Minerva Mills Ltd. Vs. Their Workers
 INSC 56 (8 October 1953)
MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND MUKHERJEA, B.K.
CITATION: 1953 AIR 505 1954 SCR 465
CITATOR INFO :
E&D 1958 SC1018 (16,19)
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, ss. 7, 8,
10-Tribunal constituted for fixed period-Constitution of new tribunal for
hearing cases not fully disposed of by previous tribunal-Legality-Powers of
Under Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947, the appropriate Government has ample power to constitute an
industrial tribunal for a fixed period of time and to constitute a new tribunal
on the expiry of that period, to hear and dispose of all references made to the
tribunal which had not been disposed of by
APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos.
140 to 143 and 156 and 157 of 1953.
Appeals by special leave granted by the
Supreme Court by its Order dated the 23rd April, 1953, from the decision dated
the 19th December, 1952, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Third
Bench, Madras, in Appeals Nos. Bom. 245/52, 246/52, 247/52 and 248/52.
466 C.K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for
India, (I. B. Dadachanji, with him) for the appellants in all the appeals.
S.Mohan Kumaramangalam for the respondents in
Civil Appeals Nos. 140 to 143.
H. J. Umrigar for the respondents in Civil
Appeals Nos. 156 and 157.
1953. October 8. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by MAHAJAN J.-The Government of Mysore by a notification dated
15th June, 1951, under powers conferred by section 7 of the Industrial
*Disputes Act, 1947, constituted an Industrial Tribunal for a period of one
year consisting of a chairman and two members for the adjudication of
industrial disputes in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It appointed
the following persons as chairman and members thereof:Chairman : Rajadharmaprasakta
T. Singaravelu Mudaliar.
Members : Janab Mohamed Sheriff.
Sri S. Rangaramiah.
Two disputes between the management and the
workers of the Minerva Mills Ltd., Bangalore, and two other disputes between
the management and workers of the Mysore Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd.,
Bangalore, were referred to the said Industrial Tribunal under section 10 (1)
)c) of the Act for adjudication. Several other disputes were also referred for
adjudication to the same tribunal. Till the 15th June, 1952, when the period of
one year expired, the tribunal had only disposed of 5 out of the 22 disputes
referred to it. In the four disputes with which we are concerned ,the tribunal
had only framed issues and had not proceeded to record any evidence.
On 27th June, 1952, the Government by another
notification constituted another tribunal for adjudication of these disputes
and acting under section 10(1) (c) of the Act referred all the disputes left
undisposed of by the first tribunal to the newly constituted 467 tribunal. This
notification was not very happily worded and has been the subject matter of a
good deal of comment in the courts below and also before us. It runs thus :"Whereas
under Notification No. L.S. 1075-L.W. 68-51-2, dated 15th June, 1951 an
Industrial Tribunal for the adjudication of industrial disputes in accordance
with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was constituted for a
period of one year, And whereas the said period of one year has expired
creating a vacancy in the office of both the chairman and the two members,
namely, Chairman: Sri B. R. Ramalingiah.
Members : Janab Mohamad Sheriff.
Sri S. Rangaramiah.
Now therefore in exercise of the power
conferred under sections 7 and 8 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, H.H. the
Maharaja of Mysore is hereby pleased to constitute an Industrial Tribunal for
adjudication of industrial disputes in the Mysore State in accordance with the
-provisions of the Act and further to appoint the following persons as chairman
and members thereof Chairman Sri B. R. Ramalingiah.
Members Janab Mohamad Sheriff.
Sri K. Shamaraja Iyengar.
