Sahib Singh Mehra Vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh  INSC 12 (22 January 1965)
22/01/1965 DAYAL, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, RAGHUBAR
CITATION: 1965 AIR 1451 1965 SCR (2) 823
D 1972 SC2609 (16,20)
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860), ss.
499 and 500Publication of statement defamatory of Public prosecuting staff at
Aligarh State Government giving, sanction for prosecution under s. 198B(c) Code
of Criminal ProcedureWhether Aligarh Prosecuting staff a collection of persons'
within the meaning of Explanation 2, s. 499-Considered whether remarks
published for public good.
The appellant published in his paper, which
had a circulation mainly in Aligarh, a statement to the effect that Public
Prosecutors and Assistant Public Prosecutors had been receiving bribes.
The Public Prosecutor and the 11 Assistant
Public Prosecutors at Aligarh obtained the sanction of the State Government as
required under s. 198B(c) of Code of Criminal Procedure to file a complaint
under s. 500 Indian Penal Code in a court of Sessions against the appellant for
publishing defamatory remarks against the Assistant Public Prosecutor S, of
District Aligarh and other police prosecuting staff of the Government in
respect of their conduct in the discharge of public functions.
The Sessions Judge convicted the appellant
and the High Court dismissed his appeal against the conviction.
It was contended on behalf of the appellant,
inter alia, that the sanction granted under s. 198B(c) was not the sanction
contemplated by law because it was a general sanction and not with respect to
the defamation of any particular Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public
for the purpose of an offence under s. 500 Indian
Penal Code the person defamed must be an individual or a particular group and
there was no evidence that the remarks were defamatory of any particular group;
that the prosecution did not lead any evidence to establish that the defamed
group had any reputation which could be harmed; and that in any event the
remarks were for public good.
HELD : (i) the sanction given by the
Government was specifically with respect to the defamation of S, the Assistant
Public Prosecutor, Aligarh, and the other prosecuting staff of the Government
and as such it could not be considered a general sanction not contemplated by
[826 H] The sanction given, could be taken to
be sanction in respect of the defamation of the entire Prosecution staff in the
State; there was therefore no force in the contention that the Public
Prosecutor Was not competent to restrict his complaint to the defamation of S,
and other Public Prosecuting staff of the State Government at Aligarh.
Furthermore, although the impugned article
did not contain any express reference to the prosecuting staff at Aligarh, the
offending remarks could properly be taken to refer to the prosecuting staff at
Aligarh in the context of the paper being a local weekly and the other
circumstances of the case. [827 C-E] (ii) Explanation II to s. 499 makes it
clear that there can be a defamation of an individual person and also of a
'collection of persons'. Such a collection of persons must be identifiable in
the sense, that one could with cartainty say that the particular group had been
defamed as distinguished from the rest of the community. The prosecuting staff of
Aligarh, and even the prosecuting staff in the State of U.P. would be such an
identifiable group or 'collection of persons'. [827 G-H; 828 A-C] Supp/. 65-6
824 (iii) The impugned remarks were per se defamatory of the group of persons
referred to. The tenor of the article did not indicate that the purpose of the
appellant in publishing these remarks was "public good". No enquiry
could have been started by that Government on such a publication implying the
acceptance of bribes by the prosecuting staff. The impugned remarks could lead
readers to believe or suspect that the Public Prosecutors were corrupt and thus
affected the reputation of the prosecuting staff adversely. Unless proved
otherwise, the presumption is that every person has a good reputation. [828
E-H] The lower courts were therefore right in rejecting the contention that the
impugned remarks were protected under Exceptions 3 and 9 to s. 499 I.P.C. and
in convicting the appellant. [829 B-D]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal
Appeal No. 47 of 1963.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order, dated January 29, 1963 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal
No. 998 of 1962.
M. K. Ramamurthi, S. C. Agarwal, R. K. Garg
and D. P. Singh, for the appellant.
Girish Chandra and 0. P. Rana, for the
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Raghubar Dayal, J. Sahib Singh Mehra, appellant in this appeal by special
leave, published an article in his paper 'Kaliyug' of Aligarh, dated September
12, 1960, under the heading "Ultra Chor Kotwal Ko Dante' which means that
a thief reprimanded the kotwal, a police officer, though the right thing would
be the other way. The article contained the following expressions, as
translated "How the justice stands at a distance as a helpless spectator
of the show as to the manner in which the illicit bribe money from plaintiffs
and defendants enters into the pockets of public prosecutors and assistant
public prosecutors and the extent to which it reaches and to which use it is
put." The Public Prosecutor and the eleven Assistant Public Prosecutors at
Aligarh requested the Superintendent of Police for obtaining the sanction of
the Government for filing a complaint by the District Government Counsel in the
Court of the Sessions Judge under s. 500 I.P.C. The Government was duly
approached through proper channel and, ultimately, the Home Secretary, U.P.
Government, wrote to the Inspector General, U.P. on March 1, 1961 :
I am directed to convey the sanction of the
State Government under section 198B(c) of the Code of 825 Criminal Procedure to
the filing of a complaint under section 500 Indian Penal Code in a Court of
Sessions, against the Editor and Publisher of the Newspaper 'Kaliyug' of
District Aligarh which published a news item under the caption 'Ulta Chor
Kotwal Ko Dante' in its issue, dated September 12, 1960 containing defamatory
remarks against the Assistant Public Prosecutor Sri R. K. Sharma of District
Aligarh and other police prosecuting staff of the Government in respect of
their conduct in the discharge of public functions." Thereafter, the
Public Prosecutor of Aligarh filed the complaint in the Court of Session,
Aligarh, praying for the summoning of the accused and for his trial according
to law for the offence under s. 500 I.P.C.
The appellant admitted before the Sessions
Judge the publication of the impugned article and stated that he never had any
evil intention. He further stated that he had published the news item for the
good of the public and that he had published it in most general terms to bring
bad things to the notice of the Government and the authorities for the public
The Sessions Judge convicted him of the
offence under s. 500 I.P.C. holding that the aforesaid statements in the
article were defamatory and that the appellant was not protected by exceptions
3 and 9 to s. 499 I.P.C. He sentenced the appellant to simple imprisonment for
six months and a fine of Rs. 200. His appeal against the conviction was
dismissed by the High Court.
Of the points sought to be urged for the
appellant, we did not allow one to be urged. It was that there was no proof
that the Government bad sanctioned the lodging of the complaint. This point had
not been taken in the Courts below and was not even taken in the petition for
special leave. What was urged in the petition for special leave was that one of
the questions of law which arose in the case for consideration was whether the
charge framed was the one for which sanction was granted or the requisite
complaint was filed. This question is very much different from the question
whether the Government did grant the sanction or whether the granting of the
sanction by the Government had been duly proved in the case.
The other points urged are : (1) that the
sanction granted was a general sanction and not with respect to the defamation
of any particular Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor and that
such sanction was not contemplated by law; (2) that it is not proved that the
appellant had any intention to harm the 826 reputation of any particular Public
Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor; (3) that there was no evidence that
the remarks were defamatory of any particular group; (4) that the prosecution
did not lead any evidence to establish that the defamed group had any
reputation which could be banned and (5) that the remarks were for public good.
Before dealing with the contentions raised
for the appellant, we may refer to the provisions of law which enable a Public
Prosecutor to Me a complaint for an offence under S. 500 I.P.C. committed
against a public servant.
Section 198 Cr. P.C. provides inter alia that
no Court shall take cognizance of an offence falling under Chapter XXI (which
contains ss. 499 and 500 I.P.C.) except upon complaint made by some person
aggrieved by such offence.
Section 198B, however, is an exception to the
provisions of S. 198 and provides that notwithstanding anything contained in
the Code, when any offence falling under Chapter XXI of the Indian Penal Code
other than the offence of defamation by spoken words is alleged to have been
committed against any public servant, employed in connection with the affairs
of a State, in respect of his conduct in the discharge of his public functions,
a Court of Session may take cognizance of such offence without the accused
being committed to it for trial, upon a complaint in writing made by the Public
Prosecutor. It is thus that a Public Prosecutor can file a complaint in writing
in the Court of Session directly with respect to an offence under S. 500 I.P.C.
committed against a public servant in respect of his conduct in the discharge
of his public functions. Sub-s. (3) of S. 198B provides that no complaint under
sub-s. (1) shall be made by the Public Prosecutor except with the previous
sanction of the Government concerned for the filing of a complaint under S. 500
I.P.C. The sanction referred to above, in this case, and conveyed by the Home
Secretary to the Inspector-General of Police, was a sanction for making a
complaint under S. 500 I.P.C. against the appellant with respect to the article
under the heading 'Ulta Chor Kotwal Ko Dante', in the issue of 'Kaliyug' dated
September 12, 1960, containing defamatory remarks against the Assistant Public
Prosecutor, R. K. Sharma, of Aligarh, and other prosecuting staff of the
Government in respect of their conduct in the discharge of public functions.
The sanction was therefore with respect to defamation of two persons (i) R. K.
Sharma, Assistant Public prosecutor, Aligarh; and (ii) the other police
prosecuting staff of Government of Uttar Pradesh, which would be the entire
prosecuting staff in the State. There was thus nothing wrong in the form of the
827 The case did not proceed with respect to
the defamation of R. K. Sharma, Assistant Public Prosecutor, as such. We may,
however, here indicate in brief this reference to the defamation of R. K.
Sharma. The appellant published sometime in May 1960 something which was
defamatory of R. K. Sharma. R. K. Sharma filed a complaint about it in
September 1960. The impugned article had stated, prior to the remarks to which
objection has been taken, the publication of the earlier article and the news
reaching the Editor that R. K. Sharma was contemplating taking action in a
Court of law and then expressed that the Editor welcomed the news and would
show how the bribe money reaches the Public Prosecutors, how it is utilised
and_how justice sees all this show from a distance. The Public Prosecutor,
however, in his complaint, restricted it to the defamation of R. K. Sharma and
other police prosecuting staff of the U.P. Government at Aligarh. It is not
possible to say that he was not competent to do so, when the sanction by the
Government could be taken to be sanction for the defamation of the entire
prosecuting staff in the State of Uttar Pradesh, there being no such express
statement in the article as to restrict the imputation to the staff at Aligarh
alone and when the remarks could be properly taken to be with reference to the
prosecuting staff at Aligarh in the context of 'Kaliyug' being a local weekly
and the desire of the Editor to make public all these matters in a Court in
proceedings to be started by R. K. Sharma in view of certain matter published
about him in an earlier issue of the paper.
We therefore do not consider that the
sanction suffered from any defect.
The next question to determine is whether it
is essential for the purpose of an offence under S. 500 I.P.C. that the person
defamed must be an individual and that the prosecuting staff at Aligarh or of
the State of Uttar Pradesh could not be said to be a 'person' which could be
defamed. Section 499 I.P.C. defines 'defamation' and provides inter alia that
whoever makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to
harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm,
the reputation of such person, is said, except in cases covered by the exceptions
to the Section, to, defame that person. Explanation 2 provides that it may
amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a company or an
association or collection of persons as such. It is clear therefore that there
could be defamation of an individual person and also of a collection of persons
as such. The contention for the appellant then reduces itself to the question
whether the prosecuting staff at Aligarh can be considered to be such a
collection of persons as is contem828 plated by Explanation 2. The language of
Explanation 2 is general and any collection of persons would be covered by it.
of course, that collection of persons must be identifiable in the sense that
one could, with certainty, say that this group of particular people has been
defamed, as distinguished from the rest of the community. The prosecuting staff
of Aligarh or, as a matter of fact, the prosecuting staff in the State of Uttar
Pradesh, is certainly such an identifiable group or collection of persons.
There is nothing indefinite about it. This group consists of all members of the
prosecuting staff in the service of the Government of Uttar Pradesh. Within
this general group of Public Prosecutors of U.P. there is again an identifiable
group of prosecuting staff, consisting of Public Prosecutors and Assistant
Public Prosecutors, at Aligarh. This group of persons would be covered by
Explanation 2 and could therefore be the subject of defamation.
We have not been referred to any case
relating to S. 499 I.P.C. in support of the contention for the appellant that
the Public Prosecutor and Assistant Public Prosecutors at Aligarh could not
form such a body of persons as would be covered by Explanation 2 to S. 499
The impugned remarks are per se defamatory of
the group of persons referred to. It is no defence and it has not been urged as
defence-that the remarks were true. The defence in the Courts below was that
they were for public good and the appellant was protected under Exceptions 3
and 9, of s. 499 I.P.C. The tenor of the article does not indicate that the
purpose of the appellant in publishing these remarks was 'public good'.
According to the article. the appellant would have welcomed the opportunity
that would be offered by the case contemplated against him by R. K. Sharma, to
make public the impugned matters. His remarks therefore could have the tendency
to dissuade R. K. Sharma from instituting the proceedings for fear of giving
greater currency to untrue allegations which be not favourable to him or to the
prosecuting staff at Aligarh or in the State, and by themselves could not
render any public good. No enquiry could have been started by the Government on
such a publication implying the passing of money from the pockets of certain
set of people to the pockets of the prosecuting staff. The impugned remarks
could certainly lead the readers of the article to believe or suspect that the
prosecuting staff is corrupt in the discharge of its duties as public
prosecutors, and are thus bound to affect the reputation of the prosecuting
staff adversely. Unless proved otherwise, the presumption is that every person
has a good reputation. In this case, the 829 Public Prosecutor and Assistant
Public Prosecutor had deposed that they are not corrupt, and according to their
knowledge, none at Aligarh, is corrupt in the discharge of his duty. There is
no evidence to the contrary.
Exception 3 to s. 499 I.P.C. comes into play
when some defamatory remark is made in good faith. Nothing has been brought on
the record to establish that those defamatory remarks were made by the
appellant after due care and attention and so, in good faith.
Exception 9 gives protection to imputations
made in good faith for the protection of the interest of the person making it
or of any other person or for the public good.
The appellant has not established his good
faith and, as we have said above, the imputations could not have been said to
have been made for the public good.
We are therefore of opinion that the
appellant has been rightly held to have committed the offence under s. 500
I.P.C. by defaming the Public Prosecutor and Assistant Public Prosecutors at
It is urged for the appellant that the
sentence is severe and be reduced to the period of imprisonment already
undergone. We do not see any justification for reducing the sentence. The Press
has great power in impressing the minds of the people and it is essential that
persons responsible for publishing anything in newspapers should take good care
before publishing anything which tends to harm the reputation of a person.
Reckless comments are to be avoided. When one is proved to have made defamatory
comments with an ulterior motive and without the least justification motivated
by self-interest, he deserves a deterrent sentence.
We dismiss the appeal. The appellant will
surrender to his bail.