Jyotish Thakur & Ors Vs.
Tarakantjha & Ors  INSC 253 (11 September 1962)
11/09/1962 GUPTA, K.C. DAS
GUPTA, K.C. DAS GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
CITATION: 1963 AIR 605 1962 SCR Supl. (1) 13
CITATOR INFO :
R 1969 SC 204 (9)
Raiyati Land--Acquisition of superior
landlord's interest by raiyat--Raiyati interest, if merged in proprietor's
interest--Land tenure in Santhal Parganas--Rule of merger, if
applicable--"Bakasht Malik", meaning of--Regulation III of 1872,
S who was the owner of the raiyati interest
in the lands in question acquired the entire interest of the Lakhirajdar under
whom he was the raiyat. These lands were purchased by the appellants under a
deed dated May 15, 1935, from the successors in interest of S. The plaintiffs'
case was that no interest passed to the vendees by the sale deed because the
raiyati character of the land was existing on the date of transfer and this was
inalienable under the provisions of s. 27 of Regulation III of 1872. The trial
court took the view that the land did not retain its raiyati character after S
acquired the landlord's interest and so s. 27 of Regulation III was not
applicable. The High Court was of the opinion that the raiyati interest
recorded in the earlier settlement continued in spite of the entry
"Bakasht Malik" in the subsequent settlement and that the raiyati
interest could not be alienated by the sale deed dated May 15,1935.
Held, that S's raiyati interest was not
merged in his pro- prietary interest but continued side by side, and that his
successors in interest did not in law transfer the raiyati interest in the land
to the vendees in 1935.
The legal position as regards merger, apart
from statutory provisions, is that while the union of the superior and subordinate
interests will not automatically cause a merger, merger will be held to have
taken place if the intention to merge is clear and not otherwise. In the
absence of any express indication of intention, the courts will proceed on the
basis that the party had no intention to merge it if it is to his interest not
to merge and also if a duty lay on him to keep the interests separate. In
deciding the intention of the party the court will have regard also to his
conduct; there was, in the present case, no evidence of intention to merge and
S must be held to have intended to keep the two interests distinct and
14 The entry in the record of "Bakasht
Malik" against the land meant that the land which was formerly recorded as
in the cultivating possession of a raiyat under a landlord was in the
cultivating possession of the landlord himself.
Held, further, that s. 27 (3) of Regulation
III did not stand in the way of the plaintiffs getting relief in the civil
Semble, in the community village areas of the
Santhal Parganas which covered the greater part of the district, a raiyat has
not got the right to put an end to his raiyati interest even where he acquires
the superior interest. The doctrine of merger does not apply to the case of
raiyati holders in the Santhal Parganas.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 443 of 1959.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated
April 27, 1956, of the Patna High Court in L. P. A. No. 13 of 1954.
L. K. Jha and B. P. Jha, for the appellants.
Al. C. Chatterjee, A. N. Sinha and P. K.
Mukherjee, for respondents Nos. 1 to 7.
1962. September II. The judgment of the Court
was delivered by DAS GUPTA, J.-If a raiyat of lands in the District of Santhal
Parganas acquires the entire superior landlord's interest, does his raiyati
interest cease to exist or does he continue to be a raiyat in addition to
becoming a superior landlord ? This is the main question raised in this appeal
arising out of a suit for declaration and delivery of possession of 12 bighas,
16 kathas, 4 dhurs of land in Mauza, Chhatahara in the District of Santhal
Parganas. The plaintiffs and the four defendants, described in the plaint as
defendants 2nd party, are the successors in interest of one Santokhi Jha who
became owner of the entire raiyati interest in these lands many years ago. Sometime
after he became a raiyat of this land, Santokhi purchased by a registered deed
the entire interest of the 15 Lakhirajdar under whom he was the raiyat. On May
15, 1935, these lands were sold by the 2nd party defendants and others
including the plaintiffs 1 to 6, to the present appellants.
The plaintiffs' case is that no interest
passed to the vendees by that sale deed, because the raiyati character of the
land was existing on the date of transfer and this was inalienable under the
provisions of Regulation III of 1872.
It was further pleaded that this transfer of
1935 was fraudulent and collusive and that there was no legal neces- sity for
The defendants first party denied the
allegations of fraud or collusion and further pleaded that the transfer was
made for legal necessity for paying antecedent debts of the family and they are
therefore binding on the plaintiffs.