Under section 10 (1) (c) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, H. H. the Maharaja is pleased to direct that the tribunal
now constituted under this notification shall hear and dispose of all the
references made to the previous tribunal constituted under the notification of
15th June, 1951, and which have remained undisposed of on 15th June,
1952." When the second tribunal proceeded to hear the four disputes which
are the subject matter of these appeals, the employers raised a number of
preliminary objections regarding the jurisdiction of the tribunal to hear and
dispose of the disputes, the principal contentions being, (1) that the time
limit of one year fixed 468 for die life of the first tribunal was unauthorized
illegal and therefore the first tribunal continued to exist in spite of the
expiry of that period; (2) that the Government could not withdraw the disputes
referred to the first tribunal from it, so long as the members of the first
tribunal were available for discharging their duties and.
that section 8 had no application to the
facts of this case ; and (3) that the trial of these disputes by the newly
constituted tribunal, even if, it had jurisdiction to entertain them, could not
be started from the stage at which they were left by the first tribunal and
should begin de novo.
The employees contested these propositions
and contended that it was competent for the Government to constitute one or
more Industrial Tribunals under section 7 and it was open to it to prescribe
that these tribunals should function for a limited period; that the
notification dated the 27th June, 1952, was valid both under sections 7 and 8
of the Act and the second tribunal was properly constituted and had
jurisdiction over the disputes referred to it under section 10 (1) (c) of the
Act and that there was no need for a de novo trial in law.
The second tribunal rejected the preliminary
objections raised by the employers and came to the conclusion that the
Government was competent to constitute the first tribunal for a limited period,
that the second tribunal was properly constituted and that the references made
were proper and could be proceeded with from the stage at which the first
tribunal had left them. Against this order the employers preferred appeals' to
the Labour Appellate Tribunal, Nos. 245 to 248 of 1952. They also filed writ
applications under article, 226 of the Constitution of India before the Court,
C.P. Nos. 79 and 80 of 1952-53, for the issue of writs of prohibition
prohibiting the second tribunal from proceeding with the adjudication of the
four disputes, the subject matter of the appeals. The points that arose for
decision in the appeals as well as in the writ applications were substantially
the same. In these circumstances the High Court postponed hearing the 469 writ
applications till the appeals had been heard by the Labour Appellate Tribunal.
The Labour Appellate Tribunal by its order
dated 19th December, 1952, dismissed all the 'appeals and subsequently the High
Court of Mysore by its order dated 25th March, 1953, also dismissed the writ
applications. It, however, granted the employers a certificate of leave to
appeal to this court. The employers filed applications for special leave to
appeal against the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal passed in the appeals
before it, and this court granted special leave to appeal by an order dated
23rd April, 1953. The result is that we have four appeals now before us against
the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, C.A. Nos. 140 to 143 of 1953 and
two appeals before us from the order of the High Court refusing the application
of the employers under article 226 of Constitution, C.A. Nos. 156 and 157 of
As all these appeals raise a common question
of law they can conveniently be disposed of by one judgment.
Mr. Daphtary, who appeared for the employers,
contended that the four disputes between the ,employers and employees that were
referred to the Industrial Tribunal constituted by the notification of 15th
June, 1951, were still in law pending before that tribunal and it was that
tribunal and that tribunal alone that could adjudicate on them and give its
award on them and that the second tribunal constituted by the notification of
27th June, 1952, had no jurisdiction to entertain the references or to give any
awards concerning them. It was contended that under the Industrial Disputes Act
there is no power in the Government for appointing a tribunal for a limited
duration, and that its power is only to constitute a tribunal and to refer
certain disputes to it.
It is said that in the provisions of the Act
it is implicit that a tribunal once appointed can cease to function only after
the references made to, it have been exhausted, i.e., after it has given its
award. It 6-83 S.C. India/59.
470 was further urged that there is no power
in the Government once it has made a reference under section 10 of the Act to
withdraw it from the tribunal and to hand it over to another tribunal. It was
suggested that the members of the first tribunal should be directed to hear those
references and to give their award. In our opinion, none of these contentions
can be sustained on the provisions of the Act Section 7 of the Act provides as
"The appropriate Government may
constitute one or more Industrial Tribunals for the adjudication of industrial
disputes in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
(2)A tribunal shall consist of such number of
independent members as the appropriate Government may think fit to appoint, and
where the tribunal consists of two or more members, one of them shall be
appointed as the chairman thereof ..........".
