Hari Narain Vs. Badri Das [1963] INSC
46 (4 March 1963)
04/03/1963 GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
HIDAYATULLAH, M.
SHAH, J.C.
CITATION: 1963 AIR 1558 1964 SCR (2) 203
CITATOR INFO:
R 1964 SC 345 (9) RF 1969 SC1273 (3) R 1971
SC 281 (8) F 1973 SC2056 (15) F 1974 SC 950 (8) R 1978 SC 765 (9)
ACT:
Supreme Court Practice-Revocation of Special
Leave granted earlier by Supreme Court-Effect of inaccurate, untrue and
misleading statements in Petition for Special Leave.
HEADNOTE:
The respondent filed a suit for the ejectment
of the appellant. That suit was dismissed by the trial Court. The respondent
filed an appeal in the Court of the Additional Sessions judge, Jaipur City. The
appeal was accepted and the claim of respondent for ejectment was allowed. The
appellant filed an appeal in the Rajasthan High Court, but that was dismissed.
The High Court also refused to grant a certificate of fitness to appeal to this
Court. The appellant filed a petition for Special Leave to appeal to this Court
and the same was allowed.
204 The respondent filed a petition in this
Court with a prayer that Special Leave granted to the appellant be revoked on
the ground that the appellant had made inaccurate, untrue and misleading
statements in the petition for Special Leave.
This Court also found that the appellant had
made certain wholly untrue statements in the petition for Special Leave.
Held, that Special Leave granted to the
appellant ought to be revoked and the appeal dismissed. It was observed that it
was of utmost importance that in making material statements and setting forth
grounds in applications for special leave, care must be taken not to make any
statements which are inaccurate, untrue and misleading. In dealing with
applications for special leave, this Court takes statements of fact and grounds
of fact contained in the petitions at their face value and it would be unfair
to betray the confidence of this Court by making statements which are untrue
and misleading.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION’: Civil Appeal
No. 14 of 1963.
From the judgment and decree dated July 30,
1962, of the Rajasthan High Court in Civil Regular S. A. No. 223 of 1961.
M. C. Setalvad, S. T. Desai and Naunit Lal
for the appellant.
G. S. Pathak and S. N. Andley, for the
respondent.
1963. March 4. The judgment of the court was
delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR J.-It is not necessary to deal with the merits of
the points which the appellant wanted to raise before us in this appeal because
we are satisfied that the respondent's prayer that the special leave granted to
the appellant should be revoked, is well-founded. The appellant is a tenant of
the premises in suit which are owned by the respondent. These premises were let
out to the appellant 205 by the respondent under a rent-note executed on December
8, 1953. The appellant was permitted to use the said premises for his Oil Mill.
The terms of the lease provided that the appellant was to pay to the respondent
the agreed rent every month and in case of default for three months, the
respondent was entitled to evict the appellant before the expiry of the
stipulated period which was five years, and in that case he was entitled also
to claim the rent for the remaining period.
On May 2, 1959, the respondent sued the
appellant for ejectment in the Court of Munsif, East Jaipur City. He alleged
that he had received the rent from the appellant up to October 31, 1957 and
that thereafter the appellant had defaulted in the payment of rent in spite of
repeated demands, and that even at the date of the suit he was in arrears of
rent and had failed to pay the house tax according to the agreement. His case
was that the appellant's tenancy had expired on December 1, 1958 by efflux of
time, but the appellant nevertheless failed to deliver over possession of the
premises to the respondent.
He, however, purported to deposit a lump sum
of Rs. 1053/to cover the period from November 1, 1957 to November 30, 1958
which was due from him. The respondent pleaded that the appellant had committed
more than three defaults in the payment of rent of two months each during the
period of 18 months and that even -at the date of the suit, the rent or mesne
profits for 5 months and 2 days still remained to be paid. That is the basis on
which a decree for ejectment was claimed by the respondent against the
appellant.
The appellant denied the respondent's claim
and alleged that the respondent was not entitled to claim ejectment against him
by virtue of the provisions of section 13(1)(a) of the Rajasthan Premises
(Control of Rent arid Eviction) Act, 1950 (Act XVII 206 of 1950) (hereinafter
called the Act). He also pleaded that by virtue of the fact that the respondent
had accepted rent paid by the appellant, he had waived his right to evict him.
In other words, he denied that there was any
default, and resisted the respondent's prayer for his ejectment. At the date of
the first hearing of the suit in the trial Court, the appellant deposited Rs.
648/on account of rent due up to the said date and the said payment was
accepted by the respondent without prejudice.
On these pleadings, the learned trial judge
framed four issues, the principal issue being whether the appellant had
committed three defaults of two months within the period of 18 months in the
payment of rent ? The finding of the trial Court on the said issue as well as
on the other issues framed by it was in favour of the appellant. In the result,
the respondent's suit was dismissed.
The respondent then preferred an appeal in
the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Jaipur City. The appellate Court
held that on the facts proved by the respondent, the three defaults had been
committed by the appellant, and so, he was entitled to a decree for ejectment.
On these findings, the decree passed by the trial Court was set aside and the
respondent's claim for ejectment was allowed.
The appellant challenged this decision by
preferring a second appeal before the Rajasthan High Court. This appeal was
heard by a learned single judge of the said High Court and was dismissed. The
appellant's request for leave to prefer an appeal under Letters Patent was
rejected by the learned Judge. It is against the decision of the learned single
judge in second appeal that the appellant applied for and obtained special
leave to appeal to this Court.
207 The main point which the appellant wanted
to urge before this Court was in regard to the construction of section 13 (1)
(a) of the Act read with section 13 (4), but as we have already indicated, we
do not reach the stage of dealing with the merits of this point, because we axe
satisfied that the material statements made by the appellant in his application
for special leave are inaccurate and misleading, and the respondent is entitled
to contend that the appellant may have obtained special leave from this Court
on the strength of what he characterises as misrepresentations of facts
contained in the petition for special leave. In the said petition, the
appellant has taken six grounds of appeal against the decision of the High
Court. The last ground is that the respondent had claimed eviction in the trial
Court on the basis of alleged non-payment and nontender of payment of rent from
December 2, 1958, but the First Appellate Court and the High Court setup a new
case for the landlord by taking into consideration the alleged defaults prior
to December 2, 1958 and not relied upon by the landlord himself. This ground
was presumably taken in support of the main argument that the High Court had
not correctly interpreted the provisions of section 13 (1) (a) of the Act.
The respondent contends that this is a
complete misstatement of the true position and in support of his argument he
has referred us to paragraph 3 in the plaint. It appears that the rent due from
the appellant for the period between November 1, 1957 to November 30, 1958,
which had fallen in default was deposited by him by cheque on December 2, 1958.
Paragraph 3 of the plaint specifically refers
to these defaults and in fact, takes into account the said defaults for the
purpose of setting up the respondent's case that the appellant had committed
more than three defaults in the payment of rent of two months each during the
period of 18 months. Therefore, there is no doubt that the unambiguous and
categorical 208 statement made in the last ground of the appellant's petition
for special leave is wholly untrue.
Similarly, it appears that in another ground
taken in the special leave petition, the appellant has made an equally
inaccurate statement. In this ground the appellant represented that by reason
of the payments made by him towards rent due from him to the respondent he had
become a statutory tenant and "admittedly did not make any default after
December 1, 1958." This statement must be read along with and in the light
of the material averments contained in paragraph 6 of the petition where the
appellant has stated that on the first hearing he deposited Rs. 648/on account
of rent due up to that date and the respondent accepted it.
Both these statements omit to refer to the
material fact that the deposit made in Court was accepted by the respondent
without prejudice, and so, the statement in the ground that the appellant
admittedly did not make any default after December 1, 1958, is equally untrue.
Mr' Pathak for the respondent urges that in view of these serious misstatements
contained in the petition for special leave, his client is justified in
assuming that special leave may have been granted to the appellant as a result
of the agreements urged by him on the strength of these misstatements, and so,
he has pressed his petition that the special leave granted to the appellant
should be revoked.
On the other hand, Mr. Setalvad contended
that he had appeared at the time when special leave was granted and to the best
of his recollection he had not referred to these grounds, but had merely urged
his contention that the High Court bad misconstrued s. 13 (1) (a) of the Act.
We have no hesitation in accepting Mr. Setalvad's statement ; but, in our
opinion, in dealing with the respondent's prayer that special leave granted to
the appellant should be 209 revoked, what was actually urged before the Court
cannot be decisive of the matter and may not even be very material.
It is true that in the present case, special
leave was granted on September 26, 1962 and it is possible for Mr. Setalvad to
recall what he argued before the Court when special leave was granted. But it
is necessary to bear in mind that the appeal may come on for hearing long after
special leave is granted, that counsel appearing at the stage of admission may
not be same as at the stage of final hearing, and the Bench that granted
special leave may not necessarily deal with the appeal at the final stage.
Therefore, it is no answer to the
respondent's contention that though the material statements in-the special
leave petition may be substantially inaccurate, though not wholly untrue, those
statements may not have influenced the Court in granting special leave. Mr.
Setalvad has also invited our attention to the fact that the impugned
statements and grounds are substantially copied from the averments made in the
appeal before the High Court. That may be so, but the fact still remains that
two important statements which, if true, may have been of considerable
assistance to the appellant in invoking the protection of s. 13 (1) (a) even on
the construction placed by the High Court on that section are found to be
untrue, and that, in our opinion, is a very serious infirmity in the petition
itself. It is of utmost importance that in making material statements and
setting forth grounds in applications for special leave, care must be taken not
to make any statements which are inaccurate, untrue or misleading. In dealing
with applications for special leave, the Court naturally takes statements of
fact and grounds of fact contained in the petitions at their face value and it
would be unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by making statements
which are untrue and misleading.
That is why we have come to the conclusion
that in the present case, special leave granted to the appellant ought to be
210 revoked. Accordingly, special leave is revoked and tile appeal is
dismissed. The appellant will pay the costs of the respondent.
Mr. Setalvad requested us to give the
appellant some time to vacate tile. premises. He invited our attention to thefact
that the appellant has invested large amounts in setting up machinery of the
Oil Mill which he is running in the premises in question. Mr. Andley for the
respondent has fairly conceded that on condition that the appellant unconditionally
undertakes to deliver possession of the premises to the respondent within six
months from the date of this judgment he would not execute the decree for
ejectment. Mr. Setalvad offered all unconditional undertaking on behalf of the
appellant as suggested by Mr. Andley. We accordingly direct that on the
appellant's undertaking, the respondent should not execute the decree for six
months from today.
Special leave revoked.
Appeal dismissed.
Back