They also pleaded that the lands in the suit
were not, on the date of the sale, raiyati but Bakasht lands of the Malik and
so there was no bar to the sale of these lands under the provisions of
Regulation III of' 1872.
The Subordinate Judge, Dumka, who tried the
suit held that the sale was justified by legal necessity and that it was not
fraudulent or collusive. He further held that while the plaintiffs were not
estopped from challenging the sale deed it was binding on them. The learned
judge was also of the opinion that the land did not retain its raiyati
character after Santokhi, the raiyat, acquired the landlord's interest and in
that view rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the lands were inalienable
under the provisions of section 27 of the Regulation III of 1872. Accordingly
lie dismissed the suit.
On appeal by the plaintiffs the District
judge, Santhal Parganas, agreed with the findings of the Trial Court and held
that the suit had been rightly dismissed.
The plaintiffs then appealed to the High
Court of judicature at Patna. Before the High Court the 16 finding that the
sale deed was for legal necessity and there was no fraud or collusion were not
challenged. The entire argument in support of the appeal was that the raiyati
interest continued to exist inspite of the acquisition of the landlord's
interest by the sole raiyat, Santokhi, and the subsequent entry in the
settlement records showed that the lands were Bakasht Malik. The learned judge
(Banerjee, J.) who heard the appeal, was of opinion that there was no conflict
between the several entries in the record of rights the first of which showed
the lands as held by Santokhi as the raiyat while the later settlement records
showed lands as Bakasht Malik and that in law the raiyati interest continued
even after the raiyat acquired the superior landlord's interest. He was also of
the view that assuming that the equitable doctrine of merger could be applied
in such cases of "unity between the interests of the raiyat and the
landlord" in the Santhal Parganas, the facts and circumstances of this
case showed that there was no merger.
He also rejected the contention made by the
respondents that the plaintiffs were estopped from challenging the deed of
sale. Accordingly he allowed the appeal, holding that the sale was void with
regard to the raiyati interest.
The Letters Patent Appeal by the defendants
1st party from this decision was unsuccessful the learned judges who heard the
appeal being of opinion, in agreement with Mr. justice Banerjee, that the
raiyati interest recorded in the earlier settlement continued "inspite of
the entry 'Bakasht Malik' in the subsequent Settlements and the raiyati
interest could not be alienated by the sale deed of May 15, 1935." The
High Court, however, gave a certificate that as regards the value and nature of
the case it fulfilled the requirements of s. 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure
read with Article 135 of the Constitution of India and was a fit case for
appeal to this 17 Court. On that certificate the defendants first party have
preferred the present appeal.
The first contention which Mr. Jha urged in
support of the appeal is that after Santokhi acquired the Lakhirajdar s
interest, he ceased to be a raiyat. The argument is two- fold. First, he argues
that as a matter of law, there was an automatic merger of the raiyati interest
in the larger interest, the Lakhirajdar's interest. Secondly, it is argued that
at least Santokhi had the option to merge the raiyati interest in the
Lakbirajdar's interest, and he exercised that option. The first argument is
indeed the language of the law of merger at English common law. Black- stone in
his Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol. II, 4th Edition, p. 151 put the
matter thus " Whenever a greater estate and a less coincide and meet in
one and the same person without any intermediate estate, the less is immediately
annihilated; or in the law phrase, is said to be merged that is, sunk or
drowned in the greater". In England equity however soon stepped in to
modify the rigour of this doctrine by laying down that one must look at the
intention of the parties to decide whether there has been a merger or not. The
result of the statutory provisions in the Judicature Act of 1873 and later of
the Law of Property in 1925 has been that merger will be held to have taken
place only where, there would be a merger both at common law and in equity. For
puts the matter thus in his Law of Landlord and Tenant, 8th Edition, p. 643 :
if the circumstances are such that a Court of equity would formerly have held
that there was no merger in equity there is now no merger at law "When no intention
is expressed, the English courts in deciding what the intention was, looked to
the benefit of the person in whom the interests coalesce. On this question of
intention it has also been hold that a presumption will exist against merger
where it can be shown that it is either the duty or the interest 18 of the
person acquiring the outstanding estate that the two estates should be
preserved as separate interests. (Vide Re Fletcher,  1 Ch. 339).
