceedings before it-Said offences under I.P.C.
whether fall within description of offences under s. 146(p) of Maharashtra Act-Sanction
of Registrar for prosecution whether necessary.
The Nagpur District Land Development Bank
Ltd. was registered as a society under the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies
Act, 1960. There was dispute as to whether one 'M' had been elected as a member
of the Bank at a meeting of the Board of Directors. The Registrar of
Cooperative Societies referred the dispute to a nominee. Certain documents
including the minutes book of the Bank were produced before the nominee. 'M'
filed a complaint against the President and Secretary of the Bank charging them
with offences under ss. 465 and 471 I.P.C. for having forged the minute book
and producing it before the nominee. The two accused raised an objection that
the magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint without
the previous sanction of the Registrar of Cooperative Societies under s. 148(3)
of the Maharashtra Cooperative Bank Act, 1960. The trial magistrate rejected
the contention. The order was confirmed by the Court of Session and the High
Court Of Bombay. In appeal before this Court the following contentions were
urged on behalf of the accused-appellants :
(i) That the nominee of the Registrar
appointed under s. 95 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960, was a
'court' within the meaning of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and a
complaint for offences under ss. 465 and 471 Indian Penal Code alleged to have
be-en committed by a party to any proceeding in respect of the document
produced or given in evidence in such proceeding, cannot be entertained except
on a complaint in writing of such court, or of a court to which it is
subordinate, (ii) That the ingredients of the offence of forgery punishable
under s. 465 I.P. Code 'and of the offence under s. 146(p) of the Maharashtra
Cooperative Societies Act are the same, and the general provision is on that
account pro tanto repealed, and in any event in view of s. 148(3) of the
Maharashtra Act no prosecution could be initiated in respect of the offences
charged otherwise than with the sanction of the Registrar.
HELD : (i) The nominee exercising power to
make an award under s. 96 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960,
derives his authority not from the statute but from investment by the Registrar
in his individual discretion.
The power invested is liable to be suspended
and may be withdrawn. He is not entrusted the judicial power of the State : he
is merely an arbitrator authorised within the limits of the power conferred to
'adjudicate upon the dispute referred to him. He is -not a court within the
meaning of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Pro'Sup.CI/69-13 18 6 Thadi Subbi
Reddi v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1930 Mad. 869, Velayuda Mudali & Anr. v.
Co-operative Rural Credit Society & Ors., A.I.R. 1934 Mad. 40, Y,
Mahabaleswarappa v. M. Gopalaswami Mudaliar, A.I.R. 1935 Mad. 673, Nand Lal
Ganguli v. Khetra Mohan Ghose, I.L.R. 45 Cal. 585, Jagannath Prasad v. State of
Uttar Pradesh,  2 S.C.R. 850, Lalji Haridas v.
State of Maharashtra & Anr.,  6
S.C.R. 700, Shri Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. State of Punjab,  2 S.C.R.
1013, Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain,
 2 S.C.R. 955, Hari Pandurang & Anr. v. Secretary of State for India
in Council I.L.R. 27 Bom. 424, Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v.
Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd.
 3 S.C.R. 163 and Malabar Hill Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. Bombay
v. K. L. Gauba & Ors. A.I.R. 1964 Bom. 147, considered.
(ii) Section 146(p) of the Maharashtra
Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 and ss. 463 and 464 I.P.C. are two distinct
offences which are capable of being committed with different intentions by
different sets of persons and it could not be contemplated that the Legislature
of the State of Maharashtra intended to repeal pro tanto the provisions of s.
465 I.P.C. by enactment of s. 146 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act.
The prosecution in the present case not being under the Maharashtra Act
sanction of the Registrar under s. 148 thereof was not necessary. [201 H-202 A]
Om Prakash Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh,  S.C.R.
423 and T. S. Balliah v. T. S. Rengachari,
 3 S.C.R. 65, applied.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:Criminal
Appeal No. 51 of 1967.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated October 3, 1966 of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench in Criminal
Revision Application No. 168 of 1966.
R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwala, G. V. Kalikar, S.
K. Dhingra and M. S. Gupta, for the appellants.
W. S. Barlingay and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for
respondent No. 1.