Section 8 provides that if for any reason a
vacancy occurs in the office of the chairman or any other member of a court or
tribunal, the appropriate Government shall, in the case of a chairman, and may,
in the case of any other member, appoint another independent person, in
accordance with the' provisions of section 6 or section 7, as the case may be,
to fill the vacancy, and the proceedings may be continued before the court or
the tribunal so reconstituted.
Section 7 does not restrict or limit the
powers of the Government in any manner and does not provide that a tribunal
cannot be constituted for a limited period or for deciding a limited number of
disputes. From the very nature and purpose for which Industrial Tribunals are
constituted it is quite clear that such tribunals are not to be constituted
permanently. It is only when some industrial disputes arise that such tribunals
are constituted and normally such tribunals function so long as the disputes
referred to them are not disposed of. But from this circumstance it cannot be
inferred that it is not open to the Government to fix a time limit for the life
of these tribunals in order 471 to see that they function expeditiously and do
not prolong their own existence by acting in a dilatory manner. Mr. Daphtary,
however, contended that though the language of section 7 was wide enough to
include within its phraseology a power in the Government to constitute
tribunals for any period of time it thought fit, this wide construction of its
language had been limited by the other provisions of the Act. He made reference
to the provisions of section 4 which deals with conciliation officers.
Sub-section (2) of section 4 provides that a conciliation officer may be
appointed for a specified area or for specified industries in a specified area
or for one or more specified industries and either permanently or for a limited
period. It is obvious that the nature of duties of conciliation officers being
of a different character, provision has been made that they may be either
appointed permanently or for a limited period. From these provisions it is
difficult to infer the same or a different intention regarding Industrial
Tribunals. They may well be appointed ad hoc for a particular dispute. It was
for this reason that no restriction was placed on the powers of Government
regarding the constitution of tribunals, and Government was given very wide
discretion and it could appoint them for any limited time or for a particular
case or cases as it thought fit and as the situation in a particular area or a
particular case demanded. Reference was then made to the provisions of sections
15 to 20 of the Act for the proposition that once a reference is made to a tribunal,
the adjudication must be ,concluded by that tribunal and that tribunal alone
must give the award, and that the life of the tribunal cannot be cut short
between the date of the reference of the dispute for adjudication and the date
of the award. Section 15 provides that where an industrial dispute has been
referred to a Tribunal for adjudication, it shall hold its proceedings
expeditiously and shall, as soon as practicable, on the conclusion thereof,
submit its award to the appropriate Government. We are unable to see that any
inference 472 can be raised from the provisions of the section supporting the
contention of Mr. Daphtary. This is a provision directing the tribunal to
function expeditiously and give its award as soon as possible. Section 20(3) is
in these terms "Proceedings before a tribunal shall be deemed to have
commenced on the date of the reference of dispute for adjudication and such
-proceedings shall be deemed to have concluded on the date on which the award
becomes enforceable under section 17-A." This section lays down the date
or the terminus a quo for the termination and commencement of the proceedings.
It is difficult to see that it in any way cuts the power of the Government to
appoint a tribunal for a limited duration.
Reference was also made to the provisions of
section 33 which relate to the conditions of service during the pendency of the
proceedings in adjudication. It is provided therein that there shall be no
change in the conditions of service of the workmen pending adjudication. In our
opinion, the Labour Appellate Tribunal and the High Court were right in holding
that from these provisions it could not be held that it was implicit in section
7 that the Government could not withdraw a dispute referred to a tribunal or
make the appointment of a tribunal for a limited period of time. In our
opinion, under the provisions of section 7, the appropriate Government has
ample power of constituting a tribunal for a limited time, intending thereby
that its life would automatically come to an end on the expiry of that time.
The contention therefore of Mr. Daphtary that the notification appointing the
first tribunal for a period I of one year was illegal and that the first
tribunal continues to exist is without force. His further contention that the
Government could not withdraw the dispute referred to the first tribunal so
long as the members of the first tribunal were available and could not hand it
over to the 'second tribunal cannot also be sustained.