We have referred to the doctrine of merger in
England even though there was no reference to it at the Bar-, for the reason
that the state of the law in England appears to have influenced the judicial
thinking in this country. As early as 1868 a question arose before the High
Court at Calcutta in Noomesh v. Rai Narain (1) whether the doctrine of merger
applied to the case of a Patni taluk coming into the hands of the Zamindar. The
Court answered the question in the negative. Sir Barnes Peacock observed in his
judgment thus:- "My own impression is that the doctrine of merger does not
apply to lands in the mofussil in this country. I believe it is the practice in
this country for Zamindars to purchase and keep on foot patni taluks with the
necessity of adopting the practice, which is followed in England, of purchasing
such taluks in the name of a trustee to prevent the merger of them.
If the doctrine of merger applies, a Zamindar
could not purchase and hold a patni tenure in khas possession." A similar
view was taken in Ruston v. Atkinson (2) and Savi v. Panchanan. (3) In Prosonna
v. jagat, (4) decided in 1878, the Court however held that while the union of
the superior and subordinate interests might not automatically cause a merger
of the latter in the former, the conduct of the party concerned might show that
he did not intend to keep the two interests alive as mutually distinct rights
and if this was shown, merger should be held to have taken place. In decision
of the Privy Council in Raja Kissen Dutt Ram v.
Raja Mumtaz Ali Khan, (1) (1868) 10 W. R. 15.
(3) (1876) 25 W. R. 503.
(2) (1869) 11 W. R. 485.
(4) (1878) 3 C. L. R. 159.
(5) (1879) I. L. R. 5 Cal. 198.
19 there was a statement in favour of the
possibility of merger of resumable birt tenures in a superior interest, where
the holder did not take steps to keep the two interests alive as distinct. In a
lager number of cases decided after this date the Calcutta High Court has taken
the view as in Prosonna v. Jagat (1) that where the conduct of the party
concerned showed that he did not intend to keep the two interests alive as
mutually distinct rights the union of the superior and subordinate interests
will result in merger of the latter in the former. (Vide Surja Narain Mandal v.
Nand Lall Sinha, (2) Ulfat Hossain v. Gayani Dass (3) and Promotha Nath Roy v.
Kishore Lal Sinha, (4 ) Dakshavani Dasi v. Amrita Lal Ghosh(5). A similar view
was indicated by the Patna High Court (Chamier, C.J., and Sharfuddin.j.) in
Lachanbati v. Bodhnath(6).
Statutory provisions as regards merger were
made in the Transfer of Property Act in 1882 and in the Bengal Tenancy Act in
1885-which was later extended to Bihar. These statutory provisions have,
admittedly no application to the present case. The legal position as regards
merger, apart from these statutory provisions, may be stated thus. That while
the union of the superior and subordinate interests will not automatically
cause a merger, merger will be held to have taken place if the intention to
merge is clear and not otherwise. In the absence of Any express indication of
intention, the courts will proceed on the basis that the party had no intention
to merge if it was to his interest not to merge and also if a duty lay on him
to keep the interests separate. In deciding the intention of the party the
courts will have regard also to his conduct.
To this general statement of law in India it
is necessary to add that there are special features in the land tenure in
Santhal Parganas which make it (1) (1878) 3 C. L. R. 159.
(3) (1909) I. L. R. 36 Cal. 802.
(5) (1919) 23 C. W. N. 826.
(2) (1906) I. L. R. 33 Cal. 1212.
(4) (1916) 21 C. W. N. 304.
(6) A. I. R. 1918 Pat. 651.
20 difficult for the law of merger to apply
there. The Santhal way of life favoured the emergence of a powerfull village
community with its special rights over all lands of the village. This community
of village raiyats has preferential and reversionary rights over all lands at
the village whether cultivated or uncultivated. (Vide Final Report on the
Survey and Settlement Operations in the District of Santhal Parganas'). There
is also in the majority of the villages of this district a headman who in'
addition to performing certain village duties collects rents from the raiyats
and pays it to the proprietor. The headman is not however a tenure holder. One
of his duties in that capacity is to arrange for settlement of lands in his
village which may fall vacant and available for settlement. All the raiyats in
the village are included in the jamabandi prepared for the village and it is
the headman's duty to settle the available land to one of the jamabandi
It does not require much imagination to see
that the interests of the village community as also of the headman are likely
to suffer if the land which as raiyati land would be included in the Jamabandi is
allowed to be taken out of the total quantity of the raiyati lands. If once
raiyati lands are allowed to lose their character as such a village may find in
the course of a few years the total stock of land available for settlement to
resident raiyats, dwindling before their eyes.