H. R. Khanna and S. P. Nayar, for respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Shah, J. The Nagpur District Land Development Bank Ltd. is registered as a
society under the Maharashtra Co-oPerative Societies Act, 1960. 'One Narayan
Tanbaji Murkute applied for membership of the Bank -as a "non-borrowing
member". At a meeting of the Bank held on June 30, 1964, the application
of Murkute and of 94 others were granted and they were enrolled as members. But
in the list of members entitled to take part in the General Meeting dated June
30, 1964 the names of Murkute and others were not included.
Murkute and others then applied to the
Registrar Cooperative Societies for an order declaring that they were entitled
to participate in the election of office-bearers and for an injunction
restraining the President and the Secretary from holding the 187 annual General
Meeting. The Registrar referred the dispute for adjudication under s. 93 of the
Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, to H. V. Kulkarni, his nominee.
The nominee decided the dispute on May 7, 1965 and held that Murkute and other
applicants were members of the Bank. In the proceeding before the nominee
certain documents including the minutes book of the Bank were produced. It is claimed
by Murkute that those 'books were fabricated by the President and the Secretary
with a view to make it appear that Murkute and other persons were never elected
members of the Bank.
On August 7, 1965, Murkute filed a complaint
in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nagpur, charging the
President and Secretary of the Bank with committing offences under ss. 465 and
471 I.P. Code. It was alleged in the complaint that the two accused had
dishonestly and fraudulently introduced a clause in Resolution No. 3 appearing
in the minutes book with the intention of causing it to be believed that the
clause was part of the original.
Resolution passed by the Board of Directors
in the meeting held on June 30, 1964, whereas it was known to them that at that
meeting no such clause was passed.
The two accused raised an objection that the
Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint without the
previous sanction of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies under s. 148(3) of
the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. The Trial Magistrate rejected
the contention. The order was confirmed by the Court of Session and the High
Court of Bombay.
In this Court counsel for the accused raised
two contentions that(1) that, the nominee of the Registrar appointed under s.
95 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, was a "court"
within the meaning of s.
195 Code of Criminal Procedure, and a
complaint for offences under ss. 465 and 471 I.P. Code alleged to have been
committed by a party to any proceeding in respect of a document produced or
given in evidence in such proceeding, cannot be entertained except on a
complaint in writing of such court, or of a court to which it is subordinate;
and (2) that offences charged in the complaint fell within the description of
the offence under s. 146(p) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act,
1960, and without the sanction of the Registrar the complaint was not
Section 195 Code of Criminal Procedure
insofar as it is relevant provides :
"(1) No Court shall take cognizance(a)
(a) (b) 188 (c) of any offence described in section 463 or punishable under
section 471 . . . when such offence is alleged to have been committed by a
party to any proceeding in any Court in respect of a document produced or given
in evidence in such proceeding, except on the complaint in writing of such
court, or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate.
(2) In clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section
'(1), the term "Court" includes a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court,
but does not include a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Indian Registration
Act, 1877." Murkute complained that the President and the Secretary of the
Bank who were parties to the proceeding before the nominee of the Registrar had
committed offences under ss.
465 & 471 I.P. Code in respect of
documents produced or given in evidence at the trial. If the Registrar's
nominee is a Court within the meaning of s. 195 Code of Criminal Procedure the
Magistrate could not take cognizance except on the complaint in writing by the
Registrar's nominee or of some court to which he was subordinate. To determine
whether the Registrar's nominee is a court, it is necessary to refer to the
relevant provisions of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960,
relating to the functions of the nominee and the powers with which he is
invested, counsel for the appellants urges that by the Maharashtra Cooperative
Societies Act the power of the Civil Court to entertain disputes with regard to
certain matters concerning cooperative societies is expressly excluded from the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court, and the Registrar or his nominee is alone
competent to determine those questions;
thereby the Registrar and his nominee are
invested with the judicial power of the State and they are on that account
"courts" within the meaning of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal
Section 2(2) of the Maharashtra Co-operative
Societies Act, 1960, defines "arbitrator" as meaning "a person
appointed under this Act to decide disputes referred to him by the Registrar
and includes the Registrar's nominee or board of nominees." Section 91 and
the following sections which occur in Ch. IX relate to disputes and
arbitration. By s. 91, insofar as it is material, it is provided :
"(1) Notwithstanding anything contained
in any other law for the time being in force, any dispute touching the
constitution, election of the office bearers, conduct of general meetings,
management or business of a society shall be referred by any of the parties to
the dispute........... to the Registrar, if both the parties hereto are one or
other of the following 189 (a) (b) a member, past member or a person claiming
through a member, past member or a deceased member of a society, or a society which
is a member of the society.
