Tansukh Rai Jain Vs. Nilratan Prasad
Shaw & Ors  INSC 249 (4 November 1964)
04/11/1964 DAYAL, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, RAGHUBAR
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) WANCHOO, K.N.
CITATION: 1966 AIR 1780 1965 SCR (2) 6
R 1978 SC 215 (30)
Constitution of India, Art. 254(1) (2)-Motor
Vehicles Act, (Act 4 of 1939), s. 64A whether renders void or repeals s. 64A of
the Motor Vehicles (Bihar Amendment) Act, 194-9 (Bihar Act 27 of 1950).
The Bihar State Legislature by Act 27 of 1950
introduced s. 64A into the Motor Vehicles Act (Central Act IV of 1939).
By that section power was given to the State
Government to revise orders of authorities and officers in proceedings under
Chapter IV of the Motor Vehicles Act. Subsequent to this by Act 100 of 1956
Parliament introduced another s. 64A into the Act providing that revision would
lie to the State Transport Authority from the non-appealable orders of Regional
Respondent No. 1 filed a writ petition before
the High Court challenging an order of the State Government under s. 64A of
Bihar Act 27 of 1950. By the said order the State Government had granted a
stage carriage permit to the appellant setting aside an order of the Appellate
Authority in favour of Respondent No. 1. The High Court held that Bihar s. 64A
did not apply to stage carriage permits for inter-State routes and therefore
the order of the State Government made under that section was bad. The
appellant thereupon filed an appeal before the Supreme Court with certificate.
Before the appeal was heard, the Supreme Court had already decided in another
case that there was nothing in Bihar s. 64A to render it inapplicable to stage
carriage permits for inter-State routes, thus reversing the High Court's
decision on that point. Respondent No. 1therefore sought, and was given
permission to challenge the order of the State Government on another ground,
namely, that Central s. 64A had by vitrue of the provisions of cls.
(1) and (2) of Art. 254 of the Constitution
rendered void or impliedly repealed Bihar s. 64A. It was urged that Central s.
64A was exhaustive, that it covered the same field as Bihar s. 64A, and that
the two sections were directly repugnant.
HELD : (i) Central section 64A could not said
to be exhaustive. While it provided for revision to the State Transport
Authority against the non-appealable orders of the Regional Transport
Authority, it did not confer, any finality on the orders passed by the former
and it was open to the Bihar Legislature to provide further remedies.
Moreover the scope of Central s. 64A could be
enlarged or reduced by the State Government which had power under s. 68 to
determine which orders of the Regional Transport Authority would be appealable.
[11 B-C, F-H] (ii) Nor could it be said that Central s. 64A and Bihar s.
64A covered the same field. Central s. 64A
only dealt with revisions against the orders of the Regional Transport
Authority, while Bihar s. 64A bad a much wider operation giving to the State Government
power to revise orders of any authority or officer in proceedings under Ch. IV
of the Act. Such orders could be those of the State Transport Authority, and
the Appellate Authority besides other authorities and officers, [11 C-D, G-H] 7
(iii) The language of Bihar s. 64A is very general, Literally construed it can
be said to be in conflict with both s. 64 and Central s. 64A, inasmuch as it
can cover cases open to appeal under the former section, and to revision under
the latter section. To the extent of this repugnance Bihar s. 64A is void. But
the section as a whole is not void nor has it been repealed by Central s. 64A;
its scope has been limited only to this extent that revisions against such
orders of the Regional Transport Authority which are not appealable, have to be
preferred to the State Transport Authority. [110, D, H; 12C] Deep Chand v.
State of Uttar Pradesh,  Supp. 2 S.C.R. 8, applied.
S. K. Pasari v. Abdul Ghafoor, C.A. No. 306
of 1964 decided on 4-5-64 and Abdul Mateen v. Ram Kailash Pandey,  3
S.C.R., 523, referred to.
In the present case the State Government of
Bihar revised the order made by the Appellate Authority. It was competent to do
so. The High Court was in error in holding otherwise.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 538 of 1964.
Appeal from the judgment and order, dated
September 25, 1963 of the Patna High Court in Misc. Judicial Case No. 1381 of
K. Rajendra Chaudhuri and K. R. Chaudhuri,
for the appel- lant.
M. C. Setalvad, D. P. Singh, S. C. Agarwal
and M. K. Rama- murthy, for the respondent No. 1.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Raghubar Dayal, J. This appeal, on certificate granted by the High Court of
Patna, raises the question whether s. 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act as
introduced by the Motor Vehicles (Bihar Amendment) Act, 1949 (Bihar Act XXVII
of 1950), hereinafter referred to as Bihar s. 64A, was not applicable to
proceedings for grant of permit for inter- State routes. This question,
however, was decided by this Court in S. K. Pasari v. Abdul Ghafoor(1). It was
held that it was applicable to cases of stage carriage permits for inter-State
The respondent prayed, in view of the
observations in Abdul Mateen v. Ram Kailash Pandey (2) for permission to challenge
the validity of the aforesaid section on the ground that Parliament, by the
Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1956 (Act No. 100 of 1956), has introduced
another s. 64A in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Act TV of 1939), hereinafter
referred to as Central s. 64A and that thereby Bihar s. 64A must be taken to
have been repealed by necessary implication.