It was in this state of things that the
alienation of Raiyat's holdings in any form was interdicted by Government
orders in 1887. These had the immediate effect of checking the practice of open
transfer which had sprung up during the first years of Wood's Settlement; but
transfers in a disguised form continued and the officers had to be constantly
on watch to check the passage of village lands into the hands of persons whose
intrusion within the village community' was considered pernicious. (Appendix 21
XV of the Settlement Report of the Santhal Parganas). In his note on the
subject of the alienation policy of lands in the Santhal Parganas, Mr.
McPherson, expressed himself strongly against any sales in any form being
allowed. "To allow sales in any form' will, I think", runs the note,
""tend to weaken the communal system of the Santhal Parganas and the
position of the Pradhan. The root idea of the system is that all the cultivated
lands of the village belong in a way to the whole community".
His recommendation was accepted by the
Government and the result was the amendment of the prohibition of transfer in
Regulation III of 1872. As a result of the amendment section 27 stands thus : -
"27. (1) No transfer by a raiyat of his right in his holding or any
portion thereof, by sale, gift, mortgage, lease, or any othe r contract or
agreement, shall be valid unless the right to transfer has been recorded in the
record of rights, and then only to the extent to which such right is so recorded.
(2) No transfer in contravention of sub-
section (1) shall be registered, or shall be in any way recognised as valid by
any court, whether in the exercise of civil, criminal or revenue jurisdiction.
(3). If at any time it comes to the notice of
the Deputy Commissioner that a transfer in contravention of sub-section (1) has
taken place, he may, in his discretion, evict the transferee and either restore
the transferred land to the raiyat or any heirs of the raiyat who has
transferred it, or re-settle the land with another raiyat according to the
village custom for the disposal of an abandoned holding:- 22 Provided- (a) that
the transferee whom it is proposed to evict has not been in continuous
cultivating possession for twelve years, (b) that he is given an opportunity of
showing cause against the order of eviction, and (c) that all proceedings of
the Deputy Commissioner under this section shall be subject to control and
revision by the Commissioner".
It is important to remember this background
of a raiyat's rights and duties and the incidents of raiyati lands in
considering the question how far the doctrine of merger applies to the Santhal
Parganas. On behalf of the respondents Mr. Chatterjee has urged that a raiyat
is in law bound to keep his raiyati interest separate even when he acquires the
superior interest. There is, in our opinion, considerable force in this
contention. Even if we assume that it. will be in the interest of the raiyat
himself to put an end to his raiyati interest in order to remove the bar
against transfer, the interests of the village community to which he belongs
and the Pradhan make it obligatory on him to keep the raiyati interest in tact.
So, it seems to us prima facie that in the community village areas of the
Santhal Parganas which cover the greater part of the districts raiyat has not
got the right to pot an end to his raiyati interest even where he acquires the
superior interest. We are inclined to hold, as at present advised, that the
doctrine of merger does not apply to the case of raiyati holders in the Santhal
Parganas; but we do not wish to express a final opinion on this point in the
Even if we assume that it is open to a raiyat
to treat the raiyati interest as merged in the proprietary interest we are clearly
of opinion that the evidence in this case does not show that this was done by
Santokhi. In their attempt to show that Santokhi decided to treat raiyati
interest as merged in the Lakhirajdar 23 interest the appellants relied on Ex.
I--a certified copy of the order-sheet in Settlement Objection Case No. 41 of
1909. The objection was made by Santokhi in respect of the entry in the record
of rights of the land now in dispute.