(c) (d) (e) (2) When any question arises
whether for the purpose of the foregoing subsections matter referred to, for
decision is a dispute or not, the question shall be considered by the
Registrar, whose decision shall be final.
(3) Save as otherwise provided under subsection
(3) of section 93 no Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or
other proceedings in respect of any dispute referred to in sub-section
(1)." Section 93 provides :
"(1) If the Registrar is satisfied that
any matter referred to him or brought to his notice is a dispute within the
meaning of section 91, the Registrar shall, subject to the rules, decide the
dispute himself, or refer it for disposal to a nominee, or a board of nominees,
appointed by the Registrar.
(2) Where any dispute is referred under the
foregoing sub-section, for decision to the Registrar's nominee or board of
nominees, the Registrar may at any time, for reasons to be recorded in writing
withdraw such dispute from his nominee or board of nominees, and may decide the
dispute himself, or refer it again for decision to any other nominee, or board
of nominees, appointed by him.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in
section 91 the Registrar may, if he thinks fit, suspend proceedings in regard
to any dispute, if the question at issue between a society and a claimant or
between different claimants, is one involving complicated questions of law and
fact, until the question has been tried by a regular suit instituted by one of the
parties or by the society. If any such suit is not instituted within two months
from the Registrar's order suspending proceedings, the Registrar shall take
action as is provided in subsection 190 Section 94 provides for the procedure
of settlement of disputes and power of the Registrar, his nominee or the board
of nominees. It provides, insofar as it is material :
"(1) The Registrar, or his nominee or
board of nominees, hearing a dispute under the last preceding section shall
hear the dispute in the manner prescribed, and shall have power to summon and
enforce attendance of witnesses including the parties interested or any of them
and to compel them to give evidence on oath, affirmation or affidavit and to
compel the production of documents by the same means and as far as possible in
the same manner, as is provided in the case of a Civil Court by the Code of
Civil Procedure, -1908.
(2) Except with the permission of the
Registrar or his nominee or board of nominees, as the case may be, no party
shall be represented at the hearing of a dispute by a legal practitioner."
Sub-section (3) of S. 94 authorises the Registrar, his nominee or the board of
nominees to join or substitute new parties. Section 95 authorises the Registrar
or his nominee or board of nominees to pass an order of attachment and other
interlocutory orders. Section 96 provides "When a dispute is referred to
arbitration the Registrar or his nominee or board of nominees may, after giving
a reasonable opportunity to the parties to the dispute to be heard, make an
award on the dispute, on the expenses incurred by the parties to the dispute in
connection with the proceedings, and fees and expenses payable to the Registrar
or his nominee or, as the case may be, board of nominees. Such an award shall
not be invalid merely on the ground that it was made after the expiry of the
period fixed for deciding the dispute by the Registrar and shall, subject to
appeal or review of revision, be binding on the parties to the dispute."
Section 97 provides "Any party aggrieved by any decision of the Registrar
or his nominee or board of nominees under the last preceding section, or an
order passed under section 95 may,...............
appeal to the Tribunal.
Section 98 provides that every order passed
by the Registrar or his nominee or board of nominees or in appeal there from
shall, it -not carried out, on a certificate signed by the Registrar, be deemed
to be a decree of a civil court, and shall be executed in 191 the same manner
as a decree of such court or be executed according to the law and under the
rules for the time being in force for the recovery of arrears of land revenue.
By s. 99 a private transfer or delivery of, or encumbrance or charge on,
property made or created after the issue of the certificate of the Registrar
under s. 98 shall be null -and void as against the society on whose application
the certificate was issued.
Jurisdiction of the Civil Court by s. 91(3)
to entertain a suit in respect of any dispute referred to in sub-s. (1) of s.