(1) Civil Appeal No. 306 of 1964, decided on
(2)  3 S.C.R. 523.
8 The question arises in this way. The
appellant Tansukh Rai Jain, was one of the applicants for the stage-carriage
permit for an inter-State route between Bihar and Orissa.
The State Transport Authority, Bihar, granted
the permit to the United Motor Works & Co. Ltd. The appellant and
respondent No. 1, Nilratan Prasad Shaw, appealed to the appellate authority,
the Deputy Minister of Transport, Bihar, against the order of the State
The appellate authority reversed the order
and granted the permit to Shaw, respondent No. 1. Thereafter, the appellant
went in revision to the Bihar Government, in view of Bihar s. 64A. The
Transport Minister set aside the order of the appellate authority and granted
the permit to Jain, the appellant. Shaw, respondent No. 1, then filed a writ
petition in the High Court and prayed for the quashing of the order of the
Transport Minister and for the restoration of the order of the appellate
authority granting the permit to him. The High Court allowed the writ petition
holding that Bihar s. 64A did not apply to stage-carriage permits for inter State
routes and that therefore the Bihar Government was incompetent to revise the
order of the appellate authority.
It is urged for the respondent that the
provisions of Bihar s. 64A are repugnant to those of Central s. 64A and are
therefore void in view of cl. (1) of Art. 254. It is also urged that the
Central Act has repealed Bihar s. 64A by enacting Central s. 64A in the
exercise of the power it had under the proviso to Art. 254(2). If the
provisions of Bihar s. 64A are repugnant to any extent with those of Central s.
64A, Bihar s. 64A will be void to the extent of the repugnancy in view of cl.
(1) of Art. 254 of the Constitution. As the Central Act was enacted by
Parliament subsequent to the enactment of Bihar s. 64A, the provisions of the
main part of cl. (2) of Art. 254 will not apply to make Bihar s. 64A good
within the State of Bihar, even though it had received the assent of the
President, as those provisions applied -when the Central Act is enacted earlier
than the State law. We have therefore to see whether the provisions of Bihar s.
64A are repugnant to those of Central S. 64A.
The tests for determining whether a certain
provision of a State law is repugnant to the provisions of a law made by
Parliament are stated thus, in Deep Chand v. The State of Uttar Pradesh(1) :
"Repugnancy between two statutes may
thus be ascertained on the basis of the following three principles (1) 
Supp. 2 S.C.R. 8, 43.
9 (1) Whether there is direct conflict
between the two provisions;
(2) Whether Parliament intended to lay down
an exhaustive code in respect of the subject matter replacing the Act of the
State Legislature; and (3) Whether the law made by Parliament and the law made
by the State Legislature occupy the same field." We may now refer to the
two sections, Central s. 64A and Bihar s. 64A :
"Central s. 64A : The State Transport
Authority may, either on its motion or on an application made to it, call for
the record of any case in which an order has been made by a Regional Transport
Authority and in which no appeal lies, and if it appears to the State Transport
Authority that the order made by the Regional Transport Authority is improper
or illegal, the State Transport Authority may pass such order in relation to
the case as it deems fit :
Provided that the State Transport Authority
shall not entertain any application from a person aggrieved by an order of a
Regional Transport Authority, unless the application is made within thirty days
from the date of the order:
Provided further that the State Transport
Authority shall not pass an order under this section prejudicial to any person
without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard." "Bihar
s. 64A : The -State Government may, on application made to it in this behalf,
within thirty days of the passing of the order in the course of any proceedings
taken under this Chapter by any authority or officer subordinate to it, call
for the records of such proceedings, and after examining such records pass such
order as it thinks fit." The words 'subordinate to it' in Bihar s. 64A,
were omitted by the Motor Vehicles (Bihar Amendment) Act, 1953 (Bihar Act 1 of
1954). This was however not noticed when Bihar s. 64A was quoted in Pasari's
First we have to see whether there is any
direct conflict between Central s. 64A and Bihar s. 64A. Such a conflict, to a
(1) Civil Appeal No. 306 of 1964, decided on 4-5-64.
Sup.165-2 10 certain extent, can arise if
Bihar S. 64A be construed literally. The language of Bihar s. 64A is very
general and empowers the State Government to revise any order made in the
course of any proceedings taken under Chapter IV and pass such orders as it
thinks fit. It must, however, be so construed, if possible, as not to come in
conflict with the provisions of the Central Act. The power of revision vested
in the State Government under its provisions are to come into play only when
the Central Act does not provide any remedy against the orders proposed to be
revised. Certain orders have been made appealable under s. 64 of the Act.