After stating that Santokhi purchased the
Zamindari interest three years ago., the order reads thus : "Santokhi is
now the Zamindar and the sole raiyat in the village. It seems necessary to have
him as Pradhan now. He wants the village to be made Khas and his jote interest
as Bakasht Malik. I think this should be allowed. Submitted to Settlement
Officer." The Settlement Officer approved of the proposal and the record
was corrected accordingly by entering "Bakasht Malik" against this
land. Mr. jha has tried to persuade us that in making the prayer that his jote
interest should be recorded as Bakasht Malik. Santokhi was treating his raiyati
interest- as at an end. We are not impressed by this argument. Admittedly, the
phrase "Bakasht Malik" as used by settlement authorities means
"in the cultivation of the owner." At page 83 of the Settlement
Report on the Santhal Parganas we find the statement that "in a few
villages there are agricultural lands which formerly belonged to raiyats, but
have come into the hands of proprietors usually by purchase at auction sales in
the days when the courts were selling raiyati jots for arrears of rent. These
lands now entered as "bakasht malik" occur both in pradhani and khas
villages." In a foot-note an explanation of the word Bakasht Malik is
given thus :
"Bakasht Malik lands in the cultivating
possession of landlords, but not privileged". This is followed by a note
as regards "Khas Khamat" thus: "Khas Khamat--privileged lands in
the private possession of landlords." We are unable to see anything that
would justify Mr.Jha's argument that assertion of Bakasht Malik status carried
with it a negation of raiyati status of the land. When Santokhi prayed for
record of the land as "Bakasht Malik" all he wanted was the record 24
of the fact that the land which was formerly recorded as in the cultivating possession
of a raiyat under a landlord was in the cultivating possession of the landlord
himself. This correction of the former entry was needed because of the very
fact that Santokhi, the raiyat, had acquired the landlord's interest. It will
be reading too much into Santokhi's prayer to think that he asserted that he
had decided to put an end to the raiyati nature of the land and to treat his
raiyati interest as merged in the landlord's interest. It is proper to mention
also that, in our opinion, it was not really in Santokhi's interest that the
raiyati should cease to be such. So long as his raiyati interest was kept alive
he had the rights of a raiyat in the village jamabandi lands. These would cease
if his raiyati interest came to an end. What he might appear to gain by getting
rid of the bar against transfer would be more harmful to him and his family in
the long run.
All things considered, it seems to us clear
that it was to the benefit of Santokhi to keep the raiyati interest distinct
and separate from the Zamindari interest acquired by him. This was also, in a
way, his duty under the community village system in the Santhal Parganas. Even
if we were to hold therefore that the doctrine of merger applies to the Santhal
Paraganas to this extent that if the person in whom the two interests unite
choose to treat them as one the lesser interest should be held to have merged
in the larger interest, there is in the present case no evidence of such choice
and Santokhi must be held to have intended to keep the two interests distinct
Our conclusion therefore is that the raiyati
interest did not merge in the proprietary interest.
Mr. Jha's next contention that the entry in
the subsequent record of rights should prevail over any entry in an earlier
record would have been of assistance to his clients only if the entry of
Bakasht Malik amounted to a negation of the raiyati interest.
25 As we are of opinion that the entry
Bakasht Malik does not amount to such a negation and is a neutral expression as
regards the continuance or otherwise of raiyati interest there is in effect no
conflict between the earlier settlement entry and the subsequent entries and no
question as to which should prevail arises.
For the same reasons Mr. Jha's contention
that the decision of the Settlement Officer that the land was Bakasht Malik
operates as res judicata is beside the point; for, it is unnecessary for the
plaintiffs to challenge the correctness of that entry.
Another point raised by Mr. jha is that the
question whether the raiyati interest continued to exist after Santokhi
acquired the proprietary interest is a question of fact and the Trial Court and
the Court of First Appeal having held that that interest had ceased to exist it
was not open to the High Court in Second Appeal to go behind that finding.
It is not possible to say, however, in the
facts and circum- stances of the present case, that the question whether the
raiyati interest continued or not after Santokhi purchased the proprietary
interest is a pure question of fact. The decision of the question depended on a
correct appreciation of the doctrine of merger as applicable to Santhal
Parganas and so the question whether the raiyati interest continued to subsist
after Santokhi's purchase of the proprietary interest cannot but be considered
to be a mixed question of law and fact. There is, therefore, no substance in
the argument that the High Court was not justified in going behind the
conclusions of the Courts below.
The result of the conclusion that Santokhi's
interest was not merged in his proprietary interest and continued side by side
with his raiyati interest necessarily is that the sale by the plaintiffs and
other successors-in-interest of Santokhi in 1935 did not in law transfer the
raiyati's interest in the land to the 26 vendees. For, it is common ground that
the right to transfer raiyati interest was never recorded in the record of
rights as regards these lands.