91 is expressly excluded and the dispute is required by law to be referred to
the Registrar or his nominee. Against the decision of the Registrar's nominee
an appeal lies under s. 97 and the order made for payment of money is
enforceable as a decree of the Civil Court. The Registrar or his nominee called
upon to decide the dispute are bound to hear it in the manner prescribed and
they have power to summon and enforce attendance of witnesses and to compel
them to give evidence on oath, affirmation or affidavit and to compel
production of documents. The effect of these provisions, according to counsel
for the Appellants, is that the judicial power of the State to deal with -and
dispose of disputes of a civil nature which fall within the description of s.
91(1) is vested in the Registrar's nominee and he is on that account made a
"court" within the normal connotation of the term.
Section 195(2) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure enacts that the term "court" includes a Civil, Revenue or
Criminal Court, but does not include a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the
Indian Registration Act, 1877. The expression "court" is not
restricted to courts, Civil, Revenue or Criminal; it includes other tribunals.
The expression "court" is not defined in the Code of Criminal
Under s. 3 of the Indian Evidence Act
"Court" is defined as including "all Judges and Magistrates, and
all persons, except arbitrators, legally authorised to take evidence".
But this definition is devised for the
purpose of the Evidence Act and will riot necessarily apply to the Code of
Criminal Procedure. The expression "Court of Justice" is defined in
the Indian Penal Code by s. 20 as denoting "a Judge who is empowered by
law to act judicially as a body, when such Judge or body of Judges is acting
That again is not a definition of the
expression "Court" as used in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The
expression "Court" in ordinary parlance is a generic expression and
in the context in which it occurs may mean a "body or organization"
invested with power, authority or dignity. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd
Edn., Vol. 9, Art. 809 at p.
342 it is stated :
"Originally the term "court"
meant, among other meanings, the Sovereign's place; it has acquired the 192
meaning of the place where justice is administered and, further, has come to
mean the persons who exercise judicial functions under authority derived'
either immediately or immediately from the Sovereign. All tribunals, however,
are not courts, in the sense in which the term is here employed, namely, to
denote such tribunals, as exercise jurisdiction over persons by reasons of the
sanction of the law, and not merely by reason of voluntary submission to their
jurisdiction, Thus, arbitrators, committees of clubs, and the like, although
they may be tribunals exercising judicial functions, are not "Courts"
in this sense of that term. On the other hand, a tribunal may be a court
"in the strict sense of the term although the chief part of its duties is
Parliament is a court. Its duties are mainly
deliberative and legislative : the judicial duties are only part of its
functions." In Art. 810 it is stated "In determining whether a
tribunal is a judicial body the facts that it has been appointed by a non judicial
authority, that it has no power to administer an oath, that the chairman has a
casting vote, and that third parties have power to intervene are immaterial,
especially if the statute setting it up prescribes a penalty for making false
statements ; elements to be considered are (1) the requirement for a public
hearing, subject to a power to exclude the public in a proper case, and (2) a
provision that -a member of the tribunal shall not take part in any decision in
which he is personally interested, or unless he has been present throughout the
A tribunal is not necessarily a court in the
strict sense of exercising judicial power because (1) it gives a final
decision; (2) hears witnesses on oath; (3) two or more contending parties
appear before it between whom it has to decide; (4) it gives decisions which
effect the rights of subjects; (5) there is an appeal to a court; and (6) it is
a body to which a matter is referred by another body.
Many bodies are not courts, although they
have to decide questions, -and in so doing have to act judicially, in the sense
that the proceedings must be conducted with fairness and impartiality, such as
the former assessment committees, the former court of referees which was
constituted under the Unemployment Insurance Acts, the blenchers of the Inns of
Court when considering the conduct of one of their members, the 193
Disciplinary Committee of the General Medical.
Council when considering questions affecting
the conduct of a medical man, a trade union when exercising disciplinary
jurisdiction over its members, or the chief officer of a force exercising
discipline over members of the force." A body required to act judicially
in the sense that its proceedings must be conducted with fairness and
impartiality may not therefore necessarily be regarded as a court.
Counsel for the appellants however invited
our -attention to a number of decisions in support of his contention that
wherever there is a dispute which is required to be resolved by a body invested
with power by statute and the body has to act judicially it must be regarded
-as a court within the meaning of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Counsel asserted that every quasi-judicial
authority is a court within the meaning of s. 195 (2) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. The contention is inconsistent with a large body of authority of
this Court to which we will presently refer.
By s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
it is enacted that certain offences amounting to contempt of lawful authority
of public servants i.e. offences falling under ss.
172 to 188 I.P; Code, offences against public
justice under ss. 193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 200, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210,
211 and 228, when such offences are alleged to have been committed in or in
relation to, any proceeding in any Court, and offences described in s. 463 or
punishable under ss. 471, 475 or 476, when such offences are alleged to have
been committed by a party to any proceeding in any Court in respect of a
document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding, cannot be taken
cognizance of by any court, except in the first class of cases on a complaint
in writing of the public servant concerned, and in the second and third class
of cases on the complaint in writing of such Court or some other Court to which
it is subordinate.
An offence ordinarily signifies a public
wrong : it is an act or omission which is a crime against society : it may
therefore be brought to the notice of the Court by any person, even if he is
not personally aggrieved by the act or omission. To that rule there are certain
exceptions which are specified in ss. 195, 196, 197, 198, 198A of the Code of
Criminal Procedure and other special statutes. Authority of courts to entertain
complaints in respect of the offences so specified is barred in view of the
special nature of the offence which vitally affect individuals only or public
bodies and in the larger interest of society it is deemed expedient to exempt
them from the general rule.
194 The nominee of the Registrar acting under
s. 96 performs the functions substantially of an arbitrator to whom a dispute
is ,referred for adjudication. The Registrar may appoint a single nominee or a
board of nominees and may at any time, for reasons to be recorded in writing,
withdraw such dispute from the nominee or 'board of nominees, and may decide
the dispute himself, or refer it again for decision to another nominee, or
board of nominees, -appointed by him. Under sub-s. (3) of s. 93 it is open to
the Registrar to suspend proceedings in regard to any dispute, if the question
at issue between -a society and a claimant or between different claimants, is
one involving complicated questions of law or fact. The jurisdiction of the
nominee or board of nominees arises by reason not of investment by statute, but
by appointment made by the Registrar who exercises control over the proceeding.
The nominee therefore derives his authority from his appointment by the
Registrar : the Registrar is entitled to withdraw his authority; and the
Registrar may fix the time within which a dispute shall be disposed of :
his adjudication is again called an award.
The nominee is even entitled to make a provision for the 'expenses payable to
the Registrar or to himself. It is true that the procedure of the nominee is
assimilated to the procedure followed in the trial of a Civil proceeding. The
nominee has the power to summon witnesses, to compel them to produce documents
and he is required to hear the dispute in the manner prescribed by the Code of
Civil Procedure. Thereby he is required to act judicially i.e. fairly and
impartially : but the obligation to act judicially will not necessarily make
him a court within the meaning of S. 195 of the Code.
The position of a nominee of the Registrar is
analogous to that of an -arbitrator designated under a statutory arbitration to
which the provisions of S. 47 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, apply.
The authorities to which our attention was
invited by counsel for the appellants may now be considered. It may be
sufficient here to observe that the tests laid down by this Court in certain
cases to be presently noticed make many of the cases relied upon of doubtful
authority. In Thadi Subbi Reddi v. Emperor(1) it was held by a single Judge of
the Madras High Court that the Registrar before whom a Cooperative Society
files its suit, or its claim for enforcing a bond, is a "Court"
within the meaning of S. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for the
Registrar to whom a dispute touching a debt due to a society by a member is
referred has power to administer oaths, to require the attendance of all
parties concerned and of witnesses, and to require the production of all books
and documents relating to the matter in dispute, and the Registrar is required
to give a decision in writing, and when it is given the decision may be
enforced on application to the Civil Court having jurisdiction as if it were a
decree of the Court.
2 00 deface, or secrete or attempts to
secrete any document which is or purports to be a will, or an authority to
adopt a son, or any valuable security, or mischief in respect of such document.
section 477A penalises falsification of accounts by a clerk, officer or servant
or by a person employed in the capacity of a clerk, officer or servant. The
offence of forgery and its allied offences may be committed if a false document
is made with intent to cause damage or injury to public or any person, or to
support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to
enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or
that fraud may be committed, (S. 463). In order to attract s. 463 I.P. Code
there must therefore, be making of a false document with the intention
mentioned in that section. By 464 it is provided :
"A person is said to make a false
documentFirst.-Who dishonestly or fraudulently makes, signs, seals or executes
a document or part of a document, or ,,makes any mark denoting the execution of
a document, -with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document
or part of a document was made, signed, sealed or executed by or by the
authority of a person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was -not
made, signed, sealed or executed, or at a time at -which he knows that it was
not made, signed, sealed or ,executed; or Secondly-Who, without lawful
authority, dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a,
document in any material part thereof, after it -has been made or executed
either by himself or by any other person, whether such person be living or dead
at -the time of such alteration; or Thirdly Who dishonestly or fraudulently
causes any person to sign, seal, execute or alter a document, -knowing that
such person by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication cannot, or that by
reason of deception practised upon him, he does not know the contents of the
document or the nature of the alteration." Making of a false document by a
person in all the three clauses must be done dishonestly or fraudulently and
with the necessary intention or knowledge contemplated by the three clauses.
Section 146 of the Maharashtra Co-operative
Societies Act, 1960, does not make any such intention as is referred to in ss.
463 and 464 I.P. Code an ingredient of the offence: it also renders a person
who is merely privy to the destruction, mutilation, alteration, falsification
or secreting or to the making of any false or 201 fraudulent entry in any
register, book of account or document belonging to the society liable to be
under s. 146 (p) The offence may be committed
under s. 146 only by an officer or member-past or present-of the society.
Even destruction or secreting of a document
or security is penalised under s. 146 of the Act.
We are unable to accept the contention that
these two sections s. 146(p) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act and
s. 465 P. Code,-are intended to deal with the same offence. It is true that
certain acts may fall within both the sections. For instance, tampering with or
altering or falsifying any, register, book of account or security, or making
any false or fraudulent, entry in the register, book of account or document
belonging to the society, may when done with the requisite intention mentioned
in s. 464 read with s. 463 I.P. Code be also an offence under s. 146(p) of the
Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act. But that, in our judgment, is not a
ground for holding 'that s. 465 I.P. Code and the related offences were
intended to be pro tanto repealed by the enactment of s. 146(p) of the
Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act. When the Indian Penal Code seeks to
impose in respect of offences under As, 477 imprisonment which may extend to
imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment upto a period of seven years for an
offence under s. 477A it would be difficult to hold that when committed by an
officer or a member of a society the maximum punishment which can be imposed by
virtue of s. 146(p) would be three years rigorous imprisonment only.
This Court in Om Prakash Gupta v. State of
Uttar Pradesh(1) held that the offences under s. 409 I.P. Code and s. 5(1)(c)
of the Prevention of Corruption Act, are distinct and separate offences and s.
409 I.P. Code is not repealed by s. 5(1) (c) of the Prevention of Corruption
In a recent judgment of this Court in T. S.
Balliah v. T. S. Rengachari(2) we had occasion to consider whether s. 177 I.P.
Code was repealed by s. 52 of the Indian Income-tax Act. It was pointed out
that in considering the problem the Court must consider the true meaning and
effect, of the two Acts, and unless there is repugnancy or inconsistency
between the two enactments or that the two enactments cannot stand together
they must be treated as cumulative.
It is clear from a perusal of s. 146 (p) of
the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, and ss. 463 and 464 I.P.
Code. that they are two distinct offences
which are capable of being (1)  S.C.R.423.
7 Sup C 1/69-14 (2)  3 S.C.R. 65.
202 Committed with different intentions by
different sets of persons and it, could not be contemplated that the
Legislature of the State of Maharashtra intended to repeal pro tanto the
provisions of S. 465 I.P. Code by enactment of s. 146 of the Maharashtra
Co-operative Societies Act.
It is unnecessary in the circumstances to
consider the question whether the Maharashtra State Legislature was competent
to repeal the provisions of s. 465 I.P. Code. The law relating to Co-operative
Societies may be enacted in exercise of the power under List II Entry 32 of the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, but if s. 146 is directly intended to
trench upon a provision ,of the Indian Penal Code-falling within List 11 Entry
1, sanction of the President under Art. 254(2) would apparently be necessary.
Both the contentions raised by counsel for
the appellants fail. The appeal is dismissed.
G.C. Appeal dismissed.