The power of revision therefore will arise
and will be exercised after the appellate power is exhausted and not when the
aggrieved person has not appealed against the order. Similarly, it will be
available only against non- appealable orders after the aggrieved person has
taken action under Central s. 64A. The aggrieved person cannot have recourse to
action under Bihar s. 64A without first taking action under Central s. 64A. To
the extent that the language of Bihar S. 64A can cover the cases open to appeal
and to revision under s. 64 and Central S. 64A respectively, it will be in
direct conflict with the provisions of the Central Act and Bihar s. 64A will be
void to that extent.
Bihar s. 64A, it is argued for the
respondent, is wholly void as by Central s. 64A Parliament intended to lay down
an exhaustive code in respect of the said subject matter of revisions. It is
also urged that Bihar s. 64A is wholly void as both that section and Central s.
64A cover the same field. On these very grounds, it is urged that by enacting
Central S. 64A Parliament has revealed by implication Bihar s. 64A as it was
competent to do in view of the proviso to cl. (2) of Art. 254.
Repeal, by implication, is not to be easily
inferred. It is to be expected that when Parliament was aware of the provisions
of Bihar s. 64A and of Art. 254 of the Constitution and it intended to repeal
Bihar s. 64A, it would have expressly stated so. There is nothing in Central s.
64A or in any other provision of the Act which expressly states that Bihar s.
64A is repealed. We are of opinion that the mere fact that Central s. 64A deals
with revisions against non-appealable orders of the Regional Transport
Authority is not sufficient to conclude that Parliament intended to repeal
Bihar s. 64A.
The language of Bihar s. 64A is very wide and
covers all orders made by any authority or officer in the course of any
proceedings taken under Chapter TV of the Act. The only limitation on the
exercise of the revisional power conferred on the State 11 by Bihar S. 64A is
that the State cannot suo motu exercise that power. It can exercise it when
moved on application by some person aggrieved with the order he seeks to be
Such orders can be orders of the State
Transport Authority, the Regional Transport Authority or any other authority or
officer. Central s. 46A provides for revisions against the orders of the
Regional Transport Authority and does not provide for revisions against the
orders of the prescribed authority to whom appeals could be preferred under S. 64.
Central s. 64A can therefore preclude the
State Government from entertaining revisions against non-appealable orders of
the Regional Transport Authority, but cannot preclude the operation of Bihar S.
64A in regard to other orders. It is not provided in the Act that the order
passed by the State Transport Authority in the exercise of its revisional
jurisdiction under Central s. 64A would be final. If such a provision had been
made it might have been possible to urge.
that Parliament intended that the order of
the State Transport Authority in revision was not to be interfered with by any
authority. The absence of such an expression therefore leads to the inference
that Parliament did not intend that there be no interference with such orders
of revision. Further, it may be noticed that s. 64 does not exhaust the list of
all appealable orders. Its cl.(1) provides for an appeal by a person aggrieved
by any other order which may be prescribed. 'Prescribed' means 'prescribed by
rules made under the Act'. Subsection (1) of s. 68 empowers the State
Government to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions
of Chapter IV which consists of ss. 42 to 68. Sub-section (2) specifies certain
matters with respect to which rules be made. Its clause (za) mentions 'any
other matter which is to be or may be prescribed'. It follows that the State
Government can make rules providing for certain orders to be appealable under
s. 64 and thus reduce the orders which otherwise would come within the ambit of
Central s. 64A. The orders made appealable under the rules framed by a State
would not be open to revision under s. 64A as it provides for revisions against
non-appealable orders only. It is clear therefore that Parliament cannot be
imputed the intention to make the provisions of s. 64A to be so exhaustive and
complete as to lead to the necessary conclusion that thereby it intended to
repeal the provisions of Bihar s. 64A which gave power to the State of Bihar to
revise orders made by authorities or officers in proceedings under Chapter IV.
The provisions of Bihar s. 64A and Central s.
64A are not such that they cannot be complied with simultaneously, except for
the contingency already mentioned, i.e., when an application is 12 made to the
State Government by a person aggrieved by such an order of the Regional
Transport Authority which be not appealable under S. 64. In such a case, the
State Government cannot exercise its power under Bihar S. 64A against the
orders of the Regional Transport Authority, though it would be free to exercise
that power at a later stage after the State Transport Authority had disposed of
the revision, if any, made to it. Revision, in the first instance, against
non-appealable orders passed under Chapter IV must go to the State Transport
Authority as in respect of such orders Parliament must be taken to have varied
the provisions of Bihar s. 64A.
We therefore hold that Bihar S. 64A is
neither void nor has been repealed by Central s. 64A and that its scope has
been limited only to this extent that revisions against such orders of the
Regional Transport Authority which are not appealable have to be preferred to
the State Transport Authority.
In the present case the State Government of
Bihar revised the order made by the appellate authority. It was competent to do
so. The High Court was in error in holding otherwise.
We therefore allow the appeal with costs, set
aside the order of the High Court and restore that of the State of Bihar
granting permit to the appellant Jain.