As a last resort Mr. jha argued that in any
case the civil court has no jurisdiction in the matter and the only relief that
can be given when an invalid transfer of raiyati interest takes place is under
s.27 (3) of the Regulations.
This sub-section of s.27 gives a Deputy
Commissioner of the District the right to evict the transferee and either
restore the transferred land to the raiyat or any of his heirs or to re-settle
the land with another raiyat according to the village custom, if at any time it
comes to his notice that a transfer in contravention of sub-section 1 of s.27
had taken place. We can find no reason to think however that the provision of
this relief was intended to be exhaustive and to be a bar against any other
reliefs in the courts. Indeed, the provisions of sub-section 2 of s.27 that no
transfer in contravention of sub-section 1 shall be in any way recognized as
valid by any court, make it obligatory for the civil court when a dispute
arises as regards the title to lands to ignore transfers made in contravention
of s.27 (1). For the proper exercise of that obligation it is necessary for the
Court to decide whether in fact the transfer on the basis of which one of the
parties to the litigation bases his claim was really made in contravention of
s.27(1). If the Court is satisfied that there was such contravention the court
must necessarily proceed to dispose of the case on the basis that no title
accrued to the transferee by such transfer. The objection that s.27(3) stands
in the way of the plaintiffs' getting relief in the civil court cannot
therefore succeed. It may be mentioned that this objection was not taken on
behalf of these appellants in any of the courts below.
It remains now to notice the cases cited at
the Bar. In Sarda Devi v. Ram Louchan Bhagat (1) the Patna High Court held that
s. 27 of the Regulation (1) A I. R. 1926 Pat. 444.
27 (3 of 1872) does not prohibit the landlord
from transferring his interest in a raiyati holding if the landlord by some
means or other comes into possession of such holding. If this decision was
intended to lay down the law that the raiyati interest of the landlord also
passed by the transfer, we are of opinion that the decision was wrong. We find
however that the High Court was careful to point out that what was being sold
there-in a court sale-"was the right, title and interest of the
judgment-debtor's 4 annas Brahmottar interest and in the 62 bighas of land held
by her in the capacity of a Brahmottardar." That would be quite correct as
section 27 prohibits transfer of the raiyati interest and not of the landlord's
interest which may co- exist in a person along with Raiyati interest.
In Madan v. Kheelu(1) which was also cited by
Mr. Jha in support of his contentions, the Patna High Court had to consider
whether certain lands were Ghatwali lands of the plaintiffs' father. Before the
High Court a plea was raised that some of the properties in suit were recorded
in the Khatian Jamabandi of the year 1904 in the name of the defendants as
raiyat and so these were not Ghatwali lands of the defendants. It appeared that
in the Revision Survey and Settlement in 1932 the lands were recorded as Ire
appertaining to Mahal Ghatwali" belonging to Maharaj Rai Ghatwal, as his
Bakasht. The High Court held on a consideration of the provisions of s. 25 of
the Regulations that this 1932 entry prevailed. In that connection they also
held that entry Bakasht was sufficiently wide to include khud-kast, sir and
Zerait and that in the facts of the case before them it was proper to hold that
the entry of raiyat in the earlier record was wrong and ought to have been
merely Ghatwal. The learned judges laid emphasis on the fact that there was no
evidence before them to show to whom the alleged raiyati belonged or when it
came into the possession of Maharaj Rai and that (1) (1957) I.L.R. 36 Pat. 439.
28 on the other hand it was established that
the land was never the raiyati land of the appellant but was the pradhani jote
of Maharaj Rai Ghatwal. It is unnecessary for us to decide whether in the facts
and circumstances of that case the decision of the High Court was correct. We
need only say that this case did not purport to decide that the entry Bakasht
would always imply the negation of a raiyati right.
It may be mentioned that the attention of the
learned judges ,who decided this case was drawn to the High Court's decision in
the case now under appeal before us and they distinguished it by saying that
the earlier decision should be held to be a finding restricted to its own
facts. and circumstances.
Our conclusion therefore is that the High
Court was right in holding that the sale of May 15, 1935 was void with respect to the raiyati interest and only the right to receive rent passed by this
sale to the defendants first party.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed with