Addanki Narayanappa & ANR Vs.
Bhaskara Krishtappa And 13 Ors  INSC 23 (21 January 1966)
21/01/1966 MUDHOLKAR, J.R.
CITATION: 1966 AIR 1300 1966 SCR (3) 400
F 1967 SC 401 (9) RF 1968 SC 676 (6) D 1974
SC1066 (4,5) R 1977 SC 489 (16) C 1980 SC 176 (17) R 1986 SC 368 (11) RF 1986
SC1821 (29) RF 1991 SC1806 (8) R 1992 SC 65 (10) RF 1992 SC 197 (10)
Registration Act (16 of 1908), s. 17(1)
(c)-Partnership assets consisting of immovable property-Relinquishment by one
partner of his share-Deed of relinquishment if should be registered.
The members of two Joint Hindu families
(Appellants and Respondents) entered into partnership for carrying on business.
The members of one family filed a suit in 1949 for dissolution of the
partnership and the taking of accounts. The members of the second family raised
the defence that the partnership was dissolved even in 1936 and that accounts
were then settled between the two families.
In support of that plea they relied upon an
unregistered document, which showed that the partnership had come to an end. It
was contended by the appellants-plaintiffs, that since the partnership assets
included immovable property and the document recorded the relinquishment by the
members 6f the plaintiff family of their interest in those assets, the document
was compulsorily registerable under s. 17(1)(c) of the Registration Act, 1908;
and that as it was not registered, it was inadmissible in evidence to prove the
dissolution as well as the settlement of accounts.
HELD : The document only records the fact
that the partnership had come to an end. It cannot be said to convey any
immovable property by a partner to another, expressly or by necessary
implication, nor is there any express reference to any immovable property,
except a recital of a fact which had taken place earlier. Therefore, the
unregistered deed of release by one family of its share in the partnership was
admissible in evidence, even though the partnership owned immovable property.
[410 D. E] The interest of a partner in partnership assets comprising of
movable as well as immovable property should be treated only as movable
property. His right during the insistence of the partnership is to get his
share of the profits from time to time, as may be agreed upon among the
partners, and his right after the dissolution of the partnership, or with his
retirement from, the partnership, is only to receive e the money value of his
share in the net partnership assets as on the date of dissolution or
retirement, after a deduction of Liabilities and prior charges. [406 E; 407
F-G) Case law reviewed.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 299 of 1961.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
decree dated December 8, 1958 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Second Appeal
No. 845 of 1953.
Alladi Kuppuswami and R. Gopalakrishnan, for
N. C. Chatterjee, S.G. Patwardhan, S. Balakrishnan,
Thiagarajan for N.S. Mani, for respondents
Nos. 4, 7 and 8.
401 The Judgment of the Court was delivered
by Mudholkar, J. In this appeal by special leave from a judgment of the High
Court of Andhra Pradesh the question which arises for consideration is whether
the interest of a partner in partnership assets comprising of movable as well
as immovable property should be treated as movable or immovable property for
the purposes of s. 17(1) of the Registration 'Act, 1908. The question arises in
Members of two joint Hindu families, to whom
we would refer for convenience as 'the Addanki family and the Bhaskara family,
entered into partnership for the purpose of carrying on business of hulling
rice, decorticating groundnuts etc.
Each family had half share in that business.
The capital of the partnership consisted, among other things, of some lands
belonging to the families. During the course of the business of the partnership
some more lands were acquired by the partnership. The plaintiffs who are two
members of the Addanki family instituted a suit in the court of Subordinate
Judge, Chittoor on March 4, 1949 for the following reliefs "(a) for a
declaration that the suit properties belong to the plaintiffs and defendants IO
to 14 and defendants 1 to 9 equally for a division of the same into four equal
shares, one share to be delivered to the plaintiffs or for a division of the
same into two equal shares to be delivered to the plaintiffs and the defendants
10 to 14 jointly;
(b) or in the alternative dissolving the
partnership between the plaintiffs and defendants 10 to 14 on the one hand and
defendants 1 to 9 on the other hand directing accounts to be taken;
(c) directing the defendants 1 to 9 to render
accounts of the income of the suit properties;
(d) directing the defendants 1 to 9 to pay
the costs of the suit to the plaintiffs;
(e) and pass such further relief as may be
deemed fit in the circumstances of the case.
It may be mentioned that in their suit the
plaintiffs made all the members of the Bhaskara family as defendants and also
joined those members of the Addanki family who had not joined as plaintiffs. We
are concerned here only with the defence of the members of the Bhaskara family.
According to them the partnership was dissolved
in the year 1936 and accounts were settled between the two families. In support
of this plea they have relied upon a karar executed in favour of Bhaskara
Gurappa 402 Setty, who was presumably the karta of the Bhaskara family, by five
members of the Addanki family, who presumably represented all the members of
the Addanki family.
Therefore, according to the Bhaskara
defendants; the plaintiffs had no cause of action. Alternatively they contended
that the suit was barred by time' In the view which we take it would not be
necessary to consider the second defence raised by the Addanki family.
The relevant portion of the karar reads thus
"As disputes have arisen in our family
regarding partition, it is not possible to carry on the business or to make investment
in future. Moreover, you yourself have undertaken to discharge some of the
debts payable by us in the coastal parts in connection with our private
Therefore, from this day onwards we have
closed the joint business. So, from this day onwards, we have given up (our)
share in the machine etc., and in the business, and we have made over the same
to you alone completely by way of adjustment. You yourself shall carry on the
business without ourselves having anything to do with the profit and loss. Here
for, you have given up to us the property forming our Venkatasubbayya's share
which you have purchased and delivered possession of the same to us even
previously. In case you want to execute and deliver a proper document in
respect of the share which we have given up to you, we shall at your own
expense, execute and deliver a document registered." This document on its
face shows that the partnership business had come to an end and that the
Addanki family had given up their share in the "machine etc., in the
business" and had made it over to the Bhaskara family. It also recites the
fact that the Addanki family had already received certain property which was
purchased by the partnership presumably as that family's share in the
partnership assets. The argument advanced by Mr. Alladi Kuppuswami is that
since the partnership assets. included immovable property and the document
records relinquishment by the members of the Addanki family of their interest
in those assets, this document was compulsorily registerable under s. 17(1)(c)
of the Registration Act and that as it was not registered it is inadmissible in
evidence to prove the dissolution of the partnership as well as the settlement
Direct cases upon this point of the courts in
India are few but before we examine them it would be desirable to advert to the
provisions of the Partnership Act itself bearing oh the interest of partners in
partnership property. Section 14 provides that subject to contract between the
partners the property of the firm includes all property originally brought into
the stock of the firm or acquired.
403 by the firm for the purposes and in the
course of the business of the firm. Section 15 provides that such property
shall ordinarily be held and used by the partners exclusively for the purposes
of the business of the firm.
Though that is so a firm has no legal
,existence under the Act and the partnership property will, therefore, be
deemed to he held by the partners for the business of the partnership. Section
29 deals with the rights of a transferee of a partner's interest and sub-s. (1)
provides that such a transferee will not have the same rights as the transferor
partner but he would be entitled to receive the share of profits of his
transferor and that he will be bound to accept the account of profits agreed to
by the partners.
Sub-section (2) provides that upon
dissolution of the firm or upon a transferor-partner ceasing to be a partner
the transferee would be entitled as against the remaining partners to receive
the share of the assets of the firm to which his transferor was entitled and
will also be entitled to an account as from the date of dissolution. Section 30
deals with the case of a minor admitted to the benefits of partnerships. Such
minor is given a right to his share of the property of the firm and also a
right to a share in the profits of the firm as may be agreed upon. But his
share will be liable for the acts of the firm though he would not be personally
liable for them. Sub-section (4) however, debars a minor from suing the
partners for accounts or for his share of the property or profits of the firm
save when severing his connection with the firm. It also provides that when he
is severing his connection with the firm the court shall make a valuation of
his share in the property of the firm. Sections 31 to 38 deal with incoming and
outgoing partners. Some of the consequences of retirement of a partner are
dealt with in sub-ss. (2) and (3) of s. 32 while some others are dealt with in
ss. 36 and 37. Under s. 37 the outgoing partner or the estate of a deceased
partner, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, would be, entitled to at
the option of himself or his representatives to such share of profits made
since he ceased to be a partner as may be attributable to the property of the
firm or to interest at the rate of six per cent. per annum on the amount of his
share in the property of the firm. The subject of dissolution of a firm and the
consequences are dealt with in chapter VI, ss. 39 to 55. of these the one which
is relevant for this discussion is s. 48 which runs thus :
"In settling the accounts of a firm
after dissolution the following rules shall, subject to agreement by the
partners, be observed :
(a) Losses, including deficiencies of
capital, shall be paid first out of profits, next out of capital and, lastly,
if necessary, by the partners individually in the proportions in which they
were entitled to share profits.
404 (b) The assets of the firm, including any
sums contributed by the partners to make up deficiencies of capital, shall be
applied in the following manner and order :(i) in paying the debts of the firm
to third parties:
(ii) in paying to each partner rateably what
is due to him from the firm for advances as distinguished from capital;
(iii) in paying to each partner rateable what
is due to him on account of capital; and (iv) the residue, if any, shall be
divided among the partners in the proportions in which they were entitled to
share profits." From a perusal of these provisions it would be abundantly
clear that whatever may be the character of the property which is brought in by
the partners when the partnership is formed or which may be acquired in the
course of the business of the partnership it becomes the property of the firm
and what a partner is entitled to is his share of profits, if any, accruing, to
the partnership from the realisation of this property, and upon dissolution of
the partnership to a share in the money representing the value of the property.
No doubt, since a firm has no legal existence, the partnership property will
vest in all the partners and in that sense every partner has an interest in the
property of the partnership. During the subsistence of the partnership,
however, no partner can deal with any portion of the property as his own. Nor
can he assign his interest in a specific item of the partnership property to
anyone. His right is to obtain such profits, if any, as fall to his share from
time to time and upon the dissolution of the firm to a share in the assets of
the firm which remain after satisfying the liabilities set out in cl. (a) and
sub-cls.. (i), (ii) and (iii) of cl.(b) of s. 48. It has been stated in Lindley
on Partnership, 12th ed. at p. 375 "What is meant by the share of a
partner is his proportion of the partnership assets after they have been ill
realised and converted into money, and all the partner-ship debts and
liabilities have' been paid and discharged.
This it is, and this only which on the death
of a partner passes to his representatives, or to a legatee of his share
.......... and which on his, bankruptcy passes to his trustee." This
statement of law is based upon a number of decisions of the English courts. One
of these is Rodriguez v. Speyer Bros.(1) H where at p. 68 it has been observed
(1)  A.C. 59.
405 " When a debt due to a firm is got
in no partner, has any definite share or interest in that debt; his right is
merely to have the money so received applied, together with the other assets,
in discharging the liabilities of the firm, and to receive his share of any
surplus there may be when the liquidation has been completed." No doubt
this decision was subsequent to the enactment of the English Partnership Act of
1890. Even in several earlier cases, as for instance, Darby v. Darby(1) the ,
same view has been expressed. That was a case where two Persons purchased lands
on a joint speculation with their joint monies for the purpose of converting them
into building plots and reselling them at a profit or loss. It was held by
Kindersley V.C. that there was a conversion of the property purchased out and
out and upon the death of one of the partners his share in the part of the
unrealised estate passed to his personal representatives. After examining the
earlier cases the learned Vice-Chancellor observed at p. 995 "The result
then of the authorities may be thus stated :-Lord Thurlow was of opinion that a
special contract was necessary to convert the land into personalty : and Sir W.
Grant followed that decision. Lord Eldon on more than one occasion strongly
"pressed his opinion that Lord Thurlow's decision was wrong. Sir J. Leach
clearly decided in three cases that there was conversion out and out :
and Sir L. Shadwell, in the last case before
him, clearly decided in the same way. That is the state of the authorities.
Now it appears to me that, irrespective of
authority, and looking at the matter with reference to principles well
established in this Court, if partners purchase land merely for the purpose of
their trade, and pay for it out of the partnership property, that transaction
makes the property personalty, and effects a conversion out and out." He
then observed " This principle is clearly laid down by Lord Eldon in
Crawshav v. CollinS(2) and by Sir W. Grant in Featherstonhaugh v. Fenwick(3)
and the right of each partner to insist on a sale of all the partnership
property, which arises from what is implied in the contract of partnership, is
just as stringent a special contract would be. If then this rule applies to
ordinary stock-in-trade, why should it.
(1) 61 E.R. 992. (2) 15 V6s. 218.
(3) 17 Ves. 298.
406 not apply to all kinds of partnership
property ? suppose that partners, for the purpose of carrying on their
business, purchase, out of the funds of the partnership, leasehold estate, or
take a lease of land, paying the rent out of the partnership funds, can it be
doubted that the same rule which applies to ordinary chattelswould apply to such
leasehold property ? I do not think it was ever questioned that, on a
dissolution, the right of each partner to have the partnership effects sold
applies to leasehold property belonging to the partnership as much as to any
other stock-in-trade. No one partner can insist on retaining his share unsold.
Nor would it make any difference in whom the legal estate was vested, whether
in one of the partners or in all; this Court would regulate the matter
according to the equities. And Sir W. Grant so decided in Featherstonhaugh v.
Fenwick.( )" We have quoted extensively
from this decision because of the argument that the decision in Rodriguez's
case(2) would have been otherwise but for s. 22 of the English Act. Adverting
to this Lindley has said :
"From the principle that a share of a
partner is nothing more than his proportion of the partnership assets after
they have been turned into money and applied in liquidation of the partnership,
whether its property consists of land or not, must, as between the real and
personal representatives of a deceased partner, be deemed to be personal and
not real estate, unless indeed such conversion is inconsistent with the
agreement between the parties. Although the decisions upon this point were
conflicting, the authorities which were in favour of the foregoing conclusion
certainly preponderated over the others, and all doubt upon the point has been
removed by the Partnership Act, 1890, which contains the following section :
22. Where land or any heritable interest
therein has become partnership, property it shall, unless the contrary
intention appears, be treated as between the. partners (including the
representative of a deceased partner), and also as between the heirs of a
deceased partner and his executors or administrators, as personal or movable
and not real or heritable estate." Even in a still earlier case Foster v.
Hale(3) a person :attempted to obtain an account of the profits of a colliery
on the ground that it was partnership property and it was objected that (1) 17
(3) 5 Ves. 308.
(2)  A.C. 59.
407 there was no signed writing, such as the
Statute of Frauds required. Dealing with it the Lord Chancellor observed :
"That was not the question : it was
whether there was a partnership. The subject being an agreement for land, the
question then is whether there was a resulting trust for that partnership by
operation of law. The question of partnership must be tried as a facte and as
if there was an issue upon it. If by facts and circumstances it is established
as a fact that these persons were partners in the colliery, in which land was
necessary to carry on the trade, the lease goes as an incident. The partnership
being established by evidence upon which a partnership may be found, the
premises necessary for the purposes of that partnership are by operation of law
hold for the purposes of that partnership." It is pointed out by Lindley
that this principle is carried to its extreme limit by Vice-Chancellor Wigram
in Dale v.
Hamilton (1). Even so, it is pointed out that
it must be treated as a binding authority in the absence of any decision of the
Court of Appeal to the contrary.
It seems to us that looldng to the scheme of
the Indian Act no other view can reasonably be taken. The whole concept of
partnership is to embark upon a joint venture and for that purpose to bring in
as capital money or even property including immovable property. Once that is
done whatever is b rought in would cease to be the trading asset of the person
who brought it in. It would be the trading asset of the partnership in which
all the partners would have interest in proportion to their share in the joint
venture of the business of partnership. The person who brought it in would,
therefore, not be able to claim or exercise any exclusive right over any
property which he has brought in, much less over any other partnership
property. He would not be able to exercise his right even to the extent of his
share in the business of the partnership. As already stated, his right during
the subsistence of the partnership is to get his share of profits from time to
time as may be agreed upon among the partners and after the dissolution of the
partnership or with his retirement from partnership of the value of his share
in the': net, partnership assets as on the date of dissolution or retirement
after a deduction of liabilities and prior charges. It is true that even during
the subsistence of the partnership a partner may assign his share to another.
In that case what the assignee would get would be only that which is permitted
by s. 29(1), that is to say, the right to receive the share of profits of the
assignor and accept the account of profits agreed to by the partners. There are
not many decisions of the High Courts on the point. in the few that there are
the preponderating view is (1) 5 Ha. 369 on appeal 2 Ph. 266.
M10Sup./Cl/66-13 408 in support of the
position which we have stated. In Joharmal v. Tejrani Jagrup(1) which was
decided by Jardine and Telang JJ., the latter took the view that though a
partner's share does not include any specific part of any specific item of
partnership property, still where the partnership is entitled to immovable
property, such share does include an interest in immovable property and, therefore,
every instrument operating to create or transfer a right to such share requires
to be registered under the Registration Act. In coming to this conclusion he
mainly purported to rely upon an observation contained in the fifth edition of
Lindley on Partnership at p. 347. This observation is not to be found in the
present edition of Lindley's Partnership nor in the 9th or 10th editions which
were brought to our notice. The 5th edition, however, is not available. The
learned Judge after quoting an earlier statement which is that the
"doctrine merely amounts to this that on the death of a partner his share
in the partnership property is to be treated as money, not as land" says :
"This obviously would not affect matters
either during the lifetime of a partner-Lindley, L.J.", says in so many
words that it has no practical operation till his' death (p. 348)or as against
parties strangers to the partnership,' e.g., the firm's debtors." While it
is true that the position so far as third persons are concerned would be
different it may be pointed out that in Forbes v. Steven(2) James V.C., has, as
quoted by the learned Judge, said : "It has long been the settled law of
this Court that real estate bought or acquired by a partnership for partnership
purposes (in the absence of some controlling agreement or direction to the
contrary), is, as between the partners and as between the real and personal
representatives of a partner deceased personal property, and devolves and is
distributable and applicable as personal estate and as legal assets."
Telang J., seems to have overlooked, and we say so with great respect, the
words "as between the partners" which precede the words "and as
between the real and personal representative of the partner deceased" and
to have confined his attention solely to the' latter. We have not found in any
of the editions of Lindley's Partnership an adverse criticism of the view of
the Vice-Chancellor, But, on the contrary, as already stated, the view
expressed is in full accord with these observations. Jardine J., has discussed
the English authorities at length and after referring to the documents upon
which reliance was placed on behalf of the defendant stated his opinion thus
"To lay down that the three letters in question, which deal generally with
the assets, movable and immovable, without specifying any particular mortgage
or other interest in real property require registration, would, incline to
think, in the present state of the authorities, go, (1)I.L.R 17 Bom. 235.
(2) L.R. 10 Eq, 178 409 too fit. It way be
argued that such letters are not 'instruments of-gift of immovable property'
but 'rather disposals of a share in a' partnership of which the business, is
money lending, and the mortgage securities merely incidental thereto." The
view, of Telang J., was not accepted by the Madras HighCourt. in Chitturi
Venkataratnam v. Siram Subba Rao(1)., The learns Judges there discussed all the
English decisions as also the decisions in Sudarsanam Maistri v. Narasimhulu
Maistri(2) and Gopala Chetty v. Vijayaraghavachariar(-3) and the opinion of
Jardine J in Joharmal's case(4) held that, an unregistered deed of release by
a: partner of his share in the, partnership business is admissible in evidence,
even where the partnership owns immovable property. The learned Judges pointed
out that though a partner may be a co-owner in the partnership property he has
no lights to ask for a' share in the property but; only that the partnership
business should be wound up including, therein the sale of immovable property
and to ask forhis share in the resulting assets. This. decisions was not
accepted as laying down the correct law by a Division Bench of the same High
Court in Samuvier v. Ramasubbier(5). The learned Judges there relied upon the
decision in Ashworth v.Munn(6) in addition to the opinion of Telang J., I and
also referred to the decision Gray v. Smith(7) in coming' to a conclusion
contrary to the one in the earlier case. It may be pointed out that the learned
Judges have made no reference to the decision of the Privy Council in Gopla
Chetty's case(3) though: that was: one of the decision relied upon by Phillips
J., in the earlier case. In so far as Ashworth's case(6) is concerned that was
a case which turned on the provisions of the Mortmain Acts and is not quite
pertinent for the decision on the point which was before them and Which is now
before us. In Gray. v. Smith(7) Kakewich J., held that an agreement by one of
the partners to retire and to assign his share in the partnership assets
including, immovable property, is an agreement to assign an interest in land,
and falls within the statute of Frauds. The view of Kekewich J. seems to have
received the approval of Cotton L.J., one of the Judges of the court of
Appeal,Though no argument was raised before it challenging its correctness.
It may, however, be observed that even
according to Kekewich j., the authorities (Foster v. Hale (8) and dale v.
Hamilton(9) establish that one may have an
agreement of partnership by parol, notwithstanding that the partnership is to
deal with land. He, however, went on to observe:
(1) I. L.R. 49 Mad. 738. (2) I.L.R. 1925 Mad.
(3) I.L.R. 45 Mad. 378 (P.,C.)  A.C.1
(4) I.L.R. 17 Bom. 235.
(5) I.L.R. 55 Mad. 72.
(6) (1880) 15 Ch. D. 363.
(7) 43 Ch. D. 208.
(8)15 Ves. 308.
(9) 5 Ha. 369 on appeal 2 Ph. 266 410
"But it does not seem to me to follow that an agreement for the
dissolution of such a partnership need not be expressed in writing, or rather
than there need not be a memorandum of the agreement for dissolution when one
of the terms of the agreement, either expressly or by necessary implication, is
that the party sought to be charged must part with and assign to others an
interest in land. That seems to me to give rise to entirely different considerations.
In the one case you prove the partnership by parol; you prove the object, the
terms of the partnership, and so on. But in the other case it is one of the
essential terms of the agreement that the party to be charged shall convey an
interest in land, and that seems therefore to bring it necessarily within the
4th section of the Statute of Frauds".
In the case before, us also in Samuvier's
case(1) the document cannot be said to convey any immovable property by a
partner to another expressly or by necessary implication.
If we may recall, the document executed by
the Addanki partners in favour of the Bhaskara partners records the fact that
the partnership business has come to an end and that the latter have given up
their share in "the machine etc., and in the business" and that they
have "made over same to you alone completely by way of adjustment. There
is no express reference to any immovable property herein. No doubt, the
document does recite the fact that the Bhaskara family has given to the Addanki
family certain property.
however, is merely a recital of a fact which
had taken place ,earlier. To cases of this type the observations of Kekewich J,
which we have quoted do not apply. The view taken in Samuvier's case (1) seemed
to commend itself to Varadachariar J., in Thirumalappa v. Ramappa but he was
reversed in Ramappa v. Thirumalappa.(2) We may also refer to the decision of a
Full Bench in Ajudhia Pershad Ram Pershad v. Sham Sunder & Ors.(3) in which
Cornelius J., has discussed most of the decisions we have earlier referred to
in addition to several others a id reached the conclusion that while a
partnership is in existence no partner can point to any ,part of the assets of
the partnership as belonging to him alone. After examining the relevant
provisions of the Act, the learned judge observed "These sections require
that the debts and liabilities should first be met out of the firm property and
(1) I.L.R. 55 Mad. 72. (2) A.I.R. 1939 Mad.
(3) A.I.R. 1947 Lah. 13.
411 after the assets should be applied in
rateable payment to each partner of what is due to him firstly on account of
advances as distinguished from capital and, secondly on amount of capital, the
residue, if any, being divided rateably among all the partners. It is obvious
that the Act contemplates complete liquidation of the assets of the partnership
as a preliminary to the settlement of accounts between partners upon
dissolution of the firm and it will, therefore, be correct to say that, for the
purposes of the Indian Partnership Act, and irrespective of any mutual
agreement between the partners, the share of each partner is, in the words of
Lindley : "his proportion of the partnership assets after they have been
all realised and converted into money, and all the partnership debts and
liabilities have been paid and discharged.
This indeed is the view which has commended
itself to us.
Mr. Kuppuswamy then referred us to two
decisions of English courts in In re Fuller's Contract(1) and Burdett-Coutts v.
Inland Revenue Commissioners(2) and on the passage at pp.
394 and 395 in Lindley's Partnership under
the head "Form of Transfer' in support of his argument. Both the cases
relied upon deal with contracts with third parties and not with agreements
between partners inter se concerning retirement or dissolution. The passage
from Lindley deals with a case where there is an actual transfer of immovable
property and is, therefore, not in point.
Mr. Chatterjee brought to our notice some
English decisions in addition to those we have adverted to in support, which
agree with the view taken in those cases. He has also referred to the decisions
in Prem Raj Brahmin v. Bhani Ram Brahmin(3) and Firm Ram Sahay v.
Bishwanath(4). We do not think it necessary to discuss them because they do not
add to what we have already said in support of our view.
For these reasons we uphold the decree of the
High Court and dismiss the appeal with costs.
(1)  Ch. D. 652.
(2)  1 W.L.R. 1027.
(3) I.L.R. E  1 Cal. 191.
(4) A.I.R. 1963 Patna